Policy evaluation programme vehicle safety standards: improving car crashworthiness by Ruth Welsh (1255239) et al.
 Policy Evaluation Programme 
Vehicle Safety Standards: 
Improving Car Crashworthiness 
PPAD 9/033/128 
S0221/VF 
 
 
 
 
 
Undertaken on behalf of  
 
Department for Transport 
 
 
Prepared by 
 
Ruth Welsh 
Richard Frampton 
Mo Bradford (Consultant) 
Vehicle Safety Research Centre 
ESRI, Loughborough University 
Simon Roberts 
Judith Unell 
Centre for Research in Social Policy 
Loughborough University 
 
 
 
 
January 2006 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
Table of Contents 
Executive Summary .........................................................................................1 
1 Introduction .............................................................................................11 
1.1 The Relationship Between DfT and TRL ................................................11 
1.2 Context ...................................................................................................12 
1.3 Aims and Objectives ...............................................................................13 
2 Background.............................................................................................15 
2.1 Historical framework for vehicle safety policy development in Europe....15 
2.2 Research and development in car crash protection................................17 
2.3 Frontal impact Protection........................................................................19 
2.4 Side impact protection ............................................................................23 
2.5 The growth of consumer information ......................................................25 
3 Methodology ...........................................................................................30 
3.1 Quantitative Data ....................................................................................30 
3.2 Qualitative Data ......................................................................................31 
4 Quantitative Analysis ..............................................................................33 
4.1 National Accident Data Analysis .............................................................33 
4.1.1 Car Occupant Casualty Trends ................................................34 
4.1.2 Analysis based on Vehicle Age ................................................37 
4.1.3 Summary of Findings - National Accident Data ........................39 
4.2 CCIS Data Analysis ................................................................................44 
4.2.1 Summary of CCIS Analysis Results .........................................45 
4.3 Discussion ..............................................................................................51 
4.4 Basic Cost Benefit Analysis (1990-2002)................................................55 
4.4.1 Costs ........................................................................................55 
4.4.2 Benefits ....................................................................................58 
5 The Qualitative Data ...............................................................................62 
5.1 Part 1: Impact .........................................................................................62 
5.1.1 The Regulations .......................................................................62 
5.1.2 EuroNCAP................................................................................79 
5.2 Part 2: Process .......................................................................................98 
5.2.1 The Regulations .......................................................................98 
5.2.2 EuroNCAP..............................................................................117 
5.3 Summary of Qualitative Data ................................................................130 
5.3.1 Regulations versus Consumer Testing...................................130 
6 Conclusions ..........................................................................................136 
7 References ...........................................................................................144 
8 Acknowledgements...............................................................................148 
9 Glossary................................................................................................149 
 
Appendix 1 Quantitative Analysis Figures and Charts 
Appendix 2 Time Line 
Appendix 3 Topic Guides 
 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF  VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
Executive Summary
Introduction 
This project aims to offer a comprehensive identification, evaluation and 
understanding of the extent to which the Department for Transport (DfT) has 
met policy aims for road casualty reduction through its contribution to 
regulations, in particular the development of the front and side impact 
Economic Commission for Europe Directives (ECE R94 and ECE R95) and 
the European New Car Assessment Programme (EuroNCAP). 
 
Methodology 
The quantitative analysis has three distinct and complementary elements: 
• an analysis of  the GB Road Accident Database Statistics (STATS 19); 
• an examination of the UK Co-operative Crash Injury Study (CCIS) 
database; 
• a basic cost-benefit analysis. 
In the accident data analysis, vehicles were divided into two distinct groups; 
those pre regulation and those post regulation. Comparisons were made 
between the two groups considering the impact direction, the impact object 
and the gender / age of the occupants (older or younger than 50 years).  
 
The cost benefit analysis was based on project and staff costs provided by 
DfT and casualty trends within the STATS19 data.  
 
The qualitative analysis was based upon responses to in-depth interviews 
with experts drawn from government, vehicle safety research, the motor 
manufacturing industry and consumer organisations in the UK and Europe.  
The analysis had two dimensions: impact and process. The impact dimension 
presented respondents’ views on what difference the front and side impact 
regulations and EuroNCAP had made to the levels of protection offered to 
occupants in a car accident. The process dimension reported on the views 
and experiences of the processes which had brought the regulations and 
EuroNCAP into effect. 
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Quantitative Data Results 
STATS 19 database 
An analysis was made of the STATS19 data base for the years 2001-2003 
and car occupant killed or seriously injured (KSI) rates considered. The results 
indicate: 
 
Car to car impacts 
• Benefits in post regulation vehicles for all drivers across all directions of 
impact. 
• Benefits in post regulation vehicles for front seat passengers (FSP) 
across all directions of impact except for female FSPs in frontal impacts 
and older FSPs in right side impacts who saw disbenefits. 
• Disbenefits in post regulation vehicles for all rear seat passengers 
(RSP) in frontal impacts, for female and older RSPs in rear impacts, for 
older RSPs in right side impacts and for male and for older RSPs in left 
side impacts. 
 
Car to non car impacts 
• Benefits in post regulation vehicles for all drivers across all directions of 
impact except for female drivers in left side impacts who saw 
disbenefits. 
• Benefits in post regulation vehicles for all FSPs across all directions of 
impact except for female FSPs in rear impacts who saw disbenefits. 
• Benefits in post regulation vehicles for all RSPs across all impact 
directions except for older RSPs in front, rear and left side impacts who 
saw disbenefits. 
 
CCIS database 
Weighted data from the CCIS database were analysed for the period 1995-
2005 to gain a better insight into occupant injury outcomes for each body 
region in frontal, struck and non-struck side crashes. The results show: 
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Frontal impacts 
• Drivers have seen an improvement in head protection in post regulation 
vehicles for both car to car and car to non-car impacts but this is not 
the case for front seat passengers.  
• Chest injury outcome has improved for all front seat occupants. For 
pelvic injuries improvements are seen for all drivers in car to non car 
impacts but disbenefits are apparent for male drivers and older drivers 
in car to car impacts.  
• Post regulation vehicles offer better thigh protection to front occupants 
in car to car impacts but such benefits are not as apparent, particularly 
for FSPs, in car to non car impacts.   
• Whilst drivers have improved knee protection in car to non car impacts, 
female drivers and younger drivers show an increased risk of serious 
injury in the post regulation cars; there is a lack of data to comment on 
knee injuries for FSPs.  
• Lower leg protection has improved all round for drivers but it is not 
possible to draw conclusions for FSPs.   
• With foot and ankle injury, female and younger drivers appear 
disadvantaged in newer vehicles for car to car impacts but there are 
improvements for all drivers in car to non-car impacts.  Where the data 
supports the analysis the foot/ankle outcome for FSPs is generally 
better in the newer cars, the exception being for female drivers in car to 
non car impacts.  
• With respect to facial, neck and abdominal injuries, the data does not 
support robust conclusions. 
 
Struck-Side Impacts 
• Post regulation vehicles offer improved cranium, chest and lower leg 
protection for all front occupants in car to car impacts. However, only 
the older occupants see benefits in car to non car impacts (excluding 
chest injury outcome). 
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• Mixed gains are apparent for neck injury. In car to car impacts there are 
improvements for female and younger occupants only and there are 
disbenefits across the board for car to non car impacts. 
• For abdominal injury outcome, female and older occupants see 
disbenefits in the post regulation vehicles for car to car impacts whilst 
in car to non car impacts only the younger occupants appear to be 
disadvantaged. 
• General improvements are noted for thigh protection, the exception 
being female front occupants in car to car impacts. 
• The data does not support robust conclusions with respect to facial, 
pelvis, knee or foot/ankle injury outcome. 
 
Non Struck-Side Impacts 
• Cranium protection has improved in all non struck-side impacts except 
for females in car to non car impacts, though a result for the older 
occupants in car to car impacts could not be calculated. 
• Chest injury outcome has improved for all but the older occupants in 
car to car impacts but conversely, there appear to be disbenefits for all 
but the elderly in car to non car impacts though this result needs to be 
treated with caution. 
• The sample size and scarcity of injury did not allow for robust 
conclusions to be drawn for any other body regions. 
 
Cost benefit analysis 
The cost benefit analysis showed an average annual reduction of 3.9% in the 
number of car occupants with KSI outcome between 1999 and 2003. The 
relative contribution to improved outcomes of research into crashworthiness 
should increase as recent vehicle models become more widespread across 
the fleet.  
 
The year-on-year fall of accidents involving serious injury over the past ten 
years represents considerable savings. For one year alone, 2002-3, the fall in 
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the number of seriously injured occupants equates to savings of more than 
£196 million at 2001 prices. 
 
Qualitative Data Findings 
Impact 
Regulations: A clear majority of respondents said that the front and side 
impact regulations had enhanced the protection of car occupants in an 
accident. They believed that the regulations were qualitatively superior to 
previous testing regimes, singling out the side impact test and the offset 
barrier test for frontal impact as critical elements.  
 
The regulations were not, however, seen as promoting continuous 
improvement in crashworthiness; rather, they were said to have produced a 
step change at a particular moment by setting minimum standards which then 
became fixed. 
 
Most respondents agreed that without the regulations motor manufacturers 
would have introduced piecemeal improvements as the necessary technology 
became available but these would not have created a consistent safety 
standard across the industry.  
 
Whole vehicle testing was widely regarded as the indispensable basis of an 
effective safety regime.  
 
While it was agreed that the regulations had led manufacturers to optimise 
their cars in order to meet test requirements, views differed as to whether this 
had created significant disbenefits for certain vehicle users. Some expressed 
concerns that female and older drivers, rear seat passengers and children had 
been significantly disadvantaged.  
 
Most respondents did not have a firm view as to whether regulation had 
resulted in additional problems of compatibility.  Compatibility between cars 
and heavier vehicles, particularly lorries, remained an important and largely 
unresolved issue. 
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None of the interviewees believed that the regulations had resulted in vehicles 
that were less pedestrian friendly. But neither did they consider that they had 
made much positive impact upon pedestrian safety.  
 
Opinion was divided about whether the speed of the regulatory tests should 
be raised to that used by EuroNCAP. Several argued for maintaining a 
separation between the requirements of the regulations and EuroNCAP in 
order to discourage optimisation at a single point. 
 
EuroNCAP: There was near unanimity that protection for car occupants had 
improved since the introduction of EuroNCAP, which had stimulated 
continuous improvement in crashworthiness performance by diffusing the 
most advanced levels of protection throughout the industry.  
 
Virtually everyone believed that optimisation of vehicles was an inevitable 
consequence of EuroNCAP although, as in the discussion of the regulations, 
there was disagreement about the extent and nature of disbenefits to the non 
50th percentile male.  
 
Views about the effect of EuroNCAP on compatibility and pedestrian 
friendliness were tentative, most believing that it had neither brought 
improvements nor made things worse.  
 
Most believed that EuroNCAP had influenced consumer attitudes towards 
purchasing cars, although it was difficult to know how consumers balanced 
safety against other criteria.   
 
There was near unanimity that EuroNCAP ratings had exercised a powerful 
positive impact upon investment by the industry in improving car 
crashworthiness.  
 
Opinion within the group was divided about the value of consumer-oriented 
publications such as “Choosing Safety”, based upon retrospective analysis of 
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real world accident data. Some argued that these were more comprehensive 
and transparent than EuroNCAP, while others questioned the capacity of 
retrospective ratings to influence current and future design.  
 
While agreeing that EuroNCAP should continue and that its funding should be 
sustained and improved, the respondents expressed different views about its 
future role and priorities. Some felt that priority should be given to extending 
the existing testing regime while others believed that more resources should 
be diverted into primary safety.  
 
Process 
Regulations: Technical research into key aspects of occupant safety was 
identified as a primary driving force behind the regulations. Whole car crash 
testing was integral to this research and the UK government was 
acknowledged as a leader in this field because of the work undertaken in the 
Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) at the DfT from the early 1980s.  
 
Much effort was devoted to creating a suitable barrier for frontal impact and a 
dummy for side impact. Some believed that the nature of the barrier for side 
impact had received too little attention, with the result that the efficacy of this 
test had been undermined. 
 
The commitment of individuals was said to have been critical to the 
formulation of the regulations. They were variously to be found in research, 
consumer and government institutions, both national and European. The TRL 
was singled out as having provided a particularly sympathetic environment for 
safety champions and CCIS was said to have injected an urgency into the 
safety agenda by demonstrating a level of personal and social cost from road 
accidents that was politically unacceptable. 
 
There was general agreement that co-operative effort across Europe, for 
example in the European Experimental Vehicle Committee (EEVC)  and the 
European Transport Safety Council (ETSC), had been an indispensable pre-
condition for the successful implementation of the regulations. At the later 
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stages, the decision by the European Parliament to reject the Commission’s 
weakened draft directives had been critical to the implementation of effective 
regulations.  
 
National governments were said to have differed markedly in the extent to 
which they promoted vehicle safety, with the UK and the Netherlands 
consistently described as the leading advocates.   
 
There was a striking difference of perspective between motor industry 
representatives and other respondents about the extent to which the industry 
had opposed the introduction of the front and side impact regulations. The 
main sticking points in the formulation of the regulations were said to have 
been technical in nature: crash testing versus computer simulation for side 
impact collisions, the nature of the barrier for frontal impact crash testing, the 
height of the side impact barrier, and the speed of the tests. 
 
There was a fair level of agreement that the financial burden to industry of 
meeting the regulations had been slight, although somewhat greater for side 
impact than for frontal impact.  
 
EuroNCAP: A sense of frustration with the delays and difficulties of the 
regulatory process was described as a primary driving force behind 
EuroNCAP. Leading safety champions had begun to look to consumer testing 
as a potentially more effective route for achieving improvements in 
crashworthiness. Models for consumer testing had already existed elsewhere, 
particularly in the United States. 
 
The UK government was widely credited with having initiated EuroNCAP 
through its support for the United Kingdom New Car Assessment Programme 
(UKNCAP) programme at the TRL, followed by its political orchestration for 
cross-national support for an expanded European programme. But it was 
recognised that the UK could not have launched EuroNCAP without the 
support of European allies.  
 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF 8 VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
Almost all respondents agreed that individual manufacturers and bodies 
representing the industry had been hostile towards EuroNCAP at the outset 
but that industry opposition had subsequently evaporated. Good ratings in 
EuroNCAP had provided manufacturers with a valuable opportunity to 
distinguish themselves in a crowded marketplace.  
 
Most respondents agreed that EuroNCAP had been more successful than 
previous consumer testing approaches in exerting pressure on manufacturers 
to improve safety. Nonetheless, concerns remained amongst some 
manufacturers about aspects of the programme, including its benefits in terms 
of real world safety.  
 
Very little information was obtained from the interviews about the costs of 
designing cars to meet EuroNCAP requirements but it was clear that 
manufacturers had found them burdensome. 
 
Most respondents believed that both the regulation and EuroNCAP would 
continue to be important in the future and that the linkage between them, 
through research and test protocols, should be maintained.  
 
Conclusions 
The front and side impact regulations and EuroNCAP have exercised a 
positive and sustained impact upon car occupant safety in the UK.  The 
regulations have provided a basic safety platform that has ensured a minimum 
standard for all vehicles, and EuroNCAP has harnessed competition between 
manufacturers to raise safety standards. 
 
Whole vehicle testing has been the indispensable basis of effective predictive 
tests and much credit can be given to the UK government for providing 
technical leadership in this field.   
 
At national government level, the UK’s contribution to securing progress in 
frontal and side impact protection through the regulations and consumer 
testing was clearly substantial and indeed indispensable in the case of 
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EuroNCAP.  The UK also orchestrated the necessary political support in the 
European arena. 
 
The DfT’s Transport Technology and Standards Division (TTS) research 
programme has been highly cost effective and has made a vital and effective 
contribution to the key policy objective of reducing serious road casualties. 
 
The increased KSI outcome for RSPs in car to car frontal impacts and the 
uneven distribution of injury mitigation by body region between drivers and 
passengers across the impact scenarios considered remain matters of 
concern. These present challenges for the regulations and EuroNCAP to 
address through improvements to their testing regimes.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The Relationship Between DfT and TRL 
During the time frame covered by this project, the Department for Transport 
(DfT) has taken a number of different names. These are as follows: 
 
Pre 1990-May 1997   Department of Transport (DOT) 
May 1997-June 2001   Department of the Environment, Transport and  
    Regions (DETR) 
June 2001-May 2002   Department for Transport, Local Government and 
    the Regions (DTLR) 
May 2002-Present  Department for Transport (DfT)  
 
 
Within the Department for transport, the Transport Technology and Standards 
(TTS) Division has variously been called: 
Vehicle Standards and Engineering (VSE) - 1991  
 
Vehicle Technology and Standards (VTS) - 2004 
  
Transport Technology and Standards (TTS) - 2005 
 
TRL was first established in 1933 as an experimental station of the Ministry of 
Transport Roads Department and later as the Road Research Laboratory 
(RRL) in the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). It was 
funded through the DSIR but the research programme was determined by the 
Director, with advice from an Advisory Board which included members from 
the Transport Ministry. 
 
On 1st April 1965, RRL became an integral part of the DfT and was funded 
direct from the vote. The research programme remained the responsibility of 
the Director through agreement with Research Committees.  
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In April 1992, TRRL became a Government Agency and bid for research 
contracts from the DfT, who now held the research budgets, with provision 
also for winning work competitively from other public and private bodies, in 
competition with other research organisations. 
 
On 1st April 1996, TRRL became a fully private limited company known as 
TRL Limited, wholly owned by the Transport Research Foundation, a non-
profit distributing company and a Scientific Research Association. Under its 
independence of ownership, TRL works throughout the world undertaking 
independent and impartial research for clients in both the public and private 
sectors. 
 
Throughout this report the acronyms DfT, TTS and TRL will be used to refer to 
the Department for Transport, the Transport Technology and Standards 
Division and the Transport Research Laboratory respectively. 
 
1.2 Context 
 
In order to support the DfT’s aims to ensure that the UK has a modern 
integrated transport system that is safe, sustainable and minimizes the impact 
on society, the TTS division has a broad based research programme directed 
towards minimizing the number of road accidents and resulting casualties as 
well as towards reducing the impact of vehicles on the environment. 
Specifically, the Government’s commitment to road safety requires a reduction 
in the number of KSI road users by 40 percent, with an equivalent figure for 
children of 50 percent, by 2010 when compared with the average for 1994-
1998. 
 
Improvements in car crashworthiness have been shown to be highly effective 
in reducing the number and severity of occupant injuries. A driving force 
behind such improvements is the requirement for new vehicles to pass 
regulatory tests and a desire by the manufacturers to perform well in the 
consumer tests, namely EuroNCAP. Research directed towards the 
development of these tests has, over the past 10-15 years, formed a 
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substantial part of the secondary safety element of the TTS research 
programme. Much of this research was carried out by TRL.  See section 1.1 
for the historic relationship between DfT and TRL. 
 
The DfT currently has a requirement to assess the effectiveness of its 
research programme in meeting the Policy aims and objectives. It is the 
beneficial contribution that Departmental initiatives have made to regulatory 
and consumer tests that form the basis for this evaluation. 
 
It is recognized that the current European front and side impact regulations 
and also EuroNCAP were very much UK government led initiatives. However, 
over the years, there has been increasing involvement at a European level. 
For the purposes of this Policy evaluation it is necessary to distinguish the 
input made by the UK government within the overall development of the test 
programmes. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
 
The primary aim of this project was to provide a comprehensive and objective 
identification, evaluation and understanding of the extent to which 
Departmental activities have met Policy aims in terms of road casualty 
reduction by considering how Regulatory testing and EuroNCAP have 
contributed to advances in car safety. 
 
To this end, the project objectives were to identify, comprehend and assess 
the different ways in which the Department has contributed to car 
crashworthiness specifically through its input into the front and side impact 
Directives (ECE R94  and ECE R95) and the EuroNCAP test programme. 
Particular consideration was given to addressing the following questions: 
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• Which particular groups in society have been affected and in what 
ways? 
• What is the general balance to society arising from the Directives and 
EuroNCAP? 
• To what extent have the Department's interventions prompted a 
process of continuous improvement? 
• Would the outcomes have happened without intervention? 
• What resources have been put into the programme to deliver the net 
benefits? 
• What is the added value of these interventions in terms of casualty 
reductions and value for money? 
• What mechanisms and processes proved most effective in developing 
and implementing policy and why? 
• Could the programme have been managed and/or delivered differently 
to improve the return on this investment? 
• Are there any lessons Government should learn in terms of policy 
making and/or programme delivery strategy? 
 
The impact and processes of the Directives and EuroNCAP were evaluated in 
order to determine which have been most successful in meeting the Policy 
aims and objectives and recommendations have been made at the end of this 
report for potential improvements where these were identified.  
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2 Background 
 
Substantial improvements in vehicle safety design have taken place over the 
last ten years in Europe leading to a large reduction in fatal and serious injury 
risk amongst car occupants. These results are due to a combination of the 
effects of new European legislative standards and the impact of new 
predictive and retrospective consumer information systems providing objective 
data on the performance of cars in state of the art crash tests and real 
crashes.  
 
The outcomes in legislative and consumer information development, 
contested at the time by the European car industry, came about as a result of 
leadership from policymakers in the UK in initiating and supporting substantial 
research and legislative development. This was backed up by European 
Parliamentarians from the main parties and advocacy from consumer, safety 
and motoring organisations.   
 
This section of the report traces such developments with reference to the 
growing scientific knowledge-base and the key role played by UK vehicle 
safety professionals, whether policymakers, researchers, Parliamentarians or 
advocates in efforts to secure long overdue, research-based improvements in 
front and side impact protection in cars. 
2.1 Historical framework for vehicle safety policy 
development in Europe 
 
International harmonisation in standards affecting vehicle construction and 
use in the UK has taken place since 1958 following the signing of the United 
Nations (UN) agreement supervised by the Inland Transport Committee’s 
Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles in Geneva (WP 29)1.   This 
provided the framework for a voluntary type approval system based on United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) Regulations. The 
principal objective of such UN ECE harmonisation was the removal of trade 
barriers. Such harmonisation provided many advantages for trade and 
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industry and freed them from having to meet a variety of national regulations. 
However, success in securing a high level of safety and consumer protection 
harmonisation proved to be elusive given the opposition of the car industry to 
prescribed design and performance standards and their concern that these 
might inhibit future freedom in styling.  
 
In the US, interest in unsafe vehicle design was awakened in the late 1960s 
by a well-publicised design fault in the Chevrolet Corsair, the work of Ralph 
Nader and debates surrounding the mandatory installation of safety 
improvements such as seat belts in cars 2.  Following a 1965 report by a 
Congressional Committee – the Ribicroft Committee, the first Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) were issued in 1967 3.  These rules, on 
which many European standards were largely based, were described as 
arbitrary design rules lacking in comprehensive justification by Mackay4. 
 
In 1985, the European Regulations Global Approach (ERGA) passive safety 
group was set up by the European Commission and Member States to study 
the possibilities for adapting existing European Economic Committee (EEC) 
Directives to technical progress.   
 
By the late 1980s/early 1990s, concern amongst European vehicle safety 
professionals about the length of time taken for the legislative process to keep 
abreast of technical progress in the interest of safety had increased.  
 
In 1992, the TRL produced estimates, which were to be used widely in the 
legislative debates, that improved crash test procedures could lead to a 
saving of 65,000 deaths and serious injuries in frontal impacts and some 
25,000 fewer deaths and serious injuries in side impacts in European Union 
(EU) countries annually 5. A report by the ETSC in 1993 concluded that many 
European vehicle safety standards were some 20 years behind the needs 
identified by road crash injury research 6. 
 
As the European Union developed and more countries joined, a new 
framework, new impetus and more opportunity for international agreement 
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and co-operation on vehicle safety initiatives in Europe emerged.  The main 
developments comprised: EEC Directives permitting EU-wide requirements 
for the type approval of vehicles (1970) 7; Single Market requirements for the 
provision of a high level of consumer protection in harmonised standards 
(1987) 8; EU Whole Vehicle Type Approval for cars (1992 coming into full 
effect in 1996) 9; and Maastricht Treaty changes giving the EU shared powers 
with Member States for road safety as well as co-decision powers for the 
European Parliament with the Council of Ministers in transport and road safety  
policy (1993) 10.  
 
As this new framework emerged, together with a new political willingness to 
take action on road safety at EU level, the 1990s saw unprecedented 
opportunity to make progress in vehicle safety 11.  Due to the leadership and 
pressure from various Member States (UK, The Netherlands and the Nordic 
countries), European Parliamentarians and consumer (Bureau Europeen des 
Consommateurs BEUC), safety (ETSC) and motoring organisations; 
Federation Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) and Alliance Internationale de 
Tourism (AIT), the EU institutions were encouraged to take research-based 
legislative action on front and side impact protection. 
 
At the same time, as a result of the lack of responsiveness of the European 
regulatory process to safety needs, a new predictive consumer information 
system (the New Car Assessment Programme) emerged. This was initiated 
by the UK government, co-sponsored by Sweden, the Netherlands, consumer 
and motoring organisations which stimulated the European car industry to 
deliver higher levels of front and side impact protection than required by 
regulation in a range of models.   
 
2.2 Research and development in car crash protection 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s in-depth accident research and analysis at 
the Birmingham University Accident Research Unit (founded in 1964) provided 
the first insights nationally into the nature and sources of injury sustained by 
car occupants in frontal and side impacts. This work highlighted the 
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importance of maintaining the integrity of the passenger compartment in 
frontal and side impacts and the huge potential for casualty reduction by 
improved car crash protection 12,13,14 . 
 
In response to the US Department of Transportation’s initiative for an 
international programme on the experimental safety of vehicles, European co-
operation on research and development on safer vehicles was established in 
1970 in the form of the EEVC.  Set up by the governments of France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom to 
focus on crash safety, EEVC working groups comprise governmental 
representatives and industrial experts who undertake research and 
development of test methods, tools and requirements 15 . Scientists from TRL 
representing the UK government played a key role in chairing Working Groups 
on frontal and side impact protection and in developing the legislative tests, 
requirements and tools.  
 
The 1970s and 1980s saw much development in knowledge about the 
biomechanics of injury through in-depth accident research and cadaver 
testing.  Crash dummy development advanced with the introduction of the 
HYBRID III dummy in 1975 in the US.  The biennial Experimental Safety of 
Vehicles (ESV) conferences provided the international focus for shared 
information and government status reports on scientific development and 
adaptation to technical progress. 
 
During the 1980s crash research in the UK intensified with whole car testing 
for research purposes beginning at TRL in 1980 and with the establishment of 
the CCIS in 1983 bringing together Birmingham and Loughborough 
Universities, the TRL, the DfT and various car manufacturers 16.  In 1987, the 
first UK casualty reduction target was set. In order to achieve it the strategy 
identified the substantial contribution that could be made by improvements in 
vehicle crash protection 17.  By 1990, the collection and analysis of real world 
accident data had increased in importance and support as a policymaking tool 
in the national programme. 
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2.3 Frontal impact Protection 
The first legislative (48km/h) and consumer information (56km/h) frontal crash 
tests were introduced in the US using a 100% full width frontal barrier test in 
1978 18.  
 
Over the next 15 years, in-depth research in the UK and elsewhere continued 
to show that the vast majority of car crashes nationally were partial overlap 
offset frontal crashes 19-22. The safety engineering need was to improve the 
front car structure so it could sustain severe offset impacts with little or no 
intrusion of other vehicles or objects, so minimizing the risk of serious and 
fatal injury.  The importance of leg injury, in addition to head and chest injury 
in frontal impacts was also established 23-26.  Such work highlighted the need 
for a European frontal crash protection standard which could better reproduce 
real-world conditions than the 100% full-width frontal barrier test, although the 
latter is acknowledged to be an appropriate test for occupant restraint system 
performance 27. 
 
In 1982, a proposal for an angled barrier test was made by UN ECE in 
Geneva, but was not adopted for a variety of technical reasons.  
 
During the 1980s consumer testing in Germany and the UK started to awaken 
public awareness about the inadequacies of current car design in real crashes 
and pressure for European regulation gradually increased.   
 
In 1984, TRL, with DfT funding, began development of a mobile deformable 
barrier. Five years later EEVC set up Working Group 11 on Frontal Impact to 
develop a frontal impact test procedure.  Australian research provided further 
evidence to show that the involvement of the full frontal structure in crashes 
was the exception to the rule 28.
 
In 1992, the earlier UN ECE proposal was revised to try and account for some 
of the technical criticisms and a 30 degree angled barrier test with anti-slide 
device was proposed.  In the interests of wider harmonisation, the US 
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presented a frontal impact test option – their full width barrier legislative test. 
The EEVC proposal for the more realistic offset deformable barrier (ODB) test 
was also near the final stages of development. Due to a deadlock in 
discussions because of different opinions on the best way forward, the debate 
moved to Brussels 6.   
 
In view of concern about the absence of evidence-based road safety 
policymaking in European harmonisation, particularly in matters of vehicle 
standards, the ETSC was established in early 1993 by the UK Parliamentary 
Advisory Committee on Transport Safety (PACTS), German, and Dutch safety 
organisations.  The Council launched with the publication of a comprehensive 
report on vehicle safety (largely the work of Vehicle Safety Consultants (UK) 
and PACTS), and was distributed to policymakers in EU institutions and 
nationally 6.  The report concluded that current legislative standards were 
around 20 years behind the needs identified by crash research.  That year, 
ETSC joined forces with the European consumer organisation , BEUC, to put 
the case to the EU institutions for improvements in vehicle crash protection 
standards. 
 
In April 1994, the attention of media and Parliamentarians was focussed on 
the casualty reduction potential of EU action in a symposium held in the 
European Parliament by the ETSC 29.  The ETSC’s Vehicle Safety Working 
Party highlighted the concern of professionals throughout Europe about the 
need for legislation to better reflect the needs identified by crash injury 
research. Attention was drawn to how market forces stimulated by consumer 
information could have a large and dynamic impact on the rate of progress.  
European Parliamentarians from the two leading parties expressed concern 
about the slow rate and poor quality of legislative development.  During this 
year, a compromised co-ordinated position of EU Member States concerning 
the UN ECE proposal was agreed involving a possible first step in 1995 using 
a modified angled barrier test, followed by the EEVC proposal as soon as it 
was ready. A month later, the EEVC Working Group 11 reported on the 
development of an offset deformable barrier test to the fourteenth ESV 
Conference in Munich 30.  Key findings from other international research in 
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support of this work were also presented.  Several studies confirmed that 
intrusion was a key factor in the generation of severe injuries 32-34; and that a 
partial overlap of 40% was the most realistic test 32-33,35-37.  The new test was 
repeatable - over 50 tests had been carried out using the new barrier 32. 
Information was also presented casting doubt on the efficiency of the anti-
slide device of the 30 degree angled barrier test option 32. 
 
In December 1994, the European Commission  issued a two stage proposal 
for legislation for frontal impact protection 38.  Stage 1 comprised a 30 degree 
rigid barrier test and anti-slide device for new car types (01.10.95) and Stage 
2, foreseeing the offset deformable barrier test by 01.10.98, though the detail 
of Stage 2 was not included in the proposal for a Directive, thus creating an 
uncertain future goal.  The Explanatory Memorandum of the draft Directive 
acknowledged that it was the Stage 2 test which was likely to have 'significant 
consequences in terms of vehicle design'  and envisaged that if all passenger 
cars were built to meet Stage 2 requirements then around 65,000 deaths and 
serious injuries in Europe could be avoided. 
 
Within the European Commission’s Advisory Committee - the European Motor 
Vehicles Working Group – the European car industry trade association, 
Association des Construteurs Europeen d’Automobile (ACEA), argued that the 
Stage 1 test was preferable and that the Stage 2 test was not practicable and 
would cost too much.  However, such arguments lacked credibility since at 
least one manufacturer had been using offset deformable barrier tests since 
the 1970s 35, the results of offset deformable barrier test (ODB) (40% frontal 
at 60 km/h) had been used in Australian consumer information since 1993 and 
the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission proposal acknowledged 
that 'the cost to industry will be minimal'. 
 
In 1995, the ODB test (64 km/h) was used for the first time by the US 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety in consumer information39.  
 
Non-governmental organisations in Brussels stepped up the campaign.  The 
first edition of ETSC’s ‘CRASH’ newsletter on vehicle crash protection was 
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compiled by vehicle safety experts from across the EU and was circulated 
widely 40. The same year, the European motoring organisation, AIT/FIA, 
joined the ETSC/BEUC non governmental organisation (NGO) campaign for 
research-based improvements to the crash test proposals.   With the support 
of FIA/AIT, ETSC developed a video produced by TRL for policymakers 
‘Legislating for Safety’ to explain why changes were needed to the 
Commission’s front and side impact proposals.  Featuring an interview with 
EEVC WG Chairman, the video provided evidence to show that the Stage 1 
(UN ECE draft tests) were weak, unscientific, unreliable and the uncertain 
Stage 2  EEVC tests were realistic, scientific, reliable, and practicable 41.  
Concerned that Stage 1 was being introduced to delay Stage 2 indefinitely, 
experts and MEPs argued for removal of Stage 1 of legislative proposals for 
both front and side impact protection and the immediate adoption of Stage 2 
40, 41a.  
 
A cross party European Parliamentary  resolution tabled on 7.2.94  expressed 
concern that new EC proposal for frontal impact protection did not reflect best 
practice 40. Given Parliament’s right of co-decision for Single Market 
legislation, the Commission’s proposals were discussed formally by European 
Parliamentary Committees.  A seminar in the European Parliament was 
organised by the lead Committee on this issue - Economic and Monetary 
Affairs.  Amendments setting out the detail of EEVC ODB test procedures and 
requirements were tabled to the Directive by the UK Member of European 
Parliament (MEP) (assisted by the UK DfT). In July 1995, after a strong 
campaign by the European non-governmental organisations, the Stage 1 
frontal impact proposal was unanimously rejected by the European Parliament 
in favour of going straight to Stage 2 in the Strasbourg plenary in July 1995.  
An amendment was also added to require a review of the Directive, two years 
after its implementation. 
 
Following continued support from UK, Dutch, Danish and Swedish 
policymakers and with the full EEVC report 42, the amended and final front 
impact Directive was agreed in May 1996, as the EEVC produced its 
validation report 43 and was published in December 1996 44.   
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2.4 Side impact protection 
During the 1980s, research and development work in the US and Europe 
produced two different specifications for a side impact test procedure.  
 
In Europe, a joint Birmingham University and TRL in-depth accident research 
project (1978-81) provided a representative sample of the characteristics of 
side-impacts feeding into the research and development work of the EEVC 
Working Group 9 45.  This EEVC group of experts oversaw the development of 
the new European side impact test procedure which involved the development 
of a new generation of European Side Impact Dummies (EuroSID-1) and 
development of a moving deformable barrier representing the front of a 
standard vehicle.  In 1982, EEVC proposed a standardised test procedure for 
cars using a movable deformable barrier in a full scale test with the EuroSID 
dummy.   
 
Extensive research and development by EEVC took place over the next 6 
years reported at ESV and elsewhere 46-52.  With the imminent development of 
a full-scale crash test, ACEA put forward a proposal in 1989 for a composite 
test procedure for side impact – a computer modelling plus component testing 
option as opposed to the EEVC full test procedure.  EEVC reviewed this 
option in 1990 and concluded that the composite test procedure was based on 
assumptions which had yet to be validated scientifically53.  That year EEVC 
Working Group 9 also produced a specification for the EEVC Side Impact 
Dummy EuroSID-1 54.  The US side impact test procedure was also adopted 
that year in FMVSS 214 with a different barrier to European barrier. 
 
In 1991 the EEVC Working Group on Side Impacts (WG 9) presented 
recommendations for side impact test procedures (90 degree impact with 
moving barrier with ground clearance height of 300mm) to the 13th ESV 
Conference in Paris 55-56.  A TRL study estimated that a better side impact test 
procedure could lead to a saving of 25,000 deaths and serious injuries in EU 
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countries 5. Several elements of this specification differed from the Geneva 
proposal, the most important being the height of the mobile barrier.   
In 1993 the UN ECE agreed a new side impact regulation compromising on a 
barrier height of 260mm. The Vehicle Safety Research Centre (VSRC) at the 
University of Loughborough conducted measurements of front stiff structure 
heights and demonstrated that the 260m barrier clearance in the Geneva 
regulation was unrepresentative of real conditions.   
 
At the 14th ESV Conference in Munich in May, 1994, EEVC Working Group 9 
issued its final report on the Side Impact Test Procedure 57.  Despite EEVC’s 
recommendations, the European Commission issued a two stage proposal for 
legislation for side impact protection based on the UN ECE Regulation later 
that year.  This comprised a Stage 1 test for a 260mm ground clearance 
height for the mobile barrier for new car types (01.10.95) and a possible Stage 
2 test with a barrier height of 300mm from 2001.   The Explanatory 
Memorandum of the draft proposal noted that there was no experimental 
research to validate the ground clearance height of 260mm.  While 300mm 
"did have a basis in research, industry with the support of a number of 
Member States, argued that the barrier should be nearer 200mm.”  The 
proposal went on to acknowledge that the higher standard foreseen in Stage 2 
would probably significantly reduce the number of deaths and injuries, and at 
minimal cost 58.    
 
Experts in the research field, representatives from safety, consumer, motoring 
organisations and MEPs challenged the technical merit of the EC proposal 
and call upon the European Parliament to drop Stage 1 and go straight to 
Stage 2 29,40.  The car industry’s objection that increasing the ground 
clearance of the barrier was not practicable was met with evidence from Fiat 
to the 1994 ESV conference that around 30% of Fiat models tested on the 
road would comply with the criteria at 300mm barrier height 59.  Fiat also 
provided evidence that the 260mm would lead to a weaker test leading to 
limited intrusion at the waist line of the test dummy and generally lower 
intrusion velocities due to the interaction of the barrier face with the car sill. 
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Having engaged in the technical debate, Parliamentarians subsequently 
amended the Directive to allow a one stage process with a barrier height to 
300mm.  The Members of the European Parliament argued that the 
Commission should have better accommodated the EU Treaty obligation to 
provide a high level of protection in the harmonisation process 60.  
 
The European Commission subsequently amended their front impact proposal 
and the new side impact Directive was agreed by the EU Council of Ministers 
at the end of 1995 61.  
2.5 The growth of consumer information 
The awakening of public interest in the influence of car design on crash injury 
in the US in the late 1960s led not only to legislative action, but to the 
provision of consumer information which could provide impartial advice to 
assist car buyers. The aim of this information was to provide objective data to 
pinpoint the maximum level of protection available to the car buying public and 
to complement regulation which should stipulate a high but minimum level of 
protection.   
 
The wide variety of crash test-based and inspection-based predictive systems 
and crash-statistic based retrospective systems developed since the 1970s 
have evolved largely independently of each other 62.  Such systems can 
contribute to substantial progress in crash protective design to protect vehicle 
occupants 63-64. 
 
In retrospective systems, safety ratings are based on the actual performance 
of cars in real crashes.  The frequency and severity of injury to car occupants 
in individual model cars are determined by examination of police crash 
statistics and/or insurance injury claim data.  In 1975, the Highway Loss Data 
institute (HLDI), as part of the US Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
(IIHS), published insurance claims data and provided a safety rating 65.  
 
Predictive systems assess a car's safety performance before it is used on the 
road.  Predictions are based on controlled whole car crash tests of individual 
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models; tests of components of the car which have been proven to be 
important in crashes; and/or visual inspections and rating of the interior of 
cars. The United States New Car Assessment Program (US NCAP) was 
established in 1978 to provide a safety rating for frontal impact protection, 
using a full frontal rigid barrier test.  Since the US NCAP programme started, 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) report there has 
been around a one-third reduction in the probability of a life-threatening injury 
in NCAP passenger cars as measured by controlled crash test results 63. 
 
In Europe, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw developments which placed 
new demands on the car industry on the part of consumer, safety and 
motoring and insurance organisations.  The ‘public right to know about vehicle 
safety’ was promoted by several organisations in Europe.  For example, the 
UK Consumers’ Association aided by members of Vehicle Safety Consultants 
produced the Secondary Safety Rating System in Cars  - a mix of visual 
inspection and component testing 66.  Results were published in WHICH? 
Magazine 67. This system later became the European Secondary Safety 
System which was used by the EU-wide umbrella organisation – the 
European Consumers organisation (BEUC) and International Testing (IT) 68. 
 
Insurance organisations in the Nordic countries published ratings based on 
retrospective data on real crashes.  Folksam in Sweden published injury risk 
ratings based on paired comparisons of car-to-car crashes from police reports 
where the injury outcome in both vehicles is considered throughout  the 
1980s.  Folksam rating has indicated that if all cars were designed to be equal 
to the best current car in each class, 50 per cent of all fatal and disabling 
injuries could be avoided 69. An analysis of Folksam data on car to car 
accidents in Sweden between 1994 and 1996 showed a decrease of 35 per 
cent in the relative risk of fatal and severe injury associated with 'new' car 
designs compared with 'old' designs 70.  A good correlation between Folksam 
ratings and the European Secondary Safety Rating System was also 
demonstrated 71. 
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Since 1987 the Traffic Safety Committee of Insurance Companies, 
Vakuutusyhtioiden Liikenneturvallisuustoimikunta (VALT) in Finland, have 
regularly published ratings compiled by the University of Oulu comparing cars 
on Finnish roads on several factors related to crash performance.  The rating 
concluded that if the crash protection of all the car models in the same weight 
class matched the best then 27 per cent fewer drivers would be injured in 
urban car to car collisions 72. 
 
In 1991 in the UK the first edition of “Car and Driver: Injury Accident and 
Casualty Rates” was published giving information on comparative accident 
involvement and injury risks of popular makes and models of car 73. The 
rating, based on the risk of driver-only injury in car-to-car injury accidents 
reported to the police, showed that if the safety of all models were improved to 
the level achieved or exceeded by the safest twentieth of models then the 
number of drivers injured in car to car accidents would fall by 12 per cent and 
the number killed or seriously injured by 22 per cent. However, it was whole 
car testing for consumer information in Europe that was to become the 
dynamo for advances in car crash protection change in the 1990s.  
 
Since 1987, the German motoring organisation (ADAC) had published results 
of frontal offset tests (40 %) with the Offset Deformable Barrier (60 km/h) and 
a German motoring magazine Auto Motor und Sport  carried out and 
published the results of frontal offset tests (50%) with angled barrier + Anti-
Slide Device (55km/h).  In 1992, an Australian New Car Assessment 
Programme (ANCAP) started which rated new cars on their performance in 
frontal impact tests. Initially ANCAP used FMVSS 208 (56 km/h), but went on 
in 1995 to use the Offset Deformable Barrier test (ODB) (40% frontal) at 
(60km/h) 74-75. 
 
By the mid-1990s, awareness in Europe about the potential of consumer 
information was becoming clear. A summary 29 of an international meeting of 
research, testing, consumer and safety organisations indicated wide 
agreement that: 
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• Market forces continued to play a major role in crash safety 
development. 
• Consumer information was useful for car buying members of public, car 
fleet purchasers, insurers and policymakers.  It also encouraged 
manufacturers to go beyond minimum legislative standards.   
• Experience with New Car Assessment Programmes in the United 
States and in Australia had demonstrated the interest of the car 
industry in responding to NCAP Standards. 
• A wide variety of crash tests were being used by NCAP programmes 
and consumer and motoring magazines.  Some were more relevant to 
real world accident scenarios than others.  Partial ODB testing seemed 
to be the way forward for frontal test procedures to get nearer to 
accident scenarios. 
• While a lot of test data was available, there was no facility currently for 
pooling information internationally. 
• Further international co-operation in this area was highly desirable. 
 
In 1995, the DfT announced a state of the art new car assessment 
programme at the TRL to start in summer 1995 with 1st phase testing of six 
models to be published the following year 76.  The UK NCAP included the 
EEVC frontal impact test, but at a higher speed (64 km/h) than the test 
proposed for legislation (56 km/h); the EEVC side impact test with the barrier 
height at 300mm and the EEVC Working Group on Pedestrian Protection (WG 
17) pedestrian sub-system tests. This announcement received a high media 
profile and intense opposition from industry. A big debate had followed the 
announcement of the new NCAP, particularly about the higher speed of the 
NCAP frontal impact crash test when compared with the legislative test.   
 
Confirmation that the UK were on the right track came from the US.  In 1996, 
the US Insurance Institute for Highway Safety published results of 14 midsize 
four-door car 1995 car models crash tests using the EEVC offset deformable 
barrier test at a speed of 64km/h.  This testing was designed to complement 
the existing US NCAP programme. At the 1996 Melbourne ESV conference, 
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which for the first time had devoted a full session on consumer information, 
the IIHS provided further confirmation that the 64 km/h speed used in 
consumer offset deformable barrier testing was representative of most severe 
real frontal world crashes - 40 per cent offset test into a deformable barrier at 
64 km/h represented a real world crash severity below which about 75 per 
cent of all Maximum Abbreviated Injury Score (MAIS) 3 or above injuries to 
car occupants occur in the US 77.
 
Due to the popular support for the programme received from consumers, 
safety and motoring organisations and leadership from UK policymakers, 
based on strong government-funded technical support from TRL and 
elsewhere, the programme went ahead.  An Automobile Association (AA) 
survey (June, 1996) indicated that 72% of members wanted better information 
about how cars would perform in the event of a crash 78. 
 
Joined by the Swedish Government and then the Dutch Ministry, EuroNCAP 
was established in 1996.  It now receives wide support from the European 
Union and several Member States and, after a long battle, the acceptance of 
the European car industry.  In its first tests the programme revealed that the 
car industry could do more than required by the newly agreed frontal and side 
impact legislation.  Research has since shown that cars with three or four 
stars are approximately 30% safer for car occupants, compared with two-star 
cars or cars without a EuroNCAP score, in car-to-car collisions 64. 
In 1997, the CCIS international symposium held by the VSRC at 
Loughborough University on real world crashes highlighted the remarkable 
progress made with the development of consumer safety ratings. 
 
In 2000, the European Commission cited EuroNCAP one of six most cost-
effective actions in a progress report on the EU road safety action programme 
79. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Quantitative Data 
 
Two data sets were used in the quantitative analysis. In the first part the 
National accident data (STATS 19) for the years 2001-2003 were used and in 
the second part the CCIS data base for the years 1995-2005 were analysed.  
In both analyses the vehicles were categorised into two mutually exclusive 
groups: those distinctly pre regulation and those distinctly post regulation.  
 
Analyses were conducted according to impact type, seating position and 
collision partner.  Provision was also made for occupant gender and age.  
 
Comparisons have been made between the pre and post regulations vehicles 
in terms of injury outcome.  Overall occupant severity (fatal / serious/ slight / 
uninjured) was considered in the STATS19 analysis whilst AIS score by body 
region injured was considered in the CCIS analysis.  Where appropriate, 
direct comparisons of injury outcome rates were made, whilst in other 
analyses ‘Odds Ratios’ were calculated. The Odds Ratio is calculated as the 
ratio of the KSI rate for a given subset in the older vehicles and the KSI rate 
for the same subset in the newer vehicles. An Odds Ratio equal to 1 
(normalised to 0) indicates no change in the KSI rate. To assist the reader the 
main findings are given in the body of this report(section 4) and supporting 
charts and comments can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
A basic cost benefit analysis has been carried out where estimates were 
made of the Department for Transport's staff and research costs related to the 
regulatory and consumer testing elements under evaluation.  Benefits were 
estimated from national data (STATS19) casualty trends over a ten year 
period. 
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3.2 Qualitative Data 
 
The qualitative analysis was based upon eighteen individual and paired 
interviews, two group interviews and one written response.  The interviewees 
were drawn from government, research, the motor industry and consumer 
organisations in the UK and Europe.  A balanced distribution of interviewees 
was achieved across these groups: 
 
Government (UK and the Netherlands): 3 individuals; 1 group. 
Research: 5 individuals; 1 pair. 
Motor Industry: 4 individuals; 1 pair; 1 group; 1 written response. 
Consumer Organisations: 4 individuals . 
 
Prior to conducting the interviews, background work was necessary in order to 
define the subject area more clearly and identify the key players from the 
groups described above. Scoping interviews were undertaken and a time line 
of key events occurring during the build up to and throughout the course of the 
evaluation period was collated. The time line (Appendix 2) included 
milestones in vehicle safety development both from research and political 
activity. Appropriate interviewees also became evident.  
 
A structured topic guide was then constructed for the remaining interviews 
(Appendix 3).  Most of the guide was consistent for all interviews but some 
questions and sections were designed specifically for industry 
representatives.   
 
The interviews, which lasted between one and three hours, were recorded 
and transcribed in full, and the analysis was based upon the transcriptions.  
Responses corresponding to each question in the topic guide were extracted 
from the individual transcripts.  The scoping interviews, necessarily more 
discursive in nature than the structured interviews, were searched for 
responses that corresponded to issues raised in the topic guide.  A 
comprehensive print-out of responses to each question and prompt was then 
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produced, and also a set of tables that gave a quick visual indication of the 
balance of responses to closed questions.   
 
The presentation of the findings of the qualitative analysis broadly follows the 
structure of the topic guide.  The findings are divided into two main sections: 
impact and process.  The impact section considers the difference made by the 
front and side impact regulations and EuroNCAP to vehicle occupant safety 
and their effects upon the motor industry, while the process section presents 
the technical and political issues that underpinned their implementation.   
In presenting the findings care has been taken to represent accurately points 
of convergence and disagreement between respondents, with particular 
attention paid to issues where there were differences of viewpoint between 
industry representatives and other groups.   
 
The aim is to provide a comprehensive overview of the emergence of the front 
and side impact regulations and EuroNCAP from the perspectives of expert 
observers, several of whom were closely involved in their development.   
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4 Quantitative Analysis 
 
4.1 National Accident Data Analysis 
 
The first stage of the quantitative analysis has involved an analysis of the 
National Accident Database, STATS 19. The National data offers a complete 
picture of the injury accident population within Great Britain; it does not 
contain damage only accidents.  
The purpose of this analysis is to examine car occupant casualty trends 
during the evaluation period. The data does not allow for a detailed injury 
analysis to be carried out, but does allow analyses based upon the police 
reported severity of the occupant, the age and gender of the occupant, the 
impact object, an indication of the impact type (front, left side, right side and 
rear) and for distinction according to the age of the vehicle. The data can also 
distinguish between drivers, front seat passengers and rear seat passengers. 
The STATS 19 analysis will serve to answer a number of questions: 
 
• Has there been a systematic reduction in the number of KSI car 
occupants? 
• Are there groups by age / gender / seating positions who have 
benefited more or less than the benefits observed in the overall trends? 
• Are there impact types where there has been more of an improvement 
than others? 
 
One disadvantage of the STATS 19 data, and indeed all available accident 
data, is that it is collected on an injury basis. In the case of STATS 19, 
uninjured passengers do not appear in the data, and there is no count of non-
injury accidents. This makes it difficult to quantify casualty reduction since the 
cases where injury has been prevented by some intervention, the vehicle 
damage only cases are not recorded. It may be possible to estimate the total 
number of accidents occurring in the UK by using insurance data, but this is 
not presently readily available and it is not felt practical to collect such 
information in the time span of this project.  However, a record is kept for each 
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driver in the accident irrespective of injury outcome so it is possible to make 
some estimation, based on the outcome for drivers, of the shift in injury 
patterns from fatal to serious through to slight and uninjured. Since 
government Policy aims to reduce the number of KSI casualties, the 
limitations in the data can be overcome for the purposes of this project. 
4.1.1 Car Occupant Casualty Trends 
 
Table 1: Car Occupant Casualties 1993-2003 
ALL CAR OCCUPANT CASUALTIES 
 Driver FSP RSP Total 
1993 114191 43155 26179 183525
1994 120041 44754 26355 191150
1995 119308 44976 25693 189977
1996 127572 46770 26913 201255
1997 132618 47748 26885 207251
1998 133239 46525 25988 205752
1999 130375 45776 24599 200750
2000 132225 45837 24166 202228
2001 130690 44167 23190 198047
2002 127509 43593 22484 193586
2003 122362 41117 21268 184747
 
Table 1 shows how the number of car occupant casualties, distinguished by 
seating position, has varied year on year since 1993 until 2003. During this 
ten year period the absolute number of car occupant casualties gradually 
increased reaching a peak in 1997 then diminished to reach a similar number 
in 2003 to that observed in 1993. 
 
A slightly different picture is apparent when killed or seriously injured car 
occupants only are considered (table 2).  The number of KSI car occupants 
increased from 1993 to a peak of 23,639 in 1996. Thereafter the number has 
fallen consistently year on year to a low of 17,000 in 2003 indicating that, in 
terms of car occupants, the 2010 casualty reduction target is readily 
achievable assuming a continued 2% annual reduction in the number of KSI 
casualties.  
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Table 2: KSI Car Occupant Casualties 1993-2003 
KSI Car Occupant Casualties 
 Driver FSP RSP Total 
1993 14129 5013 3238 22380 
1994 14724 5420 3310 23454 
1995 14404 5401 3224 23029 
1996 14886 5476 3277 23639 
1997 14744 5132 2922 22798 
1998 13686 4763 2811 21260 
1999 12862 4536 2517 19915 
2000 12569 4379 2410 19358 
2001 12537 4274 2275 19086 
2002 11931 4176 2347 18454 
2003 10939 3844 2216 16999 
 
Table 3: Fatal Car Occupant Casualties 1993-2003 
Fatal car occupants 
 Driver FSP RSP Total 
1993 1091 393 242 1726 
1994 1095 360 279 1734 
1995 1076 398 249 1723 
1996 1139 398 250 1787 
1997 1162 381 225 1768 
1998 1128 340 209 1677 
1999 1071 357 233 1661 
2000 1076 369 194 1639 
2001 1158 347 206 1711 
2002 1140 381 213 1734 
2003 1161 380 201 1742 
 
Considering solely fatal car occupants, Table 3 shows an apparent plateauing 
over the ten year period. However, this result is a little misleading as exposure 
data needs to be taken into account in the interpretation.   
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Figure 1: Fatalities by licence holders and Vehicles licensed 
 
Figure 1 shows the fatality rate for drivers as a proportion of the number of 
licence holders year on year and also the fatality rate for all car occupants as 
a proportion of the number of licensed cars year on year. The data presented 
in figure 1 indicate a systematic reduction in the proportion of fatalities since 
the mid 1990’s, however a slight increase is observed in 2001 (the latest 
available exposure data). Figure 2 shows an estimate of the distance covered 
by passenger cars on an annual basis. This has clearly risen year on year. 
Thus, it would seem that, when exposure is taken into account, fatalities are in 
fact decreasing, though the situation should continue to be monitored. 
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Figure 2: Distance travelled by passenger cars 
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4.1.2 Analysis based on Vehicle Age  
 
There are two possibilities for a methodology to examine the safety 
improvements of vehicle design resulting from, for example, the front and side 
impact regulations. On the one hand crashes that occurred before the 
introduction of the regulations could be compared with those occurring after. 
The selection of two time periods, one before, one after would mean that 
vehicles of similar ages at the time of the crash could be compared, ensuring 
that the effects of wear and tear in older vehicles were minimised. However 
changes in fatality and KSI  numbers are a result of a range of factors 
including changes in vehicle safety (primary or secondary), road designs, road 
user behaviour (e.g. travel speeds), enforcement levels and other factors. 
Many of these change over a period of time in line with national road safety 
policies. For example continued enforcement of driver alcohol levels may 
have an effect on reducing accident numbers and it is important to distinguish 
these effects from those of improvements to vehicle design. In particular the 
effects of changes in alcohol and speed enforcement levels were considered 
to be substantial over the period of the 1990s and there were no analytic 
procedures that could easily be used without considerably more detailed 
information. Alternatively a comparison of old and new cars involved in 
accidents during the same time period would inherently imply exposure to a 
more constant set of traffic, roads, enforcement and other conditions. Analysis 
of this data would permit a focus on the differences between vehicles and 
avoid artificial differences stemming from exposure differences. The main 
difficulty with this approach is that during the years selected, 2001- 2003, the 
new designs had been on the road for only a small number of years whereas 
the older designs also had been used for much longer and so had incurred 
more wear and tear. With no ideal analysis methodology available to account 
for all of these factors is was decided to use the latter approach in the view 
that vehicles built after the 1980s were generally more far more resistant to 
the effects of aging. 
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Both methodologies had the limitation that they compared all changes in 
vehicle design between the two periods so were not able to isolate passive 
safety benefits from primary safety improvements. 
 
The National accident data for the years 2001-2003 were used for this 
analysis and vehicles selected for inclusion in the analysis according to their 
year of manufacture. Two distinct groups of vehicle were defined: 
 
• Old vehicles manufactured 1990-1992   – distinctly pre regulation 
• New vehicles manufactured 2001-2003 – distinctly post regulation 
 
The injury outcome for drivers, front seat passenger (FSP) and rear seat 
passengers (RSP) have been considered in each of the front, side and rear 
impact scenarios, for the cases where the collision partner was another car 
(more representative of the regulatory test procedure) and where the collision 
partner was other than a car (not covered by regulations). 
 
The impact type is categorised according to the STATS19 variable ‘First point 
of impact’ as judged by the attending police officer. It does not necessarily 
imply a strictly ‘frontal’ direction of force for the impact. The data have been 
further categorised according to driver gender and driver age (<50, 50+). 
 
The first part of the analysis focuses upon drivers and considers the following 
scenarios: 
 
• Car to car impacts 
• Car to non car impacts 
 
The second section of the STATS19 analysis considers the outcome for car 
passengers, front and rear, for the same impact scenarios listed above. 
 
The main findings are reported in the subsequent sections and the supporting 
charts and comments can be found in Appendix 1. 
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4.1.3 Summary of Findings - National Accident Data 
 
4.1.3.1 Car to Car Impacts 
 
Drivers 
Front Impacts 
The data suggest that in car to car frontal impacts, drivers of newer cars are 
marginally more likely to receive an injury than drivers of older vehicles, but 
that the injury is likely to be less severe in the newer vehicles. It is clear that 
female drivers are more likely to be injured in a frontal impact than male 
drivers. The proportion of female drivers uninjured is some 20% lower than 
male drivers. There appears to have been equal benefit for the reduction of 
KSI for both men and women in frontal impacts. Older drivers (over 50 years) 
remain more vulnerable to KSI injury outcome on frontal car to car impacts 
than younger drivers. Although there has been a reduction in the KSI rate for 
both age groups, the benefit in the newer cars has been greater for the 
younger drivers than the older drivers.  
 
Rear Impacts 
Newer vehicle design appears to have had an effect in reducing the likelihood 
of all injury severities in rear car to car impacts. Female drivers remain 
disadvantaged in rear impacts compared to male drivers, but the 
improvements in terms of KSI injury outcome are more noticeable for women 
than for men. It appears that modern vehicle design has been beneficial in 
rear impacts for both younger and older drivers, with the benefit in terms of 
serious injury outcome being greater for the older drivers than the younger 
drivers. 
 
Right Side Impacts 
Newer vehicles appear to offer better protection in right side car to car impacts 
than older vehicles. For right side car to car impacts, there is no difference in 
the KSI rate between genders and there is an equal reduction in the rate of 
KSI in the newer vehicles. Female drivers however remain more vulnerable to 
slight injury outcome than male drivers. Modern vehicle design has benefited 
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both younger and older drivers in right side impacts but the benefit appears 
greatest for the older drivers. 
 
Left Side Impacts 
Modern car design appears to have had a positive effect on the likelihood of 
serious injury outcome for drivers in left side car to car impacts but the rate of 
slight injury has increased. Newer vehicle design appears to have had a 
benefit in reducing serious injury outcome for both male and female drivers in 
left side car to car impacts, the benefit being marginally greater for males than 
females. Female drivers remain considerably disadvantaged in terms of slight 
injury outcome compared to male drivers. Although older drivers have a lower 
rate of overall injury outcome than younger drivers, and the reduction in the 
rate of KSI is similar for both driver age groups, the older drivers remain 
disadvantaged in terms of serious injury outcome in left side car to car 
impacts.  
 
Front and Rear Seat Passengers 
For front seat passengers the only disbenefit was observed for females in 
frontal impacts. The greatest benefits were observed in left side impacts 
across all population variations; for male FSP and young FSP in right side 
impacts and for old FSP in rear impacts. 
 
For rear seat passengers, disbenefits were noted for all population variations 
in frontal impacts. In rear impacts disbenefits were seen for the ‘all occupant 
category’, for female RSP and for the older RSP. In right side impacts 
disbenefits were apparent for the older RSP, similarly for left side impacts. 
The greatest disbenefits were for the female and the older RSP in rear 
impacts and for the older RSP in left side impacts. The greatest benefit was 
observed for the male RSP in rear impacts (note however that reduced 
sample size may have an effect on these results). 
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4.1.3.2 Car to Non Car Impacts 
 
Drivers  
Front Impacts 
In general, the STATS 19 data show that newer vehicles offer better 
protection for against KSI injury outcome than older vehicles in non car to car 
frontal collisions. There has been a marginally greater benefit in terms of KSI 
reduction for male drivers compared to female drivers, but the rate remains 
higher for men than for women. There are similar KSI rates for both older and 
younger drivers across both vehicle age groups. The benefit has been 
marginally greater for the older drivers compared with the younger drivers. 
 
Rear Impacts 
Considering all drivers, newer vehicle design appears to have had an effect 
upon reducing the likelihood of all injury severities in rear car to non car 
impacts. Female drivers are clearly more likely to be injured in a rear impact 
than male drives and this remains the case irrespective of vehicle age. 
However, female drivers have seen a greater reduction in KSI injury outcome 
in modern cars compared with the reduction for male drivers. The data 
suggest that modern vehicle design has been beneficial for both younger and 
older drivers and that the benefit has been greater for the older drivers than 
the younger drivers. 
 
Right Side Impacts 
Newer vehicles appear to offer better protection for drivers in right side (struck 
side in the main) car to non car impacts than older vehicles. Whilst female 
drivers are considerably more vulnerable to slight injury than male drivers and 
remain so in the newer cars, male drivers have a higher KSI rate in both the 
newer and older cars. The benefit in the reduction of the KSI rate for both 
males and females is similar. Modern vehicle design has benefited both 
younger and older drivers in right side car to non car impacts, but the benefit 
has been greater for the younger drivers. 
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Left Side Impacts 
Modern car design appears to have had a positive effect on reducing the 
likelihood of KSI injury outcome for drivers in left side (non struck side) car to 
non car impacts. There has been a considerable benefit in terms of serious 
injury outcome for the male drivers, but there has been no benefit, in fact a 
marginal increase, in the rate of KSI injury outcome for female drivers. Both 
younger and older drivers have a better KSI outcome in the newer cars and 
the benefit has been greater for the younger drivers. 
 
Front and Rear Seat Passengers 
For front seat passengers in car to non car impacts benefits are apparent for 
all except the female FSP in rear impacts. The greatest benefits have been 
experienced by Male FSP in rear impacts and older FSP in right side impacts. 
 
For rear seat passengers, older RSPs stand out as the only group 
disadvantaged in the newer cars compared with the older cars. This is the 
case in front impacts, rear impacts and left side impacts.  
 
The results are further summarised in the following tables 4 and 5. A tick 
indicates a better or identical outcome in the newer cars when compared with 
the older cars, a cross indicates a worse outcome. 
Table 4: Summary of National data results – car to car impacts 
DRIVERS ALL MALE FEMALE YOUNG OLD 
Front √ √ √ √ √ 
Rear √ √ √ √ √ 
Right √ √ √ √ √ 
Left √ √ √ √ √ 
FSP All Male Female Young Old 
Front √ √ X √ √ 
Rear √ √ √ √ √ 
Right √ √ √ √ X 
Left √ √ √ √ √ 
RSP All Male Female Young Old 
Front X X X X X 
Rear X √ X √ X 
Right √ √ √ √ X 
Left √ X √ √ X 
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Table 5: Summary of National data results – car to non car impacts 
DRIVERS ALL MALE FEMALE YOUNG OLD 
Front √ √ √ √ √ 
Rear √ √ √ √ √ 
Right √ √ √ √ √ 
Left √ √ X √ √ 
FSP All Male Female Young Old 
Front √ √ √ √ √ 
Rear √ √ X √ √ 
Right √ √ √ √ √ 
Left √ √ √ √ √ 
RSP All Male Female Young Old 
Front √ √ √ √ X 
Rear √ √ √ √ X 
Right √ √ √ √ √ 
Left √ √ √ √ X 
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4.2 CCIS Data Analysis 
 
In the second part of the quantitative analysis, the UK CCIS in-depth accident 
data base has been examined. The UK data analysed were collected between 
1995 and 2005 as part of the on-going UK Co-operative Crash Injury Study.  
 
All vehicles in the study were less than seven years old at the time of the 
crash and were towed away from the crash scene. The CCIS data use a 
stratified sampling criterion to identify crashes to be investigated. 100% of 
fatal, 80% of ‘serious’ and 10-15% of ‘slight’ injury crashes (according to the 
UK Government’s accident classification) are investigated. Consequently, the 
resulting sample is biased towards the more serious crashes. The data used 
in this analysis has been weighted to address this sampling bias. 
 
The impact type experienced by the occupants in each vehicle has been 
classified according to the most significant impact in the crash event rather 
than selecting out single impact crashes. Selecting on single impact crashes 
reduces an already small sample size to a point where much of the analysis 
becomes meaningless. Frontal, struck side and non struck side impacts have 
been considered. The object struck was also taken into consideration; firstly 
the data were analysed in their entirety, subsequently specifically car to car 
impacts were analysed and finally an analysis was made of those cases 
where the impact object was other than a car. 
 
The cars included in the analysis have been further selected according to the 
vehicle’s age: old vehicles were those registered between 1985 and 1993; 
new vehicles were those registered between 1997 and 2005. Throughout the 
analysis the Odds Ratios have been calculated to compare the injury outcome 
in the new cars to that in the old cars. Results are considered not applicable 
when the incidence of serious injury is zero in either the new or old car sample 
since in these circumstances it is not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio. 
Results that are susceptible to small changes in incidence rates are 
highlighted; these are where the incidence count is less than 5 in either or 
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both of the new and old car samples. In such cases caution is attached to the 
interpretation of the result.  
 
In frontal crashes both the drivers and the front passengers were belted. For 
the struck and non-struck side analysis both belted and un-belted occupants 
were included and the analysis took no account of whether or not there was a 
further occupant in the front (occupant beside). The rear seat occupant 
sample was too small to yield any meaningful results. 
 
All injuries in the CCIS data are coded using the Abbreviated Injury Scale 
(AIS) 1990 revision. Data from medical records were obtained from hospitals 
to which the crash casualties were admitted. All vehicles in the study were 
less than seven years old at the time of the crash and were towed away from 
the crash scene. An in-depth examination of each vehicle was made in 
recovery-yards and garages within a few days of the accident.  AIS 3+ rates 
(equating to serious injury) were considered for the cranium, face, chest, 
abdomen, pelvis and thigh. AIS 2+ rates (equating to fracture) were 
considered for the neck, knee, lower leg and foot/ankle. Further analyses 
were made according to occupant gender and occupant age (young aged 50 
years or less / Old aged more than 50 years). 
 
The main findings are reported in the subsequent sections and the supporting 
charts and comments can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
4.2.1 Summary of CCIS Analysis Results 
 
Frontal Crashes 
 
Belted Drivers 
For all objects struck there was a significant improvement in protection against 
serious facial injury in new cars. Most of this improvement occurred in car to 
car impacts. There was also a significant improvement in protection against 
fracture of the pelvis and lower leg in new cars, again, the gains being most 
prominent in car to car impacts. There was a significant improvement in 
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protection against serious injury to the cranium in new cars and this 
improvement was similar irrespective of the object struck. There was only a 
modest improvement against serious chest injury overall. The gains were 
mostly in car to car impacts and there was little change in serious chest injury 
risk between old and new cars when an object other than a car was impacted.  
 
There was a slight improvement in protection against femur fracture overall 
but the small gains were seen mainly in car to car impacts. There was a slight 
improvement in protection against knee and foot/ankle fracture but these 
gains were seen mainly in impacts with objects other than cars.  
There was a slight increase in neck fracture and serious abdominal injury in 
newer cars, mainly in car to car impacts.  
 
Overall, the largest gains in protection against serious cranium and chest 
injury in new cars are for females. The smallest gains in protection against 
serious chest injury are for older people. 
 
The largest gains in lower leg protection (fracture) are for females, followed by 
the older occupants. Females show very large gains in protection against 
pelvic fracture.  
 
Belted Front Seat passengers 
For all struck objects, new cars showed a significant improvement in 
protection against serious neck injury. Most improvement was seen in car to 
object impacts. However, there was a modest increase in serious injury to the 
cranium. 
 
In new cars, there was modest improvement in protection against serious 
chest injury, lower leg fracture and foot/ankle fracture. This increased 
protection was mainly seen in car to car impacts. In car to object impacts 
there was however an increase in lower leg fractures in new cars.  
 
No conclusion could be drawn for the face and pelvis, abdomen and thigh 
injury risks due to limited case numbers. 
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Overall, the largest gains in protection against neck fracture were for the old, 
while females showed a disbenefit. 
 
The largest gains in protection against lower leg fracture were for males. 
The largest gains in protection against foot/ankle fracture were for the old. 
The smallest benefits for protection against serious chest injury were for 
females. 
 
Struck Side Occupants 
Generally, improvements in protection occurred in car to car rather than in car 
to object impacts. 
 
Overall there was a very slight increase in serious head injury and foot/ankle 
fracture in new cars (mainly accounted for in car to object crashes). In car to 
car impacts there is a slight improvement in protection for these body regions. 
There was insufficient data for comment on improvements in protection for the 
face, abdomen or lower leg. 
 
Overall, there was a very slight improvement in protection against serious 
chest injury due to the increased protection in car to car impacts only. 
Overall there was a slight increase in neck and knee fracture (mainly in car to 
object impacts). 
 
There was a slight improvement in protection against pelvic and femur 
fracture (mainly in car to car impacts). 
 
Chest, cranium and pelvis protection has improved more for the old than for 
the young. But the old have a higher neck fracture rate. 
 
Females have higher rates of neck, femur and foot/ankle fracture compared to 
males. 
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Non Struck Side Occupants 
Overall, newer cars showed significant improvement in protection against 
pelvic fracture. In car to object impacts these injuries were rare in both old and 
new vehicles. In car to car impacts, no occurrence was found at all in new 
vehicles compared to 7 occurrences in old vehicles.  
Overall there was a significant decrease in serious abdominal injury in both 
car to car and car to object impacts. 
 
There was modest improvement in protection against neck fracture (mainly in 
car to object impacts, with little change in protection in car to car impacts) and 
males seem to have benefited most. 
 
There was modest improvement in protection against foot/ankle fracture 
(mainly in car to car impacts) and older people appeared to benefit the most. 
 
There was a slight improvement in protection against serious cranial injury (in 
both car to car and to car to object impacts). Older occupants appear to have 
the largest reduction in risk. 
 
There was a slight increase in lower leg fracture in newer cars (seen in both 
car to car and car to object impacts). 
 
There was a significant increase in knee fracture (mainly in car to object 
impacts). 
 
For all objects struck, there was very little change to serious chest injury risk 
between old and new cars. In car to object impacts there was a modest 
increase in risk to the chest whilst in car to car impacts there was a slight 
decrease in risk. 
 
It was not possible to come to conclusions about changes in injury risk to the 
face and thigh due to small numbers of data. 
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The results are further summarised in the following tables 6-17.  A tick 
indicates a better or identical outcome in newer cars when compared with the 
older cars, a cross indicates a worse outcome.  Cells appearing in bold text 
indicate results that should be treated with caution. 
 
Frontal 
 
Table 6: Car to all objects – Drivers 
 
 
Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All √ √ X √ X √ √ √ √ √ 
Male √ √ X √ X √ √ √ √ √ 
Female √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Young √ √ X √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Old √ √ √ √ X √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Table 7: Car to all objects – FSP 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All X n/a √ √ √ n/a √ X √ √ 
Male √ n/a n/a √ n/a n/a √ n/a √ √ 
Female X n/a X √ √ √ X n/a √ √ 
Young X n/a √ √ X n/a √ n/a √ √ 
Old n/a n/a √ √ √ n/a X X √ √ 
 
Table 8: Car to Car - Drivers 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All √ n/a X √ X √ √ X √ √ 
Male √ √ X √ X X √ √ √ √ 
Female √ √ √ √ √ n/a √ X √ X 
Young √ √ X √ √ √ √ X √ X 
Old √ n/a √ √ n/a X √ √ √ √ 
 
Table 9: Car to Car – FSP 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All X n/a √ √ X n/a √ n/a √ √ 
Male √ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a √ n/a n/a √ 
Female n/a n/a √ √ X n/a √ n/a √ √ 
Young √ n/a n/a √ n/a n/a √ n/a n/a √ 
Old n/a n/a √ √ n/a n/a √ n/a n/a n/a 
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Table 10: Car to non Car – Drivers 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All √ n/a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Male √ n/a √ √ X √ X √ √ √ 
Female √ n/a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Young √ n/a √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Old √ n/a √ X √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
Table 11: Car to non Car – FSP 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All X n/a √ √ √ n/a X n/a X √ 
Male X n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Female X n/a √ √ √ n/a X n/a X X 
Young X n/a n/a √ n/a n/a X n/a √ n/a 
Old n/a n/a n/a √ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a √ 
 
 
Struck Side 
 
Table 12: All objects  
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All X √ X √ √ √ √ X √ X 
Male X √ X √ √ √ √ √ X X 
Female X n/a X √ X X X X √ √ 
Young X √ X √ X √ √ √ X X 
Old √ √ X √ √ √ √ n/a √ √ 
 
Table 13: Car to Car 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All √ X √ √ √ √ √ n/a √ √ 
Male √ n/a X √ √ √ √ n/a √ √ 
Female √ √ √ √ X X X n/a √ √ 
Young √ X √ √ √ √ √ n/a √ √ 
Old √ n/a X √ X √ √ n/a √ X 
 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF 50 VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
Table 14: Car to Non Car 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All X √ X X X X √ √ X X 
Male X √ X X √ X √ √ X X 
Female X √ X X √ X √ √ X X 
Young X √ X X X X √ √ X X 
Old √ n/a n/a X √ √ n/a n/a √ n/a 
 
 
Non Struck Side 
Table 15: All objects 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All √ n/a √ X √ √ √ X X √ 
Male √ n/a √ X √ n/a X n/a X √ 
Female X √ X X n/a √ √ X X √ 
Young √ n/a √ X √ √ √ X X √ 
Old √ √ X X n/a n/a X n/a n/a √ 
 
Table 16: Car to Car 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All √ n/a √ √ √ n/a √ X X √ 
Male √ n/a √ √ √ n/a √ n/a n/a √ 
Female √ n/a X √ n/a n/a n/a √ √ n/a 
Young √ n/a √ √ √ n/a √ X X n/a 
Old n/a n/a X X n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a √ 
 
Table 17: Car to Non Car 
 Cranium Face Neck Chest Abdo Pelvis Thigh Knee Lower 
Leg 
Foot/ 
ankle 
All √ n/a √ X √ n/a X n/a X n/a 
Male √ n/a √ X √ √ X n/a √ n/a 
Female X n/a √ X n/a n/a X n/a n/a n/a 
Young √ n/a √ X √ n/a X n/a √ n/a 
Old √ n/a n/a √ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
Stats 19 national data and weighted CCIS in-depth crash injury data have 
been examined to assess whether the development and introduction of new 
front and side crash test legislation has improved car crashworthiness. 
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Although the regulations specify single point tests, the rational behind their 
introduction was to improve crashworthiness over the whole spectrum of real–
world crashes. 
 
In reality, it is doubtful whether the effectiveness of legislation can be 
separated from the effects of the New Car Assessment Programme (NCAP) 
because this was introduced at about the same time.  
 
The current study utilises Stats 19 data to give a broad picture of the 
effectiveness of new crash tests in the whole accident population. In-depth 
CCIS data was interrogated for the details of body regions where injury risk 
changed. In CCIS serious injury rates (AIS 3+) were considered for the 
cranium, face, chest, abdomen, pelvis and femur. AIS 2+ rates were 
considered for the neck, knee, lower leg and foot/ankle because they define 
fracture and ligament injuries to those body regions. Vehicle manufacturers 
started changing safety design in advance of the introduction of the new tests. 
The timing of these changes adds a complication to any “before” and “after” 
study. Therefore, in order to ensure a valid comparison with new vehicle 
designs, older vehicles (registered 1985 - 1992) were compared to newer 
vehicles (registered 1997 – 2005) which were likely to have been designed to 
pass the new tests. 
 
In frontal crashes:  National data show that drivers of older cars received 
serious injury more often than those in newer cars when the object struck was 
another car. The in-depth data suggests this is due to reductions in AIS 3+ 
facial injury, pelvic fracture (especially for females) and lower leg fracture 
(especially for females). The reduction in facia and foot-well intrusion for 
newer cars appears to help reduce pelvis and lower leg injury to drivers who 
sit closer to the steering wheel. 
 
Reductions in AIS 3+ head injury also contributed to injury reductions in newer 
cars. The benefits of driver airbag fitment are seen to reduce head and face 
injury irrespective of the impacted object.  
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Serious chest injury, femur fracture, knee fracture and foot/ankle fracture was 
not reduced greatly in newer cars, irrespective of the object struck. There was 
also a small increase in neck fracture and serious abdominal injury (mainly in 
car to car impacts). Modern seat belt systems appear not to show expected 
benefits in chest injury reduction and a reduction in foot-well intrusion has not 
resulted in the expected injury reductions to the foot and ankle. Increases in 
neck fracture need to be investigated but may be due to higher crash pulses 
with newer vehicles and there may be a need to consider the role of airbag 
deployment as a contributor to these injuries. 
 
National data show that female drivers were more likely to be injured than 
male drivers. However the largest gains in protection for the head are for 
females. Older drivers were more likely to be seriously injured than younger 
drivers in newer cars, serious chest injury being more predominant for the 
older drivers. This suggests the need to examine restraint effectiveness for 
older people.   
 
For front seat passengers, national data show a benefit in newer cars for all 
genders and ages in car to object crashes. In car to car impacts the same is 
true with the exception that females appear to have an increased injury risk. 
In-depth data shows a very modest improvement in crash protection for the 
chest but none for the head. Older passengers see improvements in 
protection against foot/ankle fracture and neck fracture, mainly in car to car 
impacts. Females were seen to have an increased risk of neck fracture 
despite a general improvement in protection for this body region. 
 
In newer cars, national data show an increased injury risk for all population 
variations of rear seat passengers in car to car frontal crashes. In car to object 
impacts the only group of rear passenger at increased risk in newer cars are 
older occupants. For rear occupants, the major restraint is the seat belt with 
very little force being put through the knee. Belt to chest loads are generally 
higher for the rear belt compared to the front and any increase in vehicle 
stiffness will increase those loads. The number of serious injuries in the in-
depth sample was too small to analyse. 
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In rear crashes:  National data show that newer cars have a reduced injury 
risk at all levels of severity (irrespective of the object struck) for both young 
and old drivers, although the benefit is greater for older drivers. Females are 
still more at risk of injury than males; however they show a greater reduction 
in serious injury in newer cars compared to males, irrespective of the striking 
object. The number of serious injuries in the in-depth sample was too small to 
analyse. 
 
For struck side occupants in side crashes:  National data show that newer 
cars are generally safer when struck by another car. Both younger and older 
occupants benefit but that benefit is greater for the older occupants. In car to 
other object impacts the benefit is greater for younger occupants. In impacts 
with cars and other objects the magnitude of the reduction in serious injury 
risk is similar for both men and women in newer cars. However, in car to 
object impacts men show a higher overall injury rate than women in both 
newer and older cars whereas in car to car impacts, men and females have 
equal rates.  
 
In-depth data also shows that improvements in occupant protection have 
mainly occurred in car to car impacts. In car to object crashes, serious head 
injury, foot/ankle fracture, neck and knee fracture show a slight increase in 
newer cars. In car to car impacts there was a very modest improvement in 
protection for the head, chest, pelvis, femur and foot/ankle fracture. Overall, 
head, chest and pelvis protection improved more for older occupants but they 
still have the highest neck fracture risk. Compared to males, females had a 
higher risk of neck, femur and foot/ankle fracture. 
 
Crash protection in newer cars has improved, but that improvement is very 
modest. Additionally, head and foot/ankle injuries have slightly increased in 
car to object impacts. 
 
For non struck side occupants in side crashes:   National data shows an 
overall improvement in occupant protection in newer cars for all struck 
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objects. In-depth data show significant decreases in pelvis fracture and 
serious abdominal injury with modest reductions in neck fracture and serious 
head injury. Chest injury rates remained similar between old and new cars. 
 
In car to car impacts both men and women are better protected in newer cars, 
however, in car to object impacts, females have marginally higher KSI rates 
than males in newer cars. The CCIS data shows that this may be due to 
slighter higher rates of knee and lower leg fracture. 
 
In car to car impacts older drivers have the same reduction in KSI rate as 
younger drivers but within the older age group the KSI rate starts at a higher 
level, therefore the benefit in injury reduction is greater for older occupants. 
The CCIS data shows that reductions in head injury and foot/ankle fracture 
contribute to this effect. In car to object impacts, benefits are greater for the 
younger occupants. 
 
In non-struck side impacts, occupants receive injury from intrusion of the 
opposite side structures, impacted object or interaction with the struck side 
occupant. Additionally, belt loads can be high, especially in angled opposite 
side impacts. The results of this analysis suggest that reductions in intrusion 
may contribute to the reduced head injury. The reductions in abdominal injury 
and the little change in chest injury outcome suggest that seat belt loads have 
not increased significantly in newer cars. 
4.4 Basic Cost Benefit Analysis (1990-2002) 
4.4.1 Costs 
 
Staff 
Throughout the period of the project there have normally been 4 project 
officers involved, 2 at S grade and 2 at H grade.  They have always been 
assisted by Administrative grades.  For the areas involved costs have been 
calculated according to 4 staff from TTS at S grade. This allows for work to 
have been carried out by the heads of branch and the administrative and 
finance grades.   
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At today’s prices the average annual cost is therefore 4 x £35k = £140k.  
Annual depreciation back over the evaluation period is based upon salary 
increases matching inflation estimated at 3%. 
 
The annual staff costs are shown in table 18. 
 
Table 18: Annual Staff Costs 
Year Salary (£) 
2002 131,963 
2001 128,119 
2000 124,387 
1999 120,765 
1998 117,248 
1997 113,833 
1996 110,517 
1995 107,298 
1994 104,173 
1993 101,139 
1992 98,193 
1991 95,333 
1990 92,556 
Whole Period 1,445,524 
 
Thus, the estimated staff costs across the evaluation period, 1990-2002, 
amount to £1,445,524.  
 
Research 
The research costs (by project as provided by the TTS) are shown in tables 
19 and 20. They are distinguished into those that are considered of direct 
relevance to the programme and period under evaluation, those that are in-
directly related. The cost of each project is corrected to reflect a figure for the 
project up to and including 2002. 
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Table 19:  Directly related projects 
Code Year Title Cost £K 
S071J/VF 97-01 Accident Report Analysis 93 
S0015/VF 01-04 Advanced Side Impact Dummy: Biomechanics and Evaluation 76 
S081F/VF 93-96 Airbags for European Cars 262 
S080F/VF 92-93 Airbags for the Protection of Occupants 16 
S080D/VF 92-96 Biomechanics and Dummy Development 1,176 
S095B/VF 95-99 Compatibility of Cars in Crashes 2,979 
S240A/AC 91-96 Computer Modelling Crashworthiness 860 
S0212/VF 02-03 Development and Test of a Back Plate for EuroSID 2 15 
S0220/VF 02-05 Development of Harmonised Side Impact Test Procedures 123 
S085D/VF 99-02 Dummy Development: Modelling of Abdominal Injuries 60 
S084D/VF 97-04 Dummy Development: Brain Injury Modelling 282 
S082D/VF 96-00 Dummy Development – Next Generation Biomechanical Dummies 1,412 
S083D/VF 98-03 Dummy Development – To Evaluate Spinal Injuries 418 
S310C/CA 95-99 Effect of Car Weight Reduction and Downsizing in Safety 120 
S0051/VC 01-01 EuroSID 2 Back Plate Testing 14 
S0048/VC 01-08 EuroNCAP: Testing Programme 778 
S090B/VF 92-95 Frontal Impact Test 1,856 
S096B/VF 99-03 IHRA/EEVC Compatibility and Frontal and Side Impact Test Procedures 1,704 
S086D/VF 00-06 Improved Injury Criteria 433 
S0013/VF 00-02 Interior Headform Tests 184 
S091D/VF 95-98 New Car Assessment Programme 3,365 
S092E/VF 99-01 Review of Frontal and Side Impact Directives and SID Development 613 
S082F/VF 94-95 Safety Steering Wheel with Airbag 60 
S096A/VF 97-01 Side Impact Head Protection Phases 2 and 3 294 
S090A/VF 92-96 Side Impact Research 1,812 
S095A/VF 96-03 Side Impact: Barrier Design and Evaluation 338 
S091B/VF 92-96 Steering Wheel Face Form Tests 140 
TOTAL   19,483 
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Table 20:  Indirectly related projects 
Code Year Title Cost £K 
S070Q/VF 96-99 Car Fatals: Trends, Rear Seat Users and Fires 234 
S082E/VF 00-04 Child Occupant Protection 279 
S094A/VF 94-96 Interior Pillar Padding 123 
S250B/VF 93-96 Laminated Glazing Safety versus Security 26 
S090D/VF 92-94 Low Cost Car Secondary Safety Method Development 4 
S0014/VF 00-03 Evaluation of Child Dummies 92 
S080E/VF 90-00 Protection of Children in Cars 1,132 
S093A/VF 94-97 Seat Test Programme 158 
S070N/VF 95-96 Serious Injuries to Child Occupants of Cars 40 
TOTAL   2,088 
 
Thus, the following two research costs have been estimated: 
 
• Directly related research : £19,483,000 
• In-directly related research : £2,088,000 
 
Combined Staff and Research 
 
Combining the staff and the research costs gives the following two estimates 
of the programme expenditure: 
 
• Directly related research and staff: £20,928,524 
• Direct and Indirect research and staff: £23,016,524 
 
4.4.2 Benefits 
 
Casualty Reduction Targets 
 
An initial question worthy of consideration is whether or not the KSI 2010 
casualty reduction target, in particularly car occupants, is likely to be met.  
This requires a reduction of 40% in the number of car occupants killed or 
seriously injured in the year 2010 compared with 94/98 average. 
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Using the STATS 19 data for the appropriate years, the average number of 
KSI car occupants for 1994 -1998 is 22,839 
  
Table 21 shows the number of car occupants killed or seriously injured year 
on year between 1999 and 2003. It also gives the % reduction each yearly 
figure represents over the 94/98 average and the year on year % reduction. 
 
Table 21: KSI car occupants 
Year Number KSI % Reduction on 94/98 average Annual % reduction 
1999 19,915 12.8 n/a 
2000 19,360 15.2 2.8 
2001 19,000 16.8 1.9 
2002 18,454 19.2 2.9 
2003 16,999 25.6 7.9 
 
The average annual reduction in the number of car occupants killed or 
seriously injured between 1999 and 2003 is 3.9%. If the annual reduction 
continues at on average 3% for the years 2004-2010, then the number of KSI 
car occupants in 2010 is estimated to be 13,735. This represents a 40% 
reduction on the 94/98 average.  Thus, in order to meet the 2010 targets with 
respect to car occupants, KSI numbers need to continue to fall at a rate of 3% 
per annum.  
 
Reduction in KSI injury outcome can be attributed to a number of factors and 
not solely improvements in car crashworthiness. These include changes in 
medical care, in road infrastructure and in enforcement. However each year 
the age of the fleet changes and around 8% is made up of the most recent 
model vehicles (based on the National accident data). Therefore the benefits 
seen in newer car design become more wide spread with each successive 
year. 
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Costs of casualties 
 
At 2001 prices, the UK government's calculated costs of accidents resulting in 
fatal, serious and slight injury outcome are as follows; 
 
Fatal = £1,194,240 
Serious = £134,190 
Slight = £10,350 
 
All other things aside, assuming car occupant casualty reduction is solely due 
to improvements in car safety and primarily due to the introduction of 
regulations / EuroNCAP, in order for the programme to have been broadly 
cost effective it needs to have prevented around 19 fatalities or 170 serious 
injury outcome accidents (using the costs associated with both directly and 
indirectly related research). Alternatively a shift from fatal outcome to serious 
outcome in 22 accidents needs to have been achieved. Table 22 shows the 
year on year counts of fatal and serious car occupant casualties. 
 
Table 22: KSI car occupants 1993-2003 
Year Driver FSP RSP Total 
 Fatal Serious Fatal Serious Fatal Serious Fatal Serious
1993 1091 13040 393 4620 242 2996 1726 20656 
1994 1095 13629 360 5060 279 3031 1734 21720 
1995 1076 13334 398 5003 249 2975 1723 21312 
1996 1139 13747 398 5078 250 3027 1787 21852 
1997 1162 13589 381 4751 225 2697 1768 21037 
1998 1128 12558 340 4423 209 2602 1677 19583 
1999 1071 11791 357 4179 233 2284 1661 18254 
2000 1076 11495 369 4010 194 2216 1639 17721 
2001 1158 11294 347 3926 206 2069 1711 17289 
2002 1140 10791 381 3795 213 2134 1734 16720 
2003 1161 9778 380 3464 201 2015 1742 15257 
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Clearly reductions seen in absolute casualty numbers over the past decade 
are due to reductions in serious rather than fatal outcome. It would appear 
that fatal numbers have plateaued a little but, as has been mentioned 
previously (Fig. 1, Sect. 4.1.1) the number of license holders has increased 
substantially so in real terms the number of fatalities per 1000 vehicles on the 
road has decreased. 
 
Considering serious injury outcome and comparing  2003 for example with 
2002 there were 1,463 less seriously injured occupants in 2003 than in 2002. 
Assuming only one serious casualty per accident this equates to a saving of 
£196,319,970 (2001 prices). Even if each accident now became slight rather 
than serious, the reduction still represents a saving of £181,117,920 in a 
single year.  This is an order of magnitude greater than the total investment 
in the programme calculated above. Therefore, in this basic analysis, the 
conclusion is that the programme has been cost effective. 
 
These savings are based upon absolute numbers of casualties. As has been 
mentioned, the fleet is evolving year on year to include proportionally more of 
the newer vehicles and the fleet is also growing in size. The implication of this 
is that the savings in the future due to the effects of the programme will 
continue to become more apparent. 
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5 The Qualitative Data 
 
The qualitative analysis had two dimensions: impact and process. The first 
represented respondents’ views on what difference the front and side impact 
regulations and EuroNCAP, separately and together, had made to the levels 
of protection offered to occupants in a car accident. The second reported their 
views and experiences of the processes which had brought the regulations 
and EuroNCAP into being. 
 
The quotes from individuals reflect their personal views, based upon their 
professional expertise and, in many cases, upon their direct involvement in 
the events that led to the regulations and EuroNCAP.   The analysis 
presented below reflects the balance of opinion across the interview group. 
Quotes have been used to introduce key points, to illustrate the thrust of 
majority opinion and also, where appropriate, dissenting views.     
 
5.1 Part 1: Impact  
5.1.1 The Regulations 
 
The general effect of the regulations upon car occupant safety 
When asked an overarching question about the difference made by the 
introduction of the front and side impact regulations, a clear majority of those 
interviewed said that the regulations had led to improvements in the levels of 
protection offered to occupants in a car accident.  This assertion was more 
frequently underpinned by professional judgements about the necessary 
consequences of a more rigorous testing regime than by findings from real 
world data.  Where such data was mentioned, the respondent tended to 
assume that it would demonstrate positive change, without making specific 
reference to existing statistical evidence. One person did mention Stats 19 as 
providing supporting evidence of improvements, although it was not clear 
whether he had personally reviewed the data, and a motor industry 
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representative was convinced that recent crash data showed a pattern 
consistent with a positive effect from the introduction of the regulations: 
 
“Maybe some of it has to come back to real world data analysis.  We 
can definitely see that the nature of serious injury crashes in the UK 
has changed, in very loose terms, front and side impacts used to be 
predominant, now they are not, so we must have done something right 
in frontal impact”  
 
Others felt, however, that it was simply too early to gauge the effect of the 
regulations from accident data. Given that these were not implemented until 
the latter part of 1998, there were doubts that enough cars conforming to their 
requirements had since featured in road accidents in sufficient numbers to 
make comparisons viable. 
 
Professional assessments about the qualitative superiority of the regulation 
tests to previous testing regimes featured strongly in the responses. Although 
two respondents felt that the additional requirements were marginal for those 
manufacturers already complying with US regulations, others stated that the 
regulations introduced important new elements that enabled the tests to offer 
a more accurate prediction of performance in real accident conditions. The 
side impact test and the offset barrier test for frontal impact were singled out 
as critical elements:   
 
“… it introduced an offset test, which is obviously the most commonly 
injurious crash we see on the roads. As it’s an offset crash at 56kph, it 
would be more demanding than the previous R12 regulation and 
obviously there wasn’t a side impact regulation before that, so yes it 
would have offered an increased level of protection from where we 
were before “ 
 
A respondent who had been closely associated with the subsequent 
introduction of EuroNCAP judged that the regulations had already begun to 
have a visible impact upon car design by 2000 when EuroNCAP’s first round 
of tests was completed. The performance of new cars in crash barrier tests 
showed considerable improvement over that of older models. The implication 
that the regulations had provided a basic platform for car occupant safety was 
echoed elsewhere: 
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“I think it does improve in the way that these regulations have avoided 
having bad cars, in the way that all the cars have a minimum 
requirement.  That minimizes the big differences between cars.  Of 
course it is not optimised but it's a push in the right direction. “ 
 
Underlying the broad agreement that there had been improvements in 
occupant safety were differing opinions about the importance of regulations in 
achieving this outcome.  Those who felt that the regulations had been the 
single most significant factor in driving change were balanced by others who 
asserted that other factors had been more important, notably the prior US 
testing requirements that had shaped the production of global manufacturers 
and EuroNCAP which had subsequently ratcheted up the minimum standards 
for European manufacturers.  Most of those interviewed, however, took an 
intermediate position in which they argued that improvements had resulted 
from the front and side impact regulations in conjunction with other 
developments. EuroNCAP, the campaigning activities of NGOs and 
competitive pressure between manufacturers to give themselves an edge in 
the marketplace were variously cited as operating alongside the regulations to 
create new incentives to improve occupant safety. Although many thought that 
the impact of these parallel developments, particularly EuroNCAP, had 
subsequently been greater than that of the regulations themselves, there was 
a fair level of agreement that the regulations had formed a necessary platform 
upon which further improvements could be built: 
 
“I think that the regulations have played a very large part in stimulating 
these improvements but we also have to take into account that 
EuroNCAP has also acted as an enormous driving force and I am sure 
has had a further influence over and above the Regulations.  But in the 
absence of EuroNCAP there still would have been a significant 
improvement, I’m sure, through the regulatory process.”  
 
“…the big advantage is that the regulation did create a kind of level 
playing field from a consumer perspective.”  
 
However, the regulations were not regarded, as a trigger for continuous 
improvement in crashworthiness performance. The general view was that they 
had produced a step change at a particular moment by setting minimum 
standards that were then fixed. They thus lacked an internal dynamic to drive 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF 64 VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
change, or, as one respondent put it, they defined a status quo that, in 
technical terms, tended to become the lowest common denominator, 
stimulating compliance rather than progress. Several of those who expressed 
this opinion acknowledged that the regulations were indeed open to 
subsequent review and refinement through the European legislative process. 
However, the complexity of this process along with the contentious nature of 
the issues involved was seen to favour inertia over progressive change.  
 
“They’re not promoting a continuous improvement because it’s only 
one regulation, which on the whole is based on a single point of time.  It 
isn’t as if the regulation is being improved and therefore making safety 
design change…. there is a place for the regulatory process.  The 
trouble is that at the European level it is so much like walking in treacle 
that the actual rate of change and the time it takes for a directive to 
come from the debating stage to an agreed one is anything between 5 
and 10 years.”  
 
One member of the research community was optimistic that the need for the 
upgrading of regulatory requirements was better recognised than in the past, 
referring to the proposals to review the side impact and pedestrian regulations 
after two or three years in order to incorporate findings about their effects into 
future planning, with the possibility of incrementally increasing safety targets. 
But he too observed a tension between a willingness to revisit legislation and 
the practical impediments to revising regulations swiftly enough to keep pace 
with a changing safety environment: 
 
“Because we need the agreement of too many people the process is 
slowed down.”   
  
The impact of the regulations upon motor manufacturers 
When asked whether the manufacturers would have introduced the same 
safety design features and overall levels of protection without the regulatory 
requirement,  most of those interviewed concluded that although piecemeal 
improvements would have taken place as the necessary technology became 
available, these would not have created a consistent safety standard across 
the industry. The effect of regulations, according to this view, had been to 
speed up and systematise the introduction of safety features that were often 
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already available but had previously been viewed by manufacturers as 
optional extras rather than basic requirements. In the process, the views of 
vehicle safety engineers within the manufacturing organisations were 
accorded a new importance:  
 
“They would have done some things along the line of improvement but 
we do know from confidential correspondence and discussions with 
some of the engineers that they themselves have difficulty persuading 
their bosses to provide money for improvement unless they can 
demonstrate an absolute need.  Will it sell more cars?  Do we have to 
have it for regulations?  So I think even the engineers involved in 
producing safer vehicles know that the regulations helped them get it 
through so I’m sure that something would have happened without it but 
nothing like the level.”  
 
Developing this theme, some suggested that the manufacturers would not 
have voluntarily acted to improve safety unless this produced a perceptible 
financial benefit in the market-place: 
 
“I am a bit cynical… my experience of working with the manufacturers 
is that they only do what they have to do.  The whole ethos is 
compliance with regulatory requirements; you don’t do more than you 
have to do”.  
 
A strongly competing view from within the industry was that far from stalling 
on safety in order to contain costs, manufacturers had invested considerable 
resources over a long period in the research and development of improved 
safety for vehicle occupants and indeed had made considerable advances 
prior to the introduction of the front and side impact regulations in 1998. One 
particular motor group, for example, had investigated offset frontal impact long 
before it entered the regulatory discussion as a key issue, and had 
independently developed a side impact test. In this capacity it considered that 
it had acted as a driving force for new safety tests and technologies that were 
subsequently reflected in the regulations. From this perspective, the industry 
had anticipated a growing awareness of safety issues among consumers and 
had worked independently to develop a dynamic safety culture in order to 
create for themselves a distinctive market position: 
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“There was certainly a competitive edge to it, manufacturers were 
looking for an edge and safety was one that hadn’t been exploited 
significantly.  There was pressure from government, from consumer 
organisations to improve safety.  There was the availability of 
technology which gave us possibilities that we couldn’t do before or do 
at economic levels so there is a whole range of different things and 
there was just a culture growing that there was a tide to do more to 
improve occupant safety”.   
 
Although views thus differed about the motives and the performance of the 
manufacturers prior to the introduction of the regulations, there was a 
convergence of opinion about the helpfulness of the regulations in 
consolidating the technical progress that had been made on occupant safety 
and translating this into a set of universal minimum requirements.  Even those 
manufacturers who believed that the regulations had had little effect upon 
their own operations because of the advances they had already made, 
acknowledged that there had been a considerable impact upon the industry as 
a whole. 
 
Aspects of the regulatory testing procedure 
The interview group was questioned about aspects of the regulatory testing 
regime, in order to define the benefits and any potential disadvantages for 
occupant and pedestrian safety. 
 
Whole vehicle versus component testing 
 
“There is no substitute for actually banging the car into the barrier and 
seeing what happens.”  
 
While both whole vehicle and component testing were regarded as important 
and complementary, the former was widely regarded as the indispensable 
basis of an effective safety regime. Only two respondents considered that 
component testing could on its own provide an accurate and comprehensive 
prediction of car performance under crash conditions. 
 
The detailed arguments in favour of whole vehicle testing were: 
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• without whole vehicle testing, it is impossible to achieve a holistic 
representation of the impact on the car and its occupants. The sub-
system is too disconnected to give a really good feel for exactly how 
the structure will perform under very high stress loads. 
• the need to test the restraint system and the vehicle characteristics at 
the same time is increasingly urgent as these elements become more 
complex; the interaction between the seat belt, the airbag, the vehicle 
crush and the deceleration forces can only be gauged through whole 
vehicle testing.   
• component testing does not take into account different car designs 
whereas whole vehicle testing allows safety performance to be defined 
within each car model. 
• with component testing there will always be more of an artificial single 
point test with a risk of some optimisation. With complete full-scale 
testing, there are a far lower number of configurations that can be 
tested. Optimisation still takes place but this time it will be an 
optimisation of all the systems according to one crash classification.   
 
Of the two respondents who dissented from the general view, one said that, 
although he had not given careful thought to the issue, he could not 
immediately see any advantages of whole vehicle testing versus component 
testing and that the former had possibly been pursued because it was more 
convenient rather than because it delivered specific benefits.  The second 
identified distinct advantages in component testing in terms of time, cost and 
repeatability.   
Optimisation 
There was a high level of agreement across the interview group that the 
introduction of the front and side impact regulations had resulted in 
manufacturers optimising the design of their cars to ensure that they would 
meet the test requirements.  However, many pointed out, that the risk of 
optimisation was not confined to the regulations and was intrinsic to all safety 
testing procedures, including those of EuroNCAP.  Views differed as to 
whether optimisation for the front and side impact regulations had created 
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significant disbenefits or whether it had simply created fewer additional 
benefits for some vehicle user groups than for others.  Some respondents felt 
that, whatever the risks of optimisation, it was important to begin somewhere 
and that the regulations had at least created greater transparency and 
consistency because manufacturers were now optimising for the same tests:   
 
“Optimisation is always going to occur, it is just when you have got a 
regulated test, everyone is going to be optimising around the same 
condition, otherwise every product is going to have a particular crash 
scenario, occupants, speed, impact direction partner vehicle which it is 
optimised for, but if there is no regulation they are all going to be 
naturally optimised at different levels, and I think you would find that 
probably with pedestrian protection at the moment because they 
understand so little about it that they are all optimised at different 
levels, whereas front and side impact they are optimising around either 
the regulated speed test or the NCAP scenario”  
 
On the other hand, there were concerns that the speed of the tests and the 
characteristics of the dummy used had led to optimisation for highly selective 
configurations of passenger and speed that did not necessarily represent a 
realistic scenario. As one respondent put it: 
 
“…35mph with a dummy that is meant to represent a healthy male is 
not what we are looking at in the real world.”     
 
Three kinds of risk were identified as a consequence of optimisation. The first 
and most frequently expressed was that the optimisation of safety for the 
average male driver disadvantaged other vehicle users. It  was said that even 
in the 30mph flat barrier test, vehicle users would be exposed to increasing 
levels of risk the more they diverged from the putative average. Stiffer 
structures, sharper restraint systems and airbags, all designed to minimise 
intrusion injuries, nonetheless contributed to a more hostile environment at 
low speeds for such `non-standard’ users, particularly in small cars. Thus, the 
small, post-menopausal woman driving a small car was likely to be 
exceptionally disadvantaged by optimisation and, even fit older men would 
fare significantly less well than the young, healthy male.  This caused one 
observer to comment that the whole issue of variation in the population and 
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variation in the types and severity of crashes was the next big challenge for 
the regulatory process.  
  
“I would just say there is always sub-optimisation to a test standard and 
that sub-optimisation is very sensitive to the way it’s tested.  We test 
with 50th percentile dummies that are themselves compromised.  
These groups that you indicate here, women, children, pregnant 
women, elderly, whatever, are always disadvantaged.  I would say that 
particularly they are more disadvantaged.  What I’m thinking about here 
is the offset regulation leads to generally stiffer vehicles and the 
restraint systems are therefore more rigorous or more severe in their 
operation and therefore I would say that elderly people and pregnant 
women are at a disadvantage because of the aggressiveness of the 
restraint systems as they need to deal with the forces of the offset.”  
 
“…for small women it leaves them vulnerable to interactions with 
airbags, for example, that are completely undetected by the current 
dummy. For the larger adult, the heavy male he may be in a restraint 
system which is completely incapable of holding him.” 
 
The second and related issue was that optimisation for the adult front seat 
passenger had made things worse for those in the rear seats, who were not 
covered by the current tests. It was suggested that these passengers would 
almost inevitably be compromised by the higher deceleration pulses released 
when anti-intrusion safety features caused only the front of the vehicle - rather 
than the front plus the passenger compartment - to be crushed in a collision, 
thus stopping the car more quickly.  
As predominantly rear seat passengers, children were seen as particularly 
vulnerable and one respondent was clearly scandalised by the lack of 
attention to their specific safety needs, both in the design process and in the 
regulatory testing regime: 
 
“Children certainly have been horribly neglected in regulations and 
there is just an extraordinary situation that we are in at the moment 
where as a parent you have to go somewhere and try and chose a 
child restraint off the shelf, based on how it looks to you, and yet you as 
an adult are enjoying restraint that is highly tuned to the particular 
vehicle and it is full of sophisticated features, load limiters and 
pretensions and things, but with our children we are still in the dark 
ages, shopping for bits of polystyrene, choosing really on the basis of 
the cover, so it is a massive difference in the approach to adult 
protection and child protection that I think is unjustifiable….”   
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Finally, there was a concern, closely linked to both the above issues, that 
optimisation at a specific speed could lead to vehicle structures that created 
more hostile environments at lower speeds, particularly for those who 
diverged furthest from the model of the healthy average male. As discussed 
further below (The correct speed for the front and side impact regulations), 
this led several respondents to oppose the raising of the speed of the 
regulatory test, with one arguing for an actual reduction in the speed. 
 
Compatibility 
Most respondents  were reluctant to commit themselves on the question of 
whether the vehicle modifications designed to meet the requirements of the 
regulations had resulted in additional problems of compatibility. Their answers 
tended to be phrased in terms of hunches and probabilities. Those who felt 
that the problem had become slightly worse, pointed to the incompatibility 
between newer cars that met the requirements of the regulations and older 
cars that did not: 
 
“It has probably got slightly worse, or there is probably more 
incompatibility than there used to be, that is almost certain to be the 
case...Certainly in front to front, I don’t think it makes a great deal of 
difference in front to side, but in the front to front it will have affected it. I 
think it becomes more noticeable when you have got a new car hitting 
an old car and if it had been two old cars hitting each other then they 
would have not had a brilliant chance of survival anyway, just makes it 
more pointed when they walk out of one car and they are dead in the 
other.”  
 
There was nonetheless a degree of optimism that the problem would ease as 
the vehicle fleet renewed itself and as adaptive solutions were developed. It 
was thought likely that incompatibility between large and small cars would 
remain a problem, although, once again, improvements were feasible. 
 
A slightly larger group of respondents considered that the regulations had 
probably not made things worse given that previous vehicle structures were 
not especially benign; at the same time, they considered that very little had 
been done to improve compatibility.  One felt that a lack of progress in 
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addressing the problem lay in an incorrect interpretation of the nature of 
compatibility: 
 
“Compatibility is very much a geometric problem rather than a mass 
problem that people have traditionally focused upon.  So I think there 
needs to be much more harmonisation of vehicle structure in terms of 
geometry, heights of bumpers, heights of chassis rails etc…  There 
needs to be more in regulation about compatibility but it needs to be 
focused on the problem and I believe the problem is as much geometry 
as it is mass and stiffness.”  
 
Placing the issue in a broader perspective, it was noted that although the 
increased sales of  4x4s and Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) had led to greater 
incompatibilities within the car fleet, the main danger for vehicle users 
remained the incompatibility between cars and heavy goods vehicles: 
 
“Massively important to get front and rear guards properly compatible 
with car structures, a lot of compatibility discussions assume it is a car 
to car problem but if you look at the fatal causalities particularly, then 
incompatibility with heavy goods vehicles is absolutely dominant.”   
 
Pedestrian friendliness 
None of the interviewees believed that the vehicle modifications designed to 
meet the requirements of the front and side impact regulations had resulted in 
vehicles that were less pedestrian friendly.  Nor did they consider, on the 
other hand, that they had had much positive impact on pedestrian safety.  
Most felt that they had made no difference, while a few believed that there had 
been marginal improvements. Where such improvements were identified, they 
were seen as coincidental spin-offs of the modifications rather than as having 
been planned for the benefit of pedestrians: 
 
“I have the feeling that the pedestrian has been improved in safety in 
relation to car design by chance up to now and if the car is less 
aggressive to the pedestrian it is not because of the industry or 
because of the regulation.  It is because of the streamlined shape of 
the car, the introduction of more plastic material and less steel.  Except 
for a few things on the external shape, which is one regulation, all the 
rest is just by chance up to now.”  
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One manufacturer was singled out as having made a commitment to 
pedestrian safety  and some practical progress, but the industry in general 
was accused by members of the research community of doing the minimum it 
could get away with, thus effectively disengaging itself from the pedestrian 
safety issue, despite the minimal cost of designing pedestrian protection into 
vehicles. The voluntary agreement on pedestrian protection was said to have 
provided an escape route for the industry : 
 
“I don’t think that is driving it at all. I think that again is an example of 
the industry watering down the requirements”  
 
The technical challenges of achieving progress in pedestrian safety were, 
however, acknowledged to be complex and reminded one researcher of the 
competing issues that shaped the evolution of the front and side impact 
regulations:  
 
“…we have got exactly the same issue going on now between industry 
and government as there was earlier on with the resistance to the test 
speed in frontal impacts and the sort of barrier height in side impacts.  
It is difficult to design the car to protect pedestrians when you think of 
the difference between a tall male and a child and where they are going 
to hit and there is a three part test there where they have got to design 
their vehicle to mitigate head injury for a child and adult and then you 
have got the hip and then the knee level, and to get all those right.”  
 
The correct speed for the front and side impact regulations 
Opinion was divided about the advisability of raising the speed of the 
regulatory tests for front and side impact to conform to that used by 
EuroNCAP.  On one side it was argued that a higher speed should have been 
implemented from the outset and that the reasons originally put forward for 
keeping the speed down (principally concerns about compatibility) had not 
been fully supported in practice: 
 
“I don’t think we should raise the EuroNCAP speed, but I think the 
regulatory speed should equate to whatever the accident people are 
saying is the best speed to mirror.   The most number of accidents, and 
that is what should decide it.”  
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Moreover, it was suggested, the EuroNCAP speed for frontal impact had 
superseded that of the directive and cars were now being designed routinely 
to perform at the higher speed.  One respondent also pointed out that a 
recently published review of the regulations by the EEVC, using experimental 
data, had concluded that the speed was too low for side impact. 
 
Ranged on the opposite side were a larger number, including all the industry 
representatives responding to this question, who were unconvinced about, or 
actually opposed to raising the speed. One manufacturer expressed the view 
that an increase in speed would be counterproductive in terms of 
compatibility, and that the inevitable increase in weight would compromise fuel 
economy and environmental performance. The benefits and disbenefits of 
testing would thus move from a positive to a negative ratio.  
 
A frequently stated argument among those opposing an increase in the speed 
of the regulatory test was that an enhancement of the performance of cars at 
higher speeds risked making them more hostile for vulnerable groups in 
crashes at relatively low speeds: 
 
“Around 80% of all the people who get AIS 2 and less injuries, if you 
don’t mind me getting a bit technical, are in crashes well below 35 mph, 
or 40 mph if you take the offset barrier test. My view is that, if anything, 
decrease the speed but lower the threshold levels that are acceptable 
on the dummies.  You go down to 750 for Head Injury Criteria (HIC) 
and 40Gs for the chest and 15lb for the legs.  That is the way you begin 
to address all of the relatively vulnerable people who are all having 
crashes in the sort of 30mph range and they make up the bulk of those 
people that get seriously hurt and killed.  This quest for having a higher 
crash speed, a more severe test by making it more extreme in terms of 
the population of crashes, is misconceived.”  
 
While only one other respondent put forward a case for reducing the speed of 
the regulatory test, there was more support for the view that an increase in the 
speed without a reduction in the injury thresholds would be counter-
productive. 
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Several argued the case for maintaining a separation between the 
requirements of the regulations and EuroNCAP in order to discourage 
optimisation at a single point. While some saw virtue in continuing to 
differentiate primarily by speed. It was also suggested that that the value of 
having two tests might be maximised by allowing them to address different  
kinds of impact: 
 
“Having two impacts which are different is a more preferable situation, 
you are testing different scenarios. So therefore I would think it was 
probably appropriate that if the regulation were to raise the EuroNCAP 
specification, EuroNCAP would drop that and go for something else… 
Or if EuroNCAP keeps what they are doing they should change 
regulation 94 to be a different impact scenario all together.  Lower 
speed, lower offset, whatever.”  
 
Making a similar point, another respondent felt that incorporating lower injury 
thresholds into the regulations would ensure more safety gains than simply 
increasing the speed of the test. According to this view, to stay with the 
existing performance criteria while increasing the speed would not overcome 
the problem of sub-optimisation of design.  
  
Finally, one research expert concluded that any debate about changes in the 
speed of the side impact regulation was premature because of  the 
acknowledged deficiencies of the test and uncertainty about how it should be 
reconfigured: 
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“Well the test procedure is wrong, the test dummy is inadequate.  I 
think that’s probably the main thing, mainly the test procedure.  In other 
words we’re back to this barrier.  What should be done?... I don’t know 
whether the speed should be higher.  We are fairly sure that the ground 
clearance should be greater on the barrier.  Now is it just the ground 
clearance and not the speed because the speed comes from the 
deformation that is affected?  We don’t know that.”  
 
The burden to industry of meeting the requirements of the front and side 
regulations 
Some interviewees from outside the motor industry acknowledged that they 
had had little idea at the time about the cost to manufacturers of meeting the 
front and side impact regulations. Their only preoccupation had been with the 
promotion of safety.  Among the others, including representatives from the 
industry, there was a fair level of agreement that the burden had been slight, 
although it was said to have been somewhat greater for side impact than for 
frontal impact.  Although vehicles needed to be redesigned in order to meet 
the new requirements for frontal impact protection, redesign and its 
associated research and development costs was already a continuous 
element within vehicle production. For side impact protection, redesign was 
not in itself sufficient to meet the new standards and additional materials were 
required, notably padding and airbags (although one research expert 
considered that padding added to a cleverly designed side structure would 
have been sufficient for the purposes of the regulations).  Since relatively little 
was known about how to manage side impact collisions, the up-front 
engineering research costs were also higher.    
 
Several accused the industry of having exaggerated the financial burden in 
order to fuel its resistance to the regulations: 
 
“It is interesting really because the industry position was that basically 
you will put us out of business if you required these sorts of levels of 
performance and then the researchers initially developed the thing not 
particularly with an eye to the cost but just saying this is what you 
actually need to do to reduce injury. I think the early tests, with the 
proposed test procedures, showed that there were production vehicles 
that did pretty well with the new procedure and then it became clear to 
the consumer groups particularly that these claims of devastating costs 
to the industry were completely unfounded.”   
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This was backed up by a respondent who had worked both in industry and in 
government research. He concluded that the real cost of engineering a 
solution for frontal impact was a fraction of what his company had been 
claiming in public: £10 as opposed to £200-£300.  Furthermore, the actual 
part component cost was in his view likely to be less than £1.00, the 
remainder of the £10.00 being devoted to “engineering glamorisation over the 
life of the product.” Another industry representative suggested that the cost to 
his company of meeting the regulations had not been much more than 50 
euros, although this figure took into account the opportunity to incorporate the 
new requirements into the normal design process well ahead of the date for 
the introduction of the regulations.  
 
On the whole, however, the manufacturers’ representatives were unwilling to 
estimate the cost of meeting the regulations. The calculations were complex 
and it was also evident from their responses that companies had differed in 
their preparedness for the regulations so that while some needed to embark 
on major research and development programmes, others which had already 
made substantial investments in safety design found that much smaller 
adaptations were required.  Some safety products became a universal 
requirement with an associated development and testing cost for all 
manufacturers but it was pointed out that these initial costs usually fell 
dramatically once the product entered mass production. Thus the high costs 
of the new technology for airbags were balanced by a much lower production 
cost over the life of the vehicle once the airbag became a routine rather than a 
luxury safety item.  
 
A question arose during the interviews about whether those manufacturers 
producing cars for the US market had had a cost advantage in meeting the 
regulations because they were already conforming to the US side and front 
impact test standards.  While one research expert considered that this was 
indeed the case, others felt that the opposite was true and that manufacturers 
conforming to the American directives had possibly underestimated the extent 
to which they would need to adapt their products to meet the very different 
requirements of the European regulations.  The few companies selling in both 
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markets were effectively required to design for two different regulatory 
regimes whereas those selling only in Europe were able to focus exclusively 
on the regulations and, later, EuroNCAP. 
 
The timescale allowed for industry’s investment decisions 
The general view among the non-industry respondents was that while the 
timescale followed for the introduction of the front and side impact regulations 
was not explicitly planned in order to meet the needs of the industry, the 
delays were such that manufacturers were given ample lead time for making 
investment and production decisions.  Indeed, most believed that the stalling 
tactics employed by the industry throughout the regulatory process, 
particularly in the motor vehicle working groups, had been used to buy time 
rather than to air legitimate objections: 
 
“Well, they use it as a … negotiating tool, they always do, I have been 
involved in the revision of virtually all the regulations in the last 20 
years and that is just the pattern of what they do, they just say we must 
have a huge lead time and it is not related to reality it is just a 
negotiating position … to make sure that nothing that happens in 
regulation influences their natural investment cycle, that is the key 
thing.”  
 
It was generally agreed that the specifications for the regulations had existed 
long before the regulations came in, with one observer estimating that the 
intervening period had been around 15 years during which the industry had 
managed to delay implementation without any sound technical basis for doing 
so. Once the regulations were introduced,  the immediate impact upon the 
industry was further softened by allowing a lengthy period to elapse before 
new models had to comply, thus giving manufacturers considerable notice of 
the changes required. The regulations were then applied incrementally to 
existing models so that the process of implementation was extended over a 
period of several years.  
 
The cost of the UK government research programme 
Although exact figures were not available, the former head of the TRL 
crashworthiness research programme estimated that between £750,000 and 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF 78 VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
£1 million per year was spent on research into front and side impact and 
compatibility from the mid 1980’s until the mid 1990s. The amount of work 
undertaken remained fairly constant throughout.  There was no single, 
identifiable budget to support the research programme for most of this period 
and the estimated spend was derived from annual contributions from 
customer held budgets.  By the time funding moved to a contract system, 
most of the work on front and side impact had been completed but the volume 
of spending, now directed mainly towards compatibility, was thought to have 
remained at about £750,000.  A colleague who worked at TRL from 1994/5 
until 1999 remembered a somewhat higher figure of around £1.5 million 
devoted to front impact research at the beginning of this period, 
tailing off towards the end. 
 
A non-government research expert point out that the impact of the 
Department for Transport’s financial commitment could not be measured 
solely in terms of the regulations: 
 
“It is used by lots of people, by the manufacturers, by the suppliers, by 
consumer groups to advance their agenda, well outside the specifics of 
development of regulations or EuroNCAP. ..it sharpened up the 
industry, for example, in a number of ways and resulted in the industry 
doing things which were way beyond what the regulations had 
required.”  
 
5.1.2 EuroNCAP 
 
The general impact of EuroNCAP upon car occupant safety 
Across the interview group, all but two respondents were convinced that 
protection for car occupants had improved since the introduction of 
EuroNCAP, which was considered to have raised the performance of the 
motor manufacturers substantially beyond the levels that would otherwise 
have been achieved by the front and side impact regulations. A key piece of 
evidence for this view was the range of standard safety features now being 
fitted in European cars, well in excess of the regulatory requirements: 
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“You can go back very many years, from the NCAP reports … and try 
to see what they’ve got in the cars that are partly market forces driven 
of which NCAP is a part and are not there just to meet the directive.  
They can take out the side airbag, all front airbags, probably take out 
all airbags and I don’t know what else and still meet the directives.  So 
all those extra safety aids that are not there to meet the directives are 
there for another reason.  They are really there because they think it 
will help to sell their car.”  
 
An insurance expert quoted findings from road safety investigations to the 
effect that EuroNCAP had stimulated manufacturers to increase safety levels 
across successive models, with the result that vehicles now obtaining four or 
five stars in the EuroNCAP tests, compared to one or two stars for previous 
models of the same vehicles, were demonstrating many fewer casualties in 
similar impact scenarios. The superior performance in terms of occupant 
protection of highly-rated vehicles was also highlighted: 
 
“  There is some very good data from the IIHS that is again showing 
where they have  tested vehicles that get a good or a best pick, they 
are considerably better (and it’s a factor of 10) in terms of occupant 
protection.  So I would certainly say that EuroNCAP as a body has 
moved the safety game on far more than government and regulations 
can possibly.”   
 
Pointing to the complexity of the interaction between the factors that 
contribute to a car’s performance in an accident, a researcher took a 
somewhat different line, arguing that EuroNCAP’s achievement lay in pushing 
forward safety in a global way rather than in defining narrow safety 
differentials between vehicles: 
 
“It is not necessarily the question of the car that has 5 stars being 
better than the one that has 3 stars but a push for the industry to have 
better, safer cars and to avoid weak points.  There are so many 
parameters involved, including the driving population, that are not the 
same in the small or large car, in the expensive or not expensive, so it 
is complicated to know really if the car is safer in an accident.”  
 
Despite such differences in interpretation of the impact of EuroNCAP upon 
vehicle performance, there was broad agreement that it had succeeded in 
harnessing market forces in the interests of occupant safety so that evidence 
of superior safety performance became a powerful marketing tool. The 
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element of competition introduced by EuroNCAP’s star ratings was said to 
have created a far more dynamic impetus to improvement than the minimum 
requirements of the regulations and also a greater convergence in the safety 
performance of cars: 
 
“When EuroNCAP first started in 1997 there was a huge disparity 
between the best and worse vehicles, that gap has narrowed 
enormously and at the same time standards have improved so we have 
offered a very wide range of performance to a narrower and higher 
level of performance.”  
 
For manufacturers whose safety specifications differed across Europe, 
EuroNCAP prompted an up-grading to the highest existing level. In one case, 
cars designed for the UK, North European and South European markets had 
been fitted with progressively lower levels of occupant protection, which 
meant that South European versions were less likely to have features such as 
airbags and Antilock Braking System (ABS). This suddenly changed with the 
introduction of EuroNCAP:  
 
“When NCAP came in and the UK Government started testing the 
lowest specification available in the European market, suddenly (the 
company) fitted all the Southern European ones with the same level of 
kit and that was a big change and that affected a number of 
manufacturers.”  
 
The speed of change following the introduction of EuroNCAP attracted 
specific comment from a government observer: 
 
“I think what in particular is surprising is the speed with which it was 
possible to introduce more or less continuous improvements in the 
level of passive safety”  
 
One researcher, while strongly endorsing the general belief about the positive 
impact of EuroNCAP, qualified his view by pointing out that the benefits of 
consumer testing could apply only to those vehicles that actually went through 
the process and that while EuroNCAP, by selecting on a sales basis, would 
test the majority of vehicles, there were “variants and even models and 
manufacturers that are never assessed.”  
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The two respondents who expressed uncertainty about the positive impact of 
EuroNCAP upon car occupant safety were both industry representatives. One 
questioned whether the resources devoted to gaining the maximum star 
ratings might not be better spent in pursuing active safety solutions that could 
have a more substantial impact upon real world safety. The other considered 
that the impact of EuroNCAP had been felt more strongly in the restraint 
systems of vehicles than in their structure,  and therefore had mixed views 
about its overall effect upon occupant safety.      
 
For the majority of respondents who had a strongly positive view of the impact 
of EuroNCAP, consumer testing was seen to be the single most important 
factor now driving safety improvements because of its observable impact 
upon the behaviour of manufacturers over a relatively short period, They were 
nonetheless aware of prior developments that had been significant in 
preparing the ground for EuroNCAP and in supporting its effective 
performance. In particular, the front and side impact regulations were said to 
have provided an essential foundation: 
 
“My view is that there had been an inter-relationship between the 
legislative side and the consumer information side, I don’t think we 
would have had the good development of EuroNCAP had there not 
been that initial front and side impact legislation there to show that the 
government was serious, to show that they would have to do 
something by a certain date.”  
 
Factors such as insurance costs and consumer awareness were also 
considered to have been influential: 
 
“There is impact from the insurers in terms of increased litigation costs 
and increased personal injury claims.  There is a heightened 
awareness now from the buying public that vehicle safety is important 
and vehicle manufacturers themselves are jumping on the consumer 
bandwagon, which isn’t bad, but advertising their vehicles as passing 
safety regulations or doing well in consumer tests.”  
 
And it was suggested that competitive market forces were in any case working 
in the direction of improved safety. 
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“Partly through NCAP, partly through just market forces because, 
remember, airbags were in the steering wheel before NCAP came in 
for the larger cars but they didn’t want to force the cost onto their cheap 
cars.”  
 
While the new safety culture was seen to be the product of an interaction 
between EuroNCAP and other trends,  EuroNCAP was nonetheless regarded 
as the prime mover because of its efficacy in consolidating existing 
achievements and driving safety to a new level.  As indicated by the last 
respondent, safety features which manufacturers had already introduced for 
larger cars or in parts of Europe with relatively rigorous safety requirements 
were rapidly extended across the fleet and across the European Union.  None 
of those interviewed believed that the same levels of safety protection for car 
occupants would have been achieved in the same time frame without 
EuroNCAP: 
 
“I think that a lot of the things that are in an average passenger car that 
are available now might have been there but it might have taken much 
longer to have got them into the market place and also it might not 
have been so widespread, it might have been limited to the 
manufacturers that see safety as their market image.”  
 
 
EuroNCAP was widely seen to have stimulated a continuous improvement in 
crashworthiness performance. In contrast to the front and side impact 
regulations, which were said to have brought about a step change towards a 
minimum safety standard, EuroNCAP was said to be driving safety ‘from the 
top’; in other words, it was working to diffuse the most advanced levels of 
protection throughout the industry: 
 
“As it’s not a pass/fail criterion like the regulation – regulation has to 
appeal to the lowest common denominator and a regulatory body 
therefore has to consider the slowest people whereas a consumer test 
can consider the slowest and the fastest and really drive from the top 
end.  It can be driven by the very best to say this manufacturer can do 
this well in this test therefore we want everybody to catch up and we 
will tell every body to buy car A because it’s the best and that will make 
car B, C and D catch up because they will lose sales.”   
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Competition in the market-place was widely regarded as the principal dynamic 
in the process of improvement. It was said that once manufacturers believed 
that superior safety ratings could give them an edge in selling their vehicles, 
the impetus for change no longer depended upon external pressure but 
became embedded in their own planning and design processes: 
 
“With EuroNCAP it is a process of continuous improvement because 
there is something for the manufacturer to gain from producing safer 
vehicles, which is not the case with the regulations.  Once he’s got past 
the base line he doesn’t need to do any more but with EuroNCAP you 
get credit for doing something.”  
 
Some respondents considered, however, that the rate of improvement was 
unlikely to be as rapid in the future as it had been in the years immediately 
following the introduction of EuroNCAP when the gap between the worst and 
best performing vehicles had narrowed sharply.  It was suggested that a 
safety plateau might be reached, beyond which there would certainly be 
changes as technology evolved, but not on the scale observed so far.  This 
would pose new challenges for EuroNCAP in maintaining the interest of 
consumers and the industry: 
 
“I think it is a lot harder now to make the incremental improvements 
than it was initially…  I think when we come to talk about the future of 
EuroNCAP I think EuroNCAP have still got to try and maintain the level 
of publicity to get the driving force behind it all and if it becomes like the 
USNCAP which nobody seems to know about, which they spend a 
huge amount of money on each year, then it starts to get very difficult 
to make things happen.”   
 
Support for the idea that EuroNCAP had stimulated a process of continuous 
improvement was not, however, universal and the four respondents who 
dissented from this view were all industry representatives. One acknowledged 
that there had been continuous change but did not equate this to continuous 
improvement, highlighting specific problems with the upgraded dummy for 
side impact tests:   
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“When EuroNCAP changed the side impact dummy from EuroSID 1 to 
EuroSID II, some of the items they were requiring were certainly for the 
good because we now know that EuroSID 1 had some deficiencies.  
On the other side, some of the other requirements introduced by 
EuroNCAP that forced car manufacturers to change design like T12 
(thoracic rib 12), like the back plate modifier, were not always for the 
good, sometimes completely the opposite.”   
 
Aspects of the EuroNCAP testing procedure 
Optimisation  
Views about the tendency to optimisation under EuroNCAP closely mirrored 
those reported above in relation to the front and side impact regulations. With 
one exception, those interviewed believed that optimisation was an inevitable 
consequence of modifying vehicles to perform well at the EuroNCAP tests. 
The exception was an industry representative who said that while sub-
optimisation was certainly possible, some manufacturers, including his own 
company, made efforts to avoid it. 
 
As in the discussion of  the regulations, there were some who considered that 
the effects of optimisation were relatively benign or at least neutral and a 
larger number who considered that they disadvantaged the non-50th percentile 
male, with some disagreements about the extent and dangers of these 
disbenefits to other groups. 
 
Several respondents pointed out that EuroNCAP enjoyed flexibility in its 
implementation that contrasted with the fixed nature of the regulations and felt 
that it was now appropriate for it to use this flexibility by varying its testing 
procedures to cover a range of speeds, accident scenarios and types of 
vehicle user: 
 
“I think probably what we have touched on already is the business of 
making sure the cars are not optimised for one particular sort of 
accident, getting in different sorts of accidents looking at the protection 
of small people, large people, perhaps looking at different speed etc. 
those are the sorts of areas you can start to expand on.”  
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It was said that although manufacturers were already testing to a range of 
scenarios, it was the desire to achieve good scores in EuroNCAP that was 
most likely to lead to design changes. All the more important therefore that the 
EuroNCAP tests involved a range of scenarios that were credible in terms of 
real world accidents and improved protection for a range of vehicle users.  
Even so, an expansion of the EuroNCAP tests would undoubtedly be 
expensive and difficult to fund. 
 
“There are conversations about older people, there are conversations 
about small females, what about 95th percentiles in small cars, so there 
are a lot of possible impact scenarios that could more robustly test the 
restraint system and the crashworthiness of the individual vehicles.  But 
…that is very costly and not an easy thing for EuroNCAP to fund 3 
additional vehicle tests to maintain its objectivity and its independence.  
There is lots of good clear thinking on the EuroNCAP group about what 
they need to do but unfortunately funds restrict what can be done.   
Therefore additional government support could be tremendously 
beneficial to increase overall vehicle crashworthiness.”  
 
Specific questions were raised about the formulation of the side impact test, 
which had proved unexpectedly benign and which was seen to require 
reviewing and upgrading in order to provide an appropriate level of protection. 
A key problem, as identified by one research expert, was that side impact was 
such a dramatic event over such a short period that it was difficult for 
structures alone to provide protection. Side air-bags were likely to offer an 
important extra safety dimension but were not currently a necessity for 
meeting the EuroNCAP test requirements: 
 
Compatibility 
When asked whether the requirements of EuroNCAP had resulted in 
additional problems of compatibility, the interviewees’ responses were, if 
anything, more tentative than those they had given to a parallel earlier 
question about the effect of the front and side impact regulations.  Most said 
that they were uncertain whether EuroNCAP had made any difference to 
compatibility, while tending to believe that it had not made it worse.  While 
some thought that increased structural stiffness in cars meeting the 
EuroNCAP regulations could disadvantage older partner vehicles in an 
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accident, others suggested once again that stiffness was not fundamental to 
the problem of compatibility: 
 
“I still believe that compatibility is as much a geometric problem as it is 
a structural stiffness problem.  As EuroNCAP doesn’t drive geometry 
one way or the other, specifically, it’s not all their fault.”  
 
The importance of achieving compatibility in frontal impact was emphasised 
on the grounds that if frontal compatibility was achieved, it became easier to 
factor in other elements such as stiffness, geometry and the road interface in 
order to achieve optimisation.   One respondent was convinced that 
optimisation would nonetheless inevitably involve moral choices and 
compromises in vehicle design: 
 
“The compromise means that maybe for the larger car, for example, we 
will have introduced not such a high internal protection because we 
need a slighter weaker structure to have optimisation.”   
 
Pedestrian friendliness 
The interviewees gave a broadly neutral response when asked whether the 
requirements of EuroNCAP had resulted in vehicles that were less pedestrian-
friendly, mirroring their answers to an earlier question about the impact of the 
front and side impact regulations upon pedestrian safety. The general view 
was that EuroNCAP had as yet resulted in few improvements in pedestrian 
friendliness but, at the same time, had probably not made things worse.  Two 
respondents felt that the tendency was towards less pedestrian friendliness, 
although they agreed with the majority opinion that little difference had been 
made overall. 
 
There were some expressions of optimism about the industry having begun to 
address pedestrian protection, including this comment from a European 
government representative: 
 
“My impression until they really started to focus and highlight the 
pedestrian issue in 1998, it was with the launch of the (make and 
model quoted)  in Amsterdam I recall, until that time they didn’t care, 
and I think we didn’t find any response by the industry to pay any 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF 87 VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
attention to the issue of pedestrian protection, the only thing that 
mattered was the cost and design - and from that time on at least there 
was some kind of response, some kind of awareness that it is an issue 
to bear in mind.”  
 
The respondents agreed, however, that EuroNCAP had not succeeded in 
producing the continuous and rapid improvements in pedestrian safety that 
had been evident in vehicle occupant safety. One reason given was that the 
pedestrian component of the test was inadequate and that potentially helpful 
vehicle modifications had had only a partial effect. While the fronts of new 
cars had become less aggressive for pedestrians than those of older vehicles, 
in that they were less angular and sharp, they nonetheless remained too stiff.  
 
Another view was that manufacturers had been let off the hook by a lack of 
consumer pressure for improvements in pedestrian safety.  Although they 
were complying with the pedestrian test procedure, very few had positively 
engaged with the challenge of embedding pedestrian safety in the design of 
their vehicles. One manufacturer was once again singled out as a leader in 
this field. While the likely effect upon real world pedestrian safety through 
exposure to its new cars was acknowledged to be small, the positive 
behaviour of one manufacturer could potentially have a measurable impact on 
its competitors. 
 
The effect of safety ratings upon consumer attitudes towards 
purchasing cars. 
Most of those interviewed believed that EuroNCAP had influenced consumer 
attitudes towards purchasing cars.  They believed that the publication of test 
results had brought safety to the fore and, by increasing safety awareness, 
had influenced consumer purchase criteria.  This higher profile given to safety 
performance was not attributed primarily to consumers seeking out 
EuroNCAP rankings – although a EuroNCAP representative in the interview 
group did note that the hit rate for its website had expanded phenomenally - 
but from manufacturers using good results as a positive marketing tool: 
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“From the information that I have from (one manufacturer) they have 
seen a big increase in sales and in analysis of their increased sales 
one of the principal reasons has been an increase in safety.  They were 
a vehicle manufacturer perceived as being less safe than the average 
and therefore they have sort of rewritten that…  so clearly there has 
been a tremendous benefit in that a manufacturer that does well in 
consumer tests, and also advertises the fact, can increase public 
perception."  
 
At the same time, negative findings for certain cars and manufacturers had 
found their way directly to consumers and had devastated their markets in the 
UK. This had made manufacturers aware of the potential of EuroNCAP for 
influencing their position in the market-place: 
 
“It was one or two real scares like that in an industry that is massively 
over capacity anyway, so one or more than one big player is going to 
go to the wall.  So that is the coincidence why EuroNCAP is so 
important because a) it can cripple your market and b) it isn’t a time 
where you can afford to have a big problem.”   
 
Not everyone was convinced, however, that there was a demonstrable 
relationship between performance in the EuroNCAP tests and consumer 
purchasing behaviour.  It was suggested, for example, that the consumer’s 
decision to buy a particular car was based upon a range of criteria, of which 
safety was an element. The weight it carried in the final choice remained 
unknown. As one industry representative put it: 
 
“Things you know about will influence you but no marketing specialist 
will ever be able to tell you that it has sold one more vehicle because it 
achieved 5 stars.”   
 
Another claimed that the fundamental reason for providing consumers with 
information about safety was not to influence sales but to enable the 
consumer to make a more fully informed choice. Some people would no doubt 
continue to choose their car on the basis of styling or speed but at least its 
safety performance would be a known rather than an unknown quantity, 
whereas prior to EuroNCAP it would have been almost impossible for 
consumers to gauge critical safety differences between vehicles.  
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By breaking the link between consumer safety awareness and sales, such 
arguments would appear at first sight to demolish the manufacturers’ principal 
incentive for improving their EuroNCAP ratings. But various respondents 
made the intriguing suggestion that manufacturers were influenced more by 
their perception of EuroNCAP’s influence than by the actual behaviour of 
consumers: 
 
“The important thing about EuroNCAP is not that we are informing 
consumers about the safety of cars.  The important thing about 
EuroNCAP is that manufacturers feel that we have that effect on the 
consumer and they modify their cars because they worry about what 
we are telling consumers.  …So it is very important that we operate on 
the basis of manipulating the manufacturers to improve their cars and 
as part of that you have got to tell the consumer but the number of 
consumers you actually influence has very little effect.”  
 
According to this analysis, the important thing was that the information was 
`out there’, with the potential to influence sales and destabilise the 
manufacturers’ position in the market-place, with the development of better-
informed consumers very much a secondary benefit. 
 
Whatever the precise mechanism at work, there was near unanimity within the 
interview group that EuroNCAP ratings exercised a powerful positive impact 
upon investment in improving car crashworthiness.  Accustomed to seeking 
competitive advantage for their own cars in the market place, manufacturers 
had seized upon the ratings as another means of demonstrating the 
superiority of their product: 
 
“I would say vehicle manufacturers strive for every half point and 
because there is a certain simplicity in the ranking undertaken with 
EuroNCAP, more so than with the IIHS offset test, the manufacturers 
will not be happy just to have 5 stars but want to have 35.5 points and 
not 35.  They will strive to do as well as they possibly can.”  
 
This imperative to maximise performance in EuroNCAP was also said to have 
altered the dynamics of decision-taking within the industry, giving vehicle 
safety engineers much greater influence than before in the design process. 
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“In fact we have heard this many times from manufacturers that the 
safety engineers have been empowered by EuroNCAP because what 
they can now say when they sit round in their design meetings and they 
say ‘Do we do this or do we do that’ and if the sales director says ‘I 
must have this because I can’t sell the cars unless this particular thing 
is added’  the safety engineer would say ‘On your head be it, in that 
case it will not be a four star car it will be a three star car’ and the 
decisions get reversed.”  
 
Respondents’ views were also sought about the value of consumer-oriented 
publications, such as the Department for Transport’s “Choosing Safety”, which 
are  based upon the retrospective analysis of real world accident data.  
Opinions were divided. Supporters believed that they promoted a better flow 
of information to the public and increased transparency. They were also seen 
to be more comprehensive in their coverage than EuroNCAP, which of 
necessity has to test vehicles selectively.  Another argument in their favour 
was that they were less susceptible to bias than consumer tests and therefore 
fairer and more accurate.  The Folksam insurance reports were singled out as 
a particularly useful resource:   
 
“If the basis is real life safety in crashes like Folksam, I think that the 
validity of such a rating is much higher, as there is no assessment 
which in case of Euro NCAP is quite often subjective and not 
related/evaluated against real life safety.”  
 
Practical booklets issued by the Department for Transport on subjects such as 
choosing and installing head restraints and child safety seats also drew praise 
for their “good, down-to-earth guidance for consumers.”  
 
Others were more sceptical of their value and impact.  It was said that they 
had a relatively low public profile and were of more interest to motor industry 
‘insiders’, whether researchers or manufacturers, than to the average 
consumer.  One respondent felt that “Choosing Safety”, in particular, was 
disadvantaged by its status as a government publication since many potential 
readers would perceive it as boring or at least as less dynamic and interesting 
than the reports of consumer organisations. Consequently, rather than trying 
to devise a more consumer-friendly image for its reports, the government 
might be better advised to use consumer groups to get its message across.  
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Some expressed doubts about the accuracy of the data contained in the 
various accident-based publications but a more fundamental problem was 
seen to lie in the retrospective nature of their reports, which meant that they 
were analysing the performance of cars within the existing fleet rather than 
influencing the nature of that fleet by assessing vehicles prospectively. As one 
industry respondent noted, it was difficult to use such information: 
 
“The difficulty with the retrospective rating systems is it is very hard for 
manufacturers to know how to respond to them, so if you have got two 
vehicles one that seemed to be good in an insurance rating and one 
that seemed to be bad, you normally don’t know why, by the time you 
have got enough data to come to a conclusion, the vehicle is long out 
of production and it’s replacement or it’s replacement’s replacement is 
the vehicle you are currently working on, so although it is useful 
information for measuring progress it is not very useful for guiding 
future design, so we have probably been less affected by those types 
of ratings than we have by the predicted ones which are either crash 
testing programmes or the expert assessment carried out by 
organisations like Which.” 
 
Even within the second hand car market, retrospective ratings were seen to 
carry little weight: 
 
“…A real problem I think this: that something like half the cars are 
bought as fleet cars.  So you have got to influence those new car 
purchases because that defines the fleet for the rest of us who buy 
second hand cars.  If the fleet is absolutely full of bad cars they are 
going to influence casualties so it has got to be the purchase of new 
cars and the industry has to feel a vulnerability in producing a bad new 
car and you cannot induce that feeling of vulnerability in them by 
studying accident data.”  
 
The same respondent went on to say that it was nonetheless critically 
important to undertake accident studies to check the validity of test-based 
predictions of vehicle accident performance. 
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The potential of EuroNCAP in achieving further improvements in 
crashworthiness 
 
While there was general agreement about the benefits so far delivered by 
EuroNCAP for vehicle safety and a shared belief that it should continue, the 
interviewees offered a range of different perspectives on its future priorities 
and mode of operation. These included: 
 
• EuroNCAP should in effect be incorporated into the regulations so that 
manufacturers should be forced to have a EuroNCAP assessment 
before selling their cars. 
• The star ratings system should separate crashworthiness from other 
factors, such as ergonomics, the latter including such things as warning 
systems for occupants to fasten belts. The effectiveness of 
crashworthiness and the restraint systems should be separately tested 
because of the forces on different sizes, ages and gender of 
occupants. 
• Rollover and rear impact should be included in the tests. 
• The impact on older children and adults in rear seats should be looked 
at separately from child restraints. 
• There should be a stronger emphasis on aspects of secondary safety 
that are still not properly covered, such as compatibility, whiplash and 
vulnerable adults. 
• There should be more experimentation with virtual testing, particularly 
in relation to  pedestrian safety. 
 
There was a plea that, given the significance of EuroNCAP in improving 
safety, government should look to sustaining and improving its funding for 
research and that a similar commitment should be sought from the European 
Commission.  
 
Some respondents felt that EuroNCAP was approaching a crossroads in 
terms of deciding whether to continue to develop secondary safety standards 
as its first priority or to divert resources into primary safety.  Although some 
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important aspects of secondary safety remained to be tackled effectively, 
notably compatibility and pedestrian protection, it was felt that returns from 
EuroNCAP testing would almost certainly diminish in the future as acceptable 
common standards for secondary safety were reached.  This risked making 
the requirements of EuroNCAP routine and predictable for the industry, with 
the consequence that they would cease to drive design.   
 
Although the promotion of primary safety was seen as a possible new 
departure for EuroNCAP, some felt that this would play to the preferred 
marketing strategies of the industry – “they absolutely love all that stuff, 
brakes and gismos and electronic Houdinis and lighting”) - without bringing 
demonstrable safety benefits. In particular, primary safety improvements were 
thought likely to increase risk compensation on the part of drivers, thus 
increasing the dangers faced by other vehicle and road users. 
 
The burden for industry to achieve good ratings in EuroNCAP 
Very little information was obtained from the interviews about the unit costs of 
producing vehicles that would achieve good ratings in EuroNCAP. One 
industry representative volunteered a figure of 300-400 euros per vehicle for 
his company but this was the only specific estimate on offer.  Another said 
that the initial cost of a new engineering solution could be high - the example 
given was a £1000 starting cost per unit for his company in developing an 
innovative bonnet designed to achieve good ratings on the EuroNCAP 
pedestrian protection test – but acknowledged that this would diminish sharply 
once it was incorporated into the standard manufacturing process. 
 
Although financial information was in short supply, the manufacturers 
evidently experienced the requirements of EuroNCAP as burdensome.  A 
major issue for them was the unpredictability of the EuroNCAP test 
requirements and, linked to this, the short lead times allowed to manufacturers 
for anticipating these requirements.  
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One industry representative complained about the difficulties of budgeting for 
changing requirements that were often, in his view, hardly safety related. He 
explained that once the car was “benchmarked”, a two-year period ensued 
during which it was developed and evaluated and a sales campaign launched: 
 
“You don’t expect anything to go further because the product should be 
good enough if you do it like that,  But if six months before it enters the 
market the requirement is popping up, everybody is rushing and maybe 
trying to improve the car is a huge investment and it is maybe not really 
improving very much.”  
 
Another manufacturer spoke of the difficulty and expense of adapting vehicles 
to new test requirements when they were part of a running series. It looked for 
stable, objective lead times that would enable it to build the test requirements 
into the design from the very beginning. Someone else said that the very short 
and sometimes negative lead times allowed by EuroNCAP led to inefficiencies 
for manufacturers that diminished the effectiveness of their safety 
investments. Whereas the regulatory process was reasonably well-defined 
and easy to plan for, EuroNCAP was seen to be: 
 
“…a maverick organisation which can change direction very quickly, 
can delay making decisions for a very long time and make them rapidly 
with retrospective effect.  Those sorts of things have a very serious 
effect on the way manufacturers can respond to them; it doesn’t bring 
the best out in what we are capable of doing.”  
 
The subjective and fluid nature of the EuroNCAP test requirements was a 
particular bone of contention for the manufacturers. It was said that however 
carefully a car had been designed to meet a requirement, there remained a 
considerable element of uncertainty in the assessment process, with the 
consequent risk that the car could be marked down in the final vehicle 
assessment and points withheld. This was felt to be both unfair and wasteful 
of time and resources.  
 
The relevance of EuroNCAP test requirements to real world safety was raised 
several times by the manufacturers’ representatives.  One company 
complained that although its cars already had an excellent record for 
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protecting drivers and occupants against knee injuries, it was being forced to 
introduce new knee airbags at a cost of 100 euros per car in order to meet 
EuroNCAP requirements – money it felt could have been better spent on other 
safety improvements. The same company remarked that EuroNCAP 
assessments were quite narrowly focused and sometimes did not recognise 
safety features that manufacturers had already incorporated into their designs. 
The example given was a 'child present orientation detection system’ that had 
been installed in the passenger seat of all its cars but whose future was now 
being questioned by management because EuroNCAP did not take account of 
it in the assessment process.    
 
A more specific issue was the extra cost to manufacturers of carrying out all 
testing related to EuroNCAP at independently accredited laboratories. It was 
suggested that where supporting test data was required to justify EuroNCAP’s 
conclusions, it should be acceptable for manufacturers to present that data 
from in-house tests, often carried out in superb conditions. As it was, 
manufacturers with 'state-of- the-art’ testing facilities were being required to 
duplicate their own testing or to use outside laboratories for pre-testing at 
considerable expense to themselves.  
 
Outside the sub-group of industry representatives there was scant sympathy 
for any burdens imposed upon manufacturers by the EuroNCAP tests. One 
research expert, closely involved in the setting up of the programme, 
acknowledged that the costs to manufacturers had never been worked out at 
the EuroNCAP end: 
 
“I think we put it round the other way: `What is the burden on 
pedestrians if we haven’t improved these cars, how many people have 
died?’, so we weren’t very interested in what the cost was to industry. 
That was not an issue to us. The thing is these are the things they 
should have been doing.”  
 
Another pointed out that, in contrast to the regulations, EuroNCAP was very 
much a voluntary scheme and that manufacturers had a choice about how 
much to spend to improve their vehicles beyond the minimum safety levels.  
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Furthermore, they were unlikely to make a significant investment unless they 
were confident that they would be compensated by extra sales and/or higher 
prices for their vehicles.  
 
Other respondents acknowledged that, despite its voluntary nature, 
EuroNCAP had effectively locked the manufacturers into a competitive battle 
for top ratings. (Indeed, one major manufacturer in the interview group spoke 
of “being forced to reach five stars.” Whether this involved an additional 
burden on the industry was, however, a matter of debate. One view was that 
for companies already meeting the regulations the extra costs of performing 
well in EuroNCAP were minimal compared to the benefits they were likely to 
receive from top ratings, especially where the test requirements could be 
incorporated from scratch into the design of new models.   Against this, it was 
said that while EuroNCAP had involved significant extra investment on the 
part of manufacturers, for example where technical barriers had to be 
overcome or major changes made to the styling of a vehicle, this investment 
should be evaluated in terms of overall safety improvements for the vehicle 
user rather than against a company’s profits. Similarly, although the costs of 
pushing a vehicle up to a five star rating could be heavy, the process 
frequently brought rapid safety gains because the timescales of EuroNCAP 
required the manufacturer to address and rectify a fault within a defined six-
month window.  
 
For a safety expert from the consumer sector, the additional investment 
stimulated by the striving for safety ratings was a cause for celebration since it 
was evidence that EuroNCAP had succeeded in spreading sophisticated 
safety technology throughout the vehicle fleet and across Europe far more 
quickly and efficiently than could have been achieved by the regulations 
alone: 
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“The extraordinary thing that EuroNCAP has achieved is that it used to 
be acceptable that a) it was only the expensive cars that had the safety 
kit on and b) if you were selling that same car in Greece no one needed 
the kit, but now EuroNCAP is saying that a life in Greece is as 
important as a life in the UK and the life of someone in a small car is 
just as important – so don’t tell us that safety is only available if you 
have got £20,000 to spend.”  
 
5.2 Part 2: Process 
5.2.1 The Regulations 
 
The driving forces behind the introduction of the front and side impact 
regulations 
 
The accounts given by the interviewees show that the process leading up to 
the introduction of the front and side impact legislation was highly complex 
and extended over many years.  It was widely accepted that the technical 
knowledge required to frame the regulations was available long in advance of 
their actual appearance and that their timing and content were crucially 
shaped by political pressures and negotiations between manufacturers, 
national governments and European institutions.  The main driving forces 
behind the regulations can perhaps be seen as inter-connecting strands of 
influence.  The following analysis seeks to identify these different strands and 
also to demonstrate the interplay between them. It should be read in 
conjunction with the timeline analysis in Appendix 2. 
 
Technical research and crash testing 
Technical research into key aspects of occupant safety, notably seat belt 
restraint systems, frontal impact protection, side impact protection and dummy 
improvements, was identified as a primary driving force, providing the detailed 
knowledge of crashworthiness that was critical to the sound formulation of the 
front and side impact regulations. Whole car crash testing was integral to this 
research and the UK government was acknowledged as a leader in this field 
because of the work undertaken in TRL from 1980 onwards.  The importance 
of pioneering work undertaken in Germany by the consumer organisation 
ADAC and the German magazine Automotor und Sport in the late 1980s was 
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also noted by some respondents because of its introduction of more 
systematic test procedures and its effect both in increasing awareness of 
safety and in raising the temperature of debate about which kinds of tests 
were appropriate.   
 
Certain manufacturers considered that their own internal testing procedures 
had made an important early contribution; for example, a particular 
manufacturing group had made conference presentations based upon tests 
undertaken in their own laboratories and, given that its products were 
designed for a global market, had had to deal with the requirements of crash 
testing in the United States some time before such tests were required in 
Europe. Commenting on the Swedish car industry, another respondent noted 
that considerable technical knowledge existed among manufacturers long 
before the introduction of the regulations, although not all considered the 
maximisation of safety to be financially viable. 
 
 “…they clearly had the insight, they had the accident research teams, 
they know about the problem, but again you have to be competitive and 
you sort of balance all the time what can I introduce? How much weight 
penalty will there be?  Can I actually raise the price and get my money 
back, and so on, so it is always a balancing act there and so I would 
say that the awareness was probably there for maybe 5-10 years and 
then some manufactures decided to do things even if there were not a 
regulation, and some manufacturers did not.”  
 
Developing the correct tools to undertake tests that would provide a realistic 
simulation of real world accidents was identified as an important and difficult 
aspect of the technical research. The prior UNECE Regulation 12 for frontal 
impact protection, which was adopted on a voluntary basis by national 
governments, was based upon the crashing of cars head on into a rigid 
concrete barrier.  This was derived from US testing standards for both frontal 
and side impact involving rigid flat barrier testing with 100% overlap. Emerging 
accident data alerted researchers at the TRL and elsewhere in Europe that 
the levels of intrusion being experienced in real world front impact crashes 
were not being replicated in the laboratory tests, leading them to question the 
appropriateness of the existing barrier. A rigid offset barrier and an angled 
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barrier were variously proposed as better alternatives, and a number of car-to-
car and barrier tests were accordingly carried out at the TRL. Further work on 
frontal impact was put on hold in the UK until the effects of introducing seat 
belt legislation could be gauged and European research priorities shifted 
towards side impact protection.  When it was resumed in the early 1990s as 
part of a research programme on frontal impact co-ordinated by the European 
Experimental Vehicle Committee (EEVC), attention once again focused upon 
the nature of the barrier. The official in charge of the TRL crashworthiness 
research programme at the time described the mixture of intuition and careful 
investigation that informed the decision to develop a barrier that was offset 
and deformable.  
 
“…basically I did a crash test and it didn’t look like an accident at all, 
and I did the first deformable one using the American side impact 
barrier because that seemed as though it would take the load and I just 
thought ` Crikey that looks good!” 
 
However, at this early stage little was known about the reasons for the 
superior performance of a deformable barrier in replicating real world crashes, 
and considerable work was required to develop the requisite technical 
understanding. A further challenge was to create a barrier that would offer the 
necessary consistency of performance and therefore repeatability of results 
from crash to crash. TRL researchers at first considered adapting an early 
deformable barrier face made from polyurethane foam that had been 
developed by European car manufacturers for side impact tests, but this was 
subsequently rejected because of the problems associated with CFC 
emissions. A lightweight version of an aluminium honeycomb material used in 
aeroplane structures eventually provided a solution. 
 
Despite the deficiencies of available tests and tools, frontal impact research 
benefited from an existing knowledge base. In contrast, very little work had 
been carried out on side impact protection when it was taken up by the TRL 
and Birmingham University in an in-depth accident research project between 
1978-81, the results informing the work of the EEVC from 1982-88 to develop 
a standardised test procedure. No injury criteria or tolerance data were 
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available and the necessary tools had to be built from scratch. In particular, 
there was the challenge of creating a suitable dummy:  
 
“…with frontal impact we had a dummy we could use. There was much 
less disagreement about hybrid III - it was a modern dummy at the 
time. You could work on the crash test speed or the configuration, 
these were areas of disagreement, or the barrier type, these were 
technical issues to be resolved.  But in side impact we had those 
technical issues and also there was no dummy that was properly 
suitable. There were experimental dummies. “  
 
However, in the opinion of one expert, the priority given from the outset to the 
development of EuroSID, the side impact dummy, diverted attention from the 
construction of the barrier, with the result that the final efficacy of the test was 
undermined: 
 
“When I was involved I was given a relatively trivial task it seemed to 
them, sorting out the barrier face. What I was starting to do was to find 
out that this was very, very important and had a very big effect, and it 
showed that all the way through the very earliest stages of specifying it 
was all wrong, but you couldn’t change all of that.  So it has always 
been the poor relation, the dummy was, the criteria for the dummy was 
the thing and the barrier was a bit of low level engineering.  But actually 
what affects the barrier face was much more important.”  
 
Technical research for frontal and side impact protection ventured into territory 
that was largely unexplored before the 1980’s, involving a rapid expansion of 
knowledge and practice from a very limited base. Although it was often highly 
experimental in nature and marked by disagreement about priorities, the 
testimony of close observers suggests that it succeeded in developing robust 
recommendations about what was needed and what was possible in terms of 
front and side impact protection. These provided a vital reference point during 
the highly politicised process through which the regulations were 
subsequently debated and put into effect.  
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The influence of individuals 
 
“At the time there happened to be certain individuals in certain 
positions and they had a certain view which was very pro safety, who 
made it happen.”  
 
A point repeatedly made by those who were closely involved in the 
formulation of the regulations was that they were driven by the personal and 
professional commitment of individuals.  These individuals were variously to 
be found in research, consumer and government institutions, both national 
and European. Typically they came from the UK, the Netherlands and 
Sweden where strong safety cultures were already established.  They held in 
common a passionate concern to improve vehicle safety and frequently 
pursued this agenda in the face of inertia or even active opposition from within 
their own organisations. They tended to know each other from collaborative 
work, conferences and meetings and in effect formed a pro-safety interest 
group that cut across established networks.   
 
The TRL, at that time based within the UK’s Department for Transport, was 
singled out by several respondents as providing a particularly sympathetic 
environment for safety champions. Lead researchers within the test team 
were accustomed to initiating research on safety issues and had the freedom 
to spend money to develop a research programme, provided that they could 
convince the department of the usefulness of their ideas. They recalled that 
the Department was prepared to pick up and support issues arising from 
research and place them within the political agenda, even in those areas such 
as frontal impact where scepticism and a degree of  opposition had been 
expressed at first. Among the researchers who had been most closely 
involved with the TRL programme leading up to the front and side impact 
regulations, there was a belief that this ethos was specific to that time and that 
the subsequent contracting out of the TRL along with changing patterns of 
financial control and policy initiation within the Department meant that it was 
no longer possible for research to drive UK policy: 
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“I don’t think the things I have done on frontal impact, side impact will 
ever occur again now in this present, in the way they are 
subcontracting, contracting out. I started this thing as a one man band, 
me and a test team…  I was incredibly fortunate in that unlike lots of 
other people I had ideas and people either could not stop me spending 
money or they gave me money to do it, they may not always have 
wanted me to do it but they did do it and I was able to do that in a way 
that I don’t think would happen now”.  
 
The critical influence of individuals within the legislative process also emerges 
from the accounts of those closely involved at the time. One such individual 
was the President of the FIA, a convert to the safety camp following the death 
of Ayrton Senna, who put himself and his organisation firmly behind the 
improvements advocated by members of the UK Department for Transport 
and other international safety experts. His role was said to have been central 
in lobbying the European Parliament to reject the Commission’s original draft 
directives on front and side impact, much weakened in their progress through 
the Commission by pressure from the industry.  Another important player at 
this late stage was a British MEP who approached TTS and offered, in his role 
as rapporteur, to put forward amendments to the Commission’s proposals. A 
member of the TTS team at the time remembered  producing around 40 
pages of highly specialized technical amendments in a week, “putting in the 
drafts that the UK had pressed for about 15 years and the EEVC and 
European (Commission) resisted”. The rapporteur duly presented the 
amendments, giving the Commission the choice to accept them or to withdraw 
the proposal. It chose to accept them and thus the safety lobby was able to 
outflank its opponents at a late stage in the legislative process.  
 
Real world accident data 
While the analysis of real world accident data had begun at the Medical 
University of Hanover and  the Birmingham University Accident Research Unit 
in the late 1960’s and 1970’s, it was the establishment in 1983 of the  CCIS as 
a joint initiative between  Birmingham and Loughborough Universities, the 
Department for Transport and the motor industry that was considered by 
several respondents to have injected an urgency into the safety agenda by 
demonstrating a level of personal catastrophe and cost to society that was 
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simply not politically acceptable.  It influenced the work undertaken in 
research laboratories by identifying front and side impact as the two biggest 
clusters of risk of killed and seriously injured car occupants and it placed 
vehicle safety squarely in the political arena in a way that could not have been 
achieved by laboratory testing alone. Vital ammunition was provided to 
interest groups campaigning on vehicle safety: 
 
“Research from real world data supported research groups, 
governments (UK and Sweden in particular) and NGOs such as ETSC 
in campaigning for appropriate regulations – the problem couldn’t be 
ignored any longer.” 
 
From the testimony of the respondents, it seems clear that real world data and 
technical research interacted to give a powerful impetus to the political 
process that led to the formulation of the regulations. 
 
European co-operation  
Respondents offered different paradigms to describe the process by which the 
front and side impact regulations were formulated and put into effect. Some 
believed in a cycle of discrete stages whereby research was followed by 
testing, which led to recommendations that required further research, and so 
on. Others saw the process as much less defined and linear, one respondent 
comparing it to the turning of a dial on a radio, moving backwards and 
forwards in response to changing conditions.   
 
Whatever the model used, there was general agreement that co-operative 
effort across European countries was an indispensable pre-condition for 
successful implementation. This effort was evident at a number of levels and 
settings. The development of the European Union in itself provided new 
opportunities for devising and enforcing harmonised safety standards across 
its member countries: 
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“…This is my personal view, that the European Union created the 
possibility to put a pressure on the industry and come up with these 
regulations and enforce them rather than in the old situation where 
there were so many political aspects from different manufactures so in 
my view the creation of European Union is probably the answer.” 
 
At a different level, the EEVC provided a collaborative forum for research on 
the technical issues underpinning frontal and side impact. According to one 
member of the UK research community, the benefits of co-operating with 
European colleagues in the research phase rather than going it alone were 
considerable, not only in terms of focusing more research effort on the 
problem but also by enabling discussions and arguments to be pre-digested 
before reaching the regulatory stage. He also pointed out those efforts by the 
UK government to push through research recommendations unilaterally, for 
example in the context of motorcycle research and the steering wheel face 
form test, had been unsuccessful.  
 
Non-governmental bodies such as the ETSC were commended for their role 
in bringing European interest groups together to raise awareness and drive 
action on vehicle safety. Created in the early 1990s out of a sense of 
frustration that vehicle safety harmonisation in Brussels and Geneva was not 
proceeding quickly enough, the ETSC launched a review of the impact of 
vehicle safety design upon traffic injuries, resulting in a 1993 report which 
demonstrated that vehicle safety standards were around 20 years behind the 
state of knowledge and identified priority needs based on UK and other 
international research: 
 
“Basically ETSC co-ordinated the campaign for the most part in 
identifying what needed to be done, based on the ETSC’s and others 
research, in bringing together the technical briefing material.  For 
example, VSRC’s stuff on side impact in terms of the ground clearance 
of the barrier.”   
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The policy agenda of national governments 
It was agreed that national governments differed markedly in the extent to 
which they promoted vehicle safety in their own countries and in Europe.  The 
UK and the Netherlands, with Sweden in a supporting role, were consistently 
described as safety advocates. Some respondents felt that the governments 
of France and Germany had also been a positive force in the safety debate, 
although a degree of ambivalence about safety was ascribed to them because 
of the close identification of the national interest with that of their indigenous 
car industries.   The UK and the Netherlands, with their small and declining 
industries, were better able to establish safety as a priority. They could, 
moreover, build upon a public consensus already established in their 
countries about the benefits of regulation to promote safety.  As a 
representative of the Dutch government pointed out, the European arena 
offered governments opportunities to better protect their populations by 
addressing vehicle safety issues that could not be tackled at a national level: 
 
“At least for us in the Netherlands we were at that time working on a 
clear integrated safety programme where we defaulted a lot of attention 
and money to the improvement of the road network in particular at local 
and regional level and by that time we already had clear indications 
that behavioural policies would be required, a road improvement 
scheme alone would never get us to our targets of -25% fatalities in 
2000.  So for that reason we have always been very eager to look at 
additional measures at the supra-national level in the domain of motor 
vehicle policy”.  
 
When asked to rate the UK contribution against that of other European 
governments as a driving force behind the front and side impact regulations, 
the majority of respondents described it as outstanding or important. The 
background technical work paid for by the Department for Transport and 
carried out at the TRL was recognised as having provided a sound scientific 
basis for the new safety proposals. Moreover, this had been complemented by 
a well-informed and determined political campaign in Europe, waged by those 
who were familiar with the intricacies of European political structures, to 
persuade others of the necessity for regulation.   
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Questions of timing 
When asked about the reasons why regulation came in when it did, most 
respondents described a series of circumstances which triggered the process 
and made regulation both possible and necessary. They described the 
movement towards regulation more as a fitful evolution than a planned, linear 
development. Progress frequently stalled as competing interests fought over 
the detail of the proposals, and rival attempts to dominate the legislative 
process in Brussels kept the outcome balanced on a knife edge until the very 
last stages.   
 
Nonetheless, certain factors emerge as highly influential.  As noted earlier, the 
collection and analysis of accident data had been given a higher profile and 
influence through the setting up of the CCIS, whose findings were used to 
inform the whole vehicle crash testing programme at the TRL.  Once the 
numbers of people killed and injured in accidents, running at around 6,000 per 
year in the mid-1980s, were made known to the public, the issue could no 
longer be ignored by governments.  
 
Although considerably more work had been done historically on frontal impact 
and various regulations were already in place, there was a perceived need to 
evaluate the effect of seat belt legislation in the UK before moving towards 
European regulation. It was for this reason that side impact was taken up first 
by the EEVC.  When attention turned once again to frontal impact, the context 
had changed in that most car occupants were now wearing seatbelts and it 
was decided that simply tweaking the existing regulations was not enough to 
make a significant difference:  
 
“You couldn’t get a major improvement by tweaking any individual one 
but what you actually needed was a new frontal test with dummies on 
board and biomechanical requirements.  So that’s what started off the 
idea that we needed to develop a more representative and realistic 
vehicle crash test with dummies on board.”   
 
The efficiency with which the EEVC accomplished the technical work 
necessary to support recommendations for both front and side impact 
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regulations was attributed to its domination at the time by research experts in 
the field, with light representation from industry. One expert who was closely 
involved at the time judged that industry had made a serious miscalculation by 
focusing its attention upon the subsequent regulatory debate in the European 
Commission and Parliament, which it was confident of dominating, instead of 
ensuring that it had a handle on the background scientific work. Although this 
made the debate all the more stormy and contentious, those backing the 
proposed regulations had the advantage of thoroughly developed 
recommendations. The same respondent observed that the industry had 
learned from its errors in taking its eye off the EEVC and had since ensured, 
for example in the development of the pedestrian regulations, that it was 
closely involved in the research phase.  
 
Some believed that the prior establishment of a regulatory regime in the US 
(and in other countries such as Australia) had provided an example and a 
spur to Europe. Various explanations were offered about why the US had 
acted much earlier on front and side impact regulation. Mention was made of 
the work of Ralph Nader in the 1960s and early 1970’s which “ sent the 
snowball rolling down the hill”, raising public consciousness of safety issues 
much earlier than in Europe and preparing the ground for the regulation of 
vehicle design. Some pointed out that the US had not had to face the 
European problem of how to reconcile different national structures and 
interests: from the outset it had been able to put in place an integrated 
regulatory system managed by a dedicated agency, the National Highway 
Transport Safety Authority (NHTSA).  The superior efficiency  of the US 
system allowed regulations to be devised,  put into effect and revised more 
quickly than in Europe but there were said to be some negative 
consequences.  In particular, the requirement to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of a regulation through prior technical research was much less 
stringent, leading, it was said, to tests that simply did not mirror real accident 
conditions:  
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“I wouldn’t say that the regulations that they have brought in were 
better - they may have brought them in earlier; they certainly 
weren’t better. The fact that we took into account the research that 
TRL did for front and side impact meant that we had far better 
regulations than they had. Their front impact Regulation is just 
smashing the car into a solid block, we know that is not right.”  
 
While acknowledging the important role played by the US in driving forward 
global standards, most respondents did not believe that US regulation on front 
and side impact had provided an appropriate model for regulation in Europe. 
Although the various European standards already in place were drawn from 
the US, there were serious questions about their technical basis and also their 
relevance to the European situation where vehicle fleets, road structures and 
approaches to seat belt legislation were so different.  In formulating the front 
and side impact regulations, Europe needed to create a separate regulatory 
system attuned to its own distinctive circumstances. 
 
The extent of industry opposition to the front and side impact  
regulations 
 
There was a striking difference of perspective between the representatives of 
motor manufacturers and other respondents about the nature and extent of 
the industry’s opposition to the introduction of front and side impact 
regulations. The former insisted that the industry had been broadly supportive 
of the regulations because of its desire to see a basic safety standard for all 
vehicles, and that any disputes had centred on the technical correctness of 
the regulations rather than on the principle of standard setting. Certain 
manufacturers had been confident that they had already had the technical 
knowledge to meet the required safety standards and said that they had 
welcomed the enforcement of improved standards in the remainder of the 
fleet.  
 
“I think at the time we didn’t really mind this becoming a regulation, 
because this, we felt, was …the basic level of safety that should be 
guaranteed for all vehicles and we really felt that it could make a 
difference in the entire vehicle fleet if everybody has to mind those 
requirements.  We cover only a small percentage of the overall vehicle 
fleet, so it certainly does something to protect people’s lives.”  
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One of the research experts supported this version of the industry’s response 
to the regulations, remembering that there had not been a great deal of 
opposition, apart from “some fuss about the barrier height in the proposed 
side impact test.” It was, however, a version strongly disputed by other 
researchers and the remainder of the respondents in the interview group. 
What they described was a sustained, hostile and vociferous campaign by the 
industry, largely spearheaded by the European manufacturers’ body ACEA 
that resulted in a delay of up to a decade in the introduction of the regulations. 
They acknowledged that the campaign was directed more towards the detail 
of the regulations than the principle of their introduction but considered that 
this was a matter of paying lip service to regulation as a public relations 
necessity rather than a willingness to promote safety improvements.  
 
The tactic of objecting to key elements of the regulatory proposals, such as 
the speed of the tests, the barrier used, the height of the barrier, and so on, 
with the aim of minimising the impact of the regulations upon the 
manufacturers, was said to have been highly effective in stalling progress: 
  
“I don’t believe there is anything else that research is done on where 
there is such concerted effort to stop you.  Let us take speed cameras 
or something.  The public may not like it but they are not an organised 
group, there is not a big commercial activity of a load of major 
manufacturers coming together, spending large amounts of money to 
stop you doing what you want to do.”) 
 
Some respondents also remembered an excessive influence being exerted by 
industry within the various groups and committees that formulated the 
proposals, often with the naked support of national governments.  
 
“…It is important to realise that the regulatory process is almost entirely 
dominated by industrial interest.  So either directly by the industry, or 
by those governments who perceive themselves to be arguing in favour 
of their industry…  and basically the idea is to prevent any change in 
legislation for as long as possible so they bring up as many technical 
smoke screens as possible.  When change seems inevitable then, to 
make sure that change is as small as possible so that doesn’t influence 
your current production practice, and then if you have lost that paddle 
then to ensure you have massive lead times so that your current 
investment in plant isn’t adversely affected by any change in 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF 110 VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
regulations, and the whole regulatory process, time and time again, 
follows that pattern.”  
 
National government manoeuvrings to support the industry position were said 
to have been most vigorous in those countries with large indigenous car 
industries, such as France and Germany, and least evident in those such as 
the UK where the industry was residual. Even in the latter, however, the 
manufacturers proved adept at exploiting the different perspectives of 
government departments for industry and transport, appealing to the former in 
order to modify the influence of the latter. 
 
The effectiveness of the industry’s lobbying strategy was acknowledged even 
by those most critical of its intent. Many different channels were used to put 
forward its viewpoint, including media briefings, regular lunch-time meetings 
with European Commission members, involving a certain amount of 
“entertainment and flattery” along with pertinent discussion, and frequent 
representations to national governments.  Such a well-resourced and 
coordinated approach could not be matched by competing interests, such as 
the European consumer groups.  Much of the lobbying was conducted on the 
industry’s behalf by motor manufacturers’ organisations such as the Society of 
Motor Manufactures and Traders (SMMT) in the UK and ACEA in Europe, 
although the latter did not include the Japanese and Korean manufacturers, 
which had their own industry bodies.  One representative of a European 
consumer organisation described ACEA as following a particularly negative 
line on safety legislation, right through to the present time, “promoting the 
lowest level of anything and sometimes not any level at all.” It was their view 
that ACEA had also tended to block the more progressive and constructive 
manufacturers who were sympathetic to improvements.      
 
Whatever the disagreements between the manufacturers’ representatives and 
other respondents about the extent of the industry’s opposition to the 
regulations and the motives behind it, they concurred in their recollection of 
the main sticking points in the formulation of the regulations. These were 
technical in nature, centring on the tools and procedures that were being 
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proposed for the tests, largely on the basis of the work that had been carried 
out by the TRL in the UK. 
 
Crash testing versus computer simulation for side impact crashes 
A computer-controlled test procedure (CCTP) involving computer modelling to 
simulate the effects of side impact crashes was funded by the industry and 
proposed as an alternative to real-life crash testing.  Non-industry researchers 
among the respondents had dismissed it from the outset, one describing it as 
“complete nonsense” which “took forever to do”.  Although eventually 
abandoned, it was the cause of considerable delay.  
 
The nature of the barrier for frontal impact crash testing 
As described above, the offset deformable barrier had been developed by 
TRL in response to the poor performance of rigid barriers in simulating the 
kinds of intrusion that  were experienced in real world crashes. It was, 
however, strongly resisted by the industry, and the accounts of those who 
were closely involved in discussions at the time suggest something of a 
competition of ideas for the most appropriate barrier.  Industry representatives 
put forward a proposal to the Global Road Safety Partnership’s (GRSP) group 
on passive safety for a 30 degree angled barrier test with an anti-slide device 
as an alternative to the offset deformable barrier.  Researchers from TRL had 
been convinced by evidence from their own work in the 1970’s that a rigid 
angled barrier was ineffective because vehicles could slide off it.  When the 
GRSP decided to support the industry’s recommendation against the advice 
of TRL representatives, the latter decided to run a series of tests on the anti-
slide device and succeeded in demonstrating that the test could be beaten by 
fixing a pedestrian bumper to the barrier.  This was critical in ensuring 
acceptance for the offset deformable barrier in the crash-testing regime 
adopted for the regulations. 
 
The barrier debate was also said to illustrate the industry’s tactic of proposing 
a two-stage process for regulatory reform, the first stage (e.g. the angled 
barrier proposal) involving minimum impact upon the industry in terms of 
investment and redesign while the second stage (e.g. the offset deformable 
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barrier) was presented as a goal to be worked towards at some future date.  
According to critics outside the industry, the objective was to ensure 
acceptance of the first stage proposal, with the expectation that the second 
stage would be quietly dropped. As noted earlier, it was the FIA intervention in 
the European Parliament that ensured that the second stage proposal for 
frontal impact was actually pushed through.  
 
The height of the side impact barrier 
The correct height of the side impact barrier proved to be one of the most 
contentious and bitterly fought issues.  The TRL research had indicated a 
height of 300mm in order to replicate the collision of the front of a vehicle with 
the ‘softer’ side structures. Analysis of the CCIS database carried out by the 
VSRC supported these findings. The industry was arguing for a lower barrier 
height of 260mm, which, according to TRL, would undermine the test fatally, 
since the collision would be directed towards the sill, the stiffest element of the 
vehicle side, and would not replicate any threat to the main compartment. One 
researcher remembered stalling tactics being deployed by the industry right to 
the last moment: 
 
“I remember meeting in 1994 when we were just presenting the final 
EEVC Side Impact Regulation and the French said, “Yes, Yes, we just 
want two tiny changes and we’ll agree with it”.  But the two tiny 
changes were to reduce the size of the side impact sledge to hit the sill 
and not miss the sill, which would have completely destroyed the effect 
of the Regulation, and reduced it to being useless.”   
 
The speed of the tests 
The speed of the tests emerges from the respondents’ accounts as an issue 
about which there was a difference of opinion between the industry and 
external safety professionals but which was not as bitterly contested as the 
nature and height of the crash barriers. It appears that the industry 
continuously advocated a lower test speed than that advocated by the TRL 
research, and some felt that its principal aim was to make the test as benign 
as possible for the manufacturers rather than to maximise safety for the 
occupant: 
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“…the speed was wrong, I mean it was 30 miles per hour when it 
should have been 40 miles and hour.  So all the way through they 
managed to just bring it down all the time to the lowest common 
denominator.”  
 
Looking back at the protracted debate about the detail of the regulations, two 
respondents considered that there had been merit in delaying the 
implementation of the regulations. One was a European government 
representative, the other a vehicle safety expert within the industry. The 
former said that the manipulation of the time-frame had been helpful in easing 
conflicts of interest by allowing manufacturers more time to prepare for the 
introduction of the new standard. He also felt that it had enabled alliances to 
be formed between the main proponents of the regulations and sub-groups 
within the industry who were committed to the safety agenda.  Pursuing a 
more technical point, the industry expert believed that the delay had helped to 
bring about an improvement in the quality of the frontal test by allowing it to be 
designed more specifically for the Hybrid III dummy.  A third respondent, with 
both government and industrial experience, did not believe that the delay had 
been justified but conceded that the additional research undertaken because 
of  industry’s complaints had brought about some enhancements, particularly 
to the side impact dummy EuroSID and the barrier. 
 
In strong contrast, most respondents could not identify any benefit from the 
late implementation and several expressed themselves forcefully on the 
subject, pointing to the large numbers of unnecessary deaths and injuries that 
had followed:   
 
“It was disgraceful the way it was delayed, quite disgraceful.”   
 
“My view is that it was a totally wasted opportunity in the way it was 
delayed.  Many lives could have been saved by bringing it in 2 or 3 
years earlier I’m sure.”  
 
While most blamed the sustained use by manufacturers of stalling tactics and 
negative lobbying, one observer pointed out that the power of industry had 
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been amplified by the unbalanced nature of the decision-taking process in the 
European arena:  
 
“You have the first step when you get the scientists who work for EEVC 
going to Geneva many times for EC regulation then they go to Brussels 
for the application for Europe.  After that the scientists are not involved 
anymore and the views of industry become stronger.  That delayed the 
decision.  For me, the delay is partly due to the process of decision 
taking which does not involve the scientific bias at the time the decision 
is taken.”  
 
Opinions differed about the extent to which industry opposition had resulted in 
modifications to the front and side impact regulations.  One view was that 
although the views of industry had been taken into account at every stage, the 
regulations had emerged remarkably unscathed from the legislative process. 
In particular, the original EEVC recommendations regarding the nature of the 
barrier for frontal impact and its height for side impact, had been rescued by 
the intervention of the FIA in the European Parliament. Others felt that there 
had been significant compromises, particularly in the speed of the tests, and 
that the opposition of industry had exercised a generally conservative 
influence. There had been an implicit acceptance, in their view, of the 
industry’s claim that the regulations were pushing it  to the outer limits of its 
technical capacity whereas, in reality, certain manufacturers had already 
surpassed the requirements of the regulatory tests and EuroNCAP was 
subsequently to demonstrate that most were capable of achieving more 
demanding standards: 
 
“The classic example of that is the way that the frontal impact 
regulations were watered down.  When we could have had a 64 kph, it 
was watered down to 56 kph….  It was all based upon what was 
realistic to do in the short term and it’s been shown that reg. 94 is really 
completely outmoded now because manufacturers aim for good 
EuroNCAP performance of 64 kph.  It was obtainable.”  
 
When asked whether the introduction of the regulations could have been 
managed differently, a few respondents pointed to changes in approach that 
could have made the process less contentious and more firmly centred upon 
the consumer interest.  One said that the European Commission had been too 
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weak in standing up for the people of Europe against the interests of the 
motor industry and could have pushed the regulations forward more 
vigorously. Two others, both industry representatives, felt that the introduction 
of public hearings along the lines of those used in the United States, would 
make the process more transparent and identify the costs and benefits of 
safety improvements more clearly.  Another industry respondent advocated 
closer cooperation and discussion between the authorities and industry at a 
much earlier stage in the process of formulating regulations, and expressed 
concern that the greater responsibilities now vested in the European 
Commission and Parliament gave greater weight to the political rather than to 
the technical end of the debate. 
 
On the whole, however, the respondents expressed a pragmatic resignation 
about the difficulties of enacting legislation in the European arena because of 
the complexity of the structures and the powerful interest groups involved: 
 
“I think the answer is the system is there because of the way it is set up 
within Europe and you will never ever change it.  You have these huge 
motor vehicle working groups when you have probably upward of 50 
people in the room all with the chance to say something, you have the 
industry you have the consumers you have governments and you have 
governments that support the industry and you have governments who 
want the safety for people on the road, and the whole thing is a big sort 
of shouting match and the lowest possible common denominator 
comes out of it.”  
 
The point was also made that industry will always see its first duty as 
maximising its profits for its shareholders and will resist improvements that 
add to its costs unless they create a market advantage.   This was said to be 
the definitive case for strong leadership from government in bringing forward 
vehicle safety legislation. 
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5.2.2 EuroNCAP 
 
The driving forces behind the introduction of EuroNCAP 
The accounts given by the interviewees indicate that EuroNCAP gained its 
initial impetus from the fraught and difficult process of introducing the front 
and side impact regulations, leading safety champions to look to consumer 
testing as a potentially more effective route for achieving improvements in 
crashworthiness. Once again, individuals within research and government 
played a decisive role in formulating the new initiative while the backing for it, 
necessary to become a truly European initiative, came from national 
governments, consumer bodies and from within the European Commission.  
Existing consumer testing models were important in demonstrating the 
viability of the new approach in promoting safety.    
 
Exasperation with the regulatory process  
A sense of exasperation with the regulatory process pervades the 
recollections of those respondents who were involved at the time as 
representatives of what might loosely be called the 'safety lobby’: government, 
research and consumer organisations with a mission to improve safety for car 
occupants. From their perspective, the process had been marked by 
illegitimate objections from industry, lengthy and unnecessary delays in 
bringing the regulations forward, compromises made on key requirements and 
weakness on the part of the European Commission in protecting the public 
interest.  There was a consequent disillusionment with the potential of 
regulation for maximising safety, leading some of the key players who had 
been most active in pursuing regulation to consider an alternative route for 
achieving their goals.  For the UK Department for Transport, which had 
supported the pioneering crash-testing programme by the TRL, it was time to 
take stock: 
 
“We alighted on this idea, well it was a sense of frustration on how 
crash working standards were developing in the late eighties early 
nineties and from that frustration grew out the idea of doing something 
serious about consumer information as a way of driving crash 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF 117 VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
worthiness standards forward in parallel and perhaps to overtake what 
we were doing in  a legislative way.  I think that was at the time not 
identified as a particularly conscious policy decision but it was 
something that happened and sent us off in another policy direction”  
 
Individual champions 
Several of the same individuals who had been instrumental in pushing for 
regulation now became active in promoting consumer testing as another and 
possibly quicker means to achieving improved safety.  Frustration with the 
regulatory process was running particularly high among key players within the 
TRL who had experienced opposition at every turn from the motor industry 
during discussions in Europe. Moreover, TRL had effectively completed its 
research on front and side impact and was ready to move in a new direction.  
Compatibility had already been agreed as a new theme, and an NCAP 
proposal was floated rather speculatively as an additional element; 
 
So I got to the end of one week, Friday night 5 o’clock and I thought 
now might be an appropriate time to put my bit together for my 
compatibility work…  I did that and then afterward I sort of thought well 
that isn’t really enough necessarily to keep the thing going.  Is there 
something else I could do?  And of course (his predecessor)  had tried 
to start up an NCAP programme shortly after the Americans had done 
it.  His problem was he had to devise test procedures and things like 
that…  I sort of thought well I wonder whether we could start it now.  I’d 
always fancied the idea of doing it and I thought the big stumbling block 
was the test procedures and justification.  I thought, “We’ve got them, 
the frontal, side and pedestrian, all on a plate, all developed by EEVC” 
 
This account is striking because of the nature of the initial proposal but 
perhaps the more crucial point is that this was embedded in the research that 
had already been undertaken under the aegis of the EEVC for the front and 
side impact regulations, enabling the new programme to be built upon agreed 
testing regimes.  
 
Support from individuals within the European arena was also described as  
influential in assisting the evolution of UKNCAP into EuroNCAP. The 
President of FIA, who had played a critical role in the final stages of the 
regulatory process, offered his backing to the new organisation as its first 
Chair, and two individuals (one British and one Dutch) from the Directorate-
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General for Transport (DG7)/ Directorate-General for Transport and Energy 
(DGTREN) within the European Commission were highly supportive, helping 
to give it a Commission stamp.      
 
Existing consumer testing models 
Those seeking to develop consumer testing as an alternative or complement 
to regulation were able to refine their ideas by examining a number of existing 
approaches, among which USNCAP, established in the United States in the 
mid-1970s, was the earliest and probably the most influential.  USNCAP 
showed how an independent testing regime could provide meaningful 
information to consumers on car crashworthiness, enabling them to rate one 
vehicle against another.  It used the tests that had been developed for 
regulatory purposes but increased the speed by five miles per hour and, 
instead of expressing performance in terms of pass/fail, indicated through a 
system of star ratings by how much each car had exceeded this new 
threshold.  Thus it simultaneously raised the minimum performance standard 
and introduced a new competitive dynamic into the process. Although 
EuroNCAP was to differ significantly from its US counterpart in its detailed 
operation, these two elements were recognisably the same.   
 
Respondents pointed to several other crashworthiness information initiatives 
that gave weight to the emerging consumer testing proposals. These variously 
involved whole car crash testing, accident data analysis and inspection based 
approaches.  Among the former was a 64kph offset barrier test carried out by 
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) in the United States and a 
series of tests undertaken in Germany by ADAC and Automotor and Sport 
magazine.  Accident analysis reports, such as those produced by the Folksam  
insurance organisation in Sweden and by the UK’s Department for Transport, 
using its STATS19 data, offered a comparative retrospective analysis of 
vehicle performance in real world crashes. And at the beginning of the 1990s, 
the Consumers Association in the UK developed an inspection-based 
approach for rating safety features, such as head restraints and safety belts, 
using a points system when publishing their results. A common thread running 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF 119 VSRC 
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
 
through all these initiatives was a comparative assessment of identified 
vehicles using a simple rating method: 
 
“So in the space of about 5 years you have got three different 
measures. You have got the basic question we feel the consumer 
ought to know which cars are safest and which are the least safe.”  
 
The consumer testing approach was also given weight by the backing of 
European consumer organisations, notably the ETSC, BEUC and AIT. 
 
National governments 
The UK government was widely credited with having initiated EuroNCAP 
through its support for the UKNCAP research programme at the TRL, followed 
by its political orchestration of cross-national support for an expanded 
European programme. When asked how they rated the UK’s contribution to 
EuroNCAP, virtually all the respondents said that it had been indispensable 
and that EuroNCAP would not have come into existence without UK 
government backing. The continuing involvement of the UK in guiding the 
development of the programme and keeping it on a firmly research-based 
path, was also highlighted. It was recognised at the same time that the UK 
could not have launched EuroNCAP without the support of other 
governments. Sweden and the Netherlands were repeatedly identified as 
early allies:  together with the FIA, they quickly transformed EuroNCAP into a 
multi-national initiative that was a force to be reckoned with, seen to be 
drawing support from governments and powerful motoring interest groups.  
The International Research Council on the Biomechanics of Impacts (IRCOBI) 
also provided a useful opportunity for promoting EuroNCAP. Responsibility for 
developing the new European programme was vested in the EEVC, and this 
was once again an astute political move, as one of the key players at TRL at 
the time recalled:   
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“Why did we do things in the EEVC and not do them ourselves, 
because if you actually look at most of these things, the UK DfT paid 
for most of it and did most of the work at TRL.  So why didn’t we just do 
it at TRL and be done with it?  Because you’d get the “not invented 
here” syndrome.  Basically we did it within the EEVC and tried to bring 
all the rest of Europe along with us.  Basically it was an EEVC thing 
and not a UK thing.”  
 
DG7/ DGTREN within the European Commission 
Support from key individuals within DG7/DGTREN of the European 
Commission has already been noted. This was seen as highly significant 
within the politics of the Commission in counteracting the influence of the 
Directorate-General for Trade and Industry (DG3), which was said to be 
strongly influenced by the industry and opposed to either regulations or 
consumer initiatives that would prove costly to manufacturers.  Proactive 
lobbying by DG7 succeeded in persuading the Commission to get on board 
and provide funding for EuroNCAP  
 
The extent of industry opposition to EuroNCAP 
Almost all respondents agreed that individual manufacturers and bodies 
representing the industry had been hostile towards EuroNCAP at the outset. 
Just three dissented from this view: one representative of a Japanese 
manufacturer who said that his company had not taken a position on 
EuroNCAP because of its low profile in Europe at the time, and two others 
who felt that industry had not been given any choice but to support it. 
 
The recollections of the majority, however, suggest a ferocity and intensity of 
opposition exceeding even that engendered by the regulations.  The `name 
and shame’ approach intrinsic to consumer-based testing was said to have 
been a central issue for manufacturers who were fearful of their products 
being exposed as unsafe or less safe than those of their competitors. 
Previous consumer ratings developed in Europe, notably by ADAC and 
Automotor and Sport, had been based upon physical parameters whereas 
EuroNCAP introduced a subjective, inspection-based element which the 
industry distrusted.  There was, moreover, said to be a widespread perception 
within the industry that EuroNCAP raised the bar impossibly high and that the 
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standards needed to obtain, for example, a four star rating were beyond the 
reach of current vehicle technology. 
  
At its inception, EuroNCAP was a UK project, in effect an extension of DfT’s 
research programme.  The fledgling UKNCAP soon found itself in 
confrontation with the SMMT, as the industry’s representative body for the UK, 
and also with the Department of Industry, which took the manufacturers’ line 
that consumer testing would be bad for the industry.  Even at this early stage, 
however, there was said to have been a duality about the industry’s response: 
implacable opposition at one level coupled with a willingness to talk about the 
detail of the new approach.  Someone who was at the DfT at the time and 
closely involved in the setting up of NCAP remembered this clearly from an 
early meeting: 
 
“We had the first meeting with industry down at TRL…It was a meeting 
not to tell industry but to inform industry this is what we are doing, this 
is where we are.  OK in the morning there was war but in the afternoon 
we started talking about items on the agenda.”  
 
A former colleague also remembered being surprised that industry was taking 
the new initiative seriously, despite the UKNCAP being a rather late entrant 
into the field, following on the heels of consumer crash tests in Europe and 
NCAPs set up abroad. He concluded that the backing given by the UK 
government had been significant: 
 
“The clear thing was that the industry saw that the credibility was much 
higher because it was a government department - the UK Department 
for Transport supporting NCAP.  Not a magazine, not a motor club.  It 
made all the difference, which we never foresaw.”  
 
The early hints by the industry that it would consider the new proposals was 
coupled with a recognition on the Department’s side that overtures would be 
needed in order to overcome industry’s opposition:  
 
“We did modify. We had to take note of what was being said in the right 
way in that we realised right at the early stage that we had to engage 
industry… If industry was going to ignore what we were trying to do or 
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to rubbish it all the time, then we wouldn’t have succeeded and we had 
to get industry coming along with us saying ‘OK that’s fair we will go 
away and try and do it.’  That’s important and it didn’t happen straight 
away.”  
 
The support of the FIA, whose President agreed to chair the NCAP steering 
group, was identified as an important endorsement for the new project, further 
raising its profile within the industry. Opposition nonetheless continued to 
grow and intensify as UKNCAP was transformed into EuroNCAP at the end of 
its first year. The conflict with industry now began to be played out on a 
European stage, drawing in some of the most powerful European 
manufacturers.  Those involved at the time recollected vitriolic meetings, 
threats on the part of manufacturers to sue EuroNCAP and, as during the 
regulatory discussions extensive and vigorous lobbying of national 
governments and European bodies, with complaints that EuroNCAP 
represented legislation by the back door. This time around, however, 
consumer organisations were involved as major players and, unlike some 
national governments, were not susceptible to pressure from the industry. 
Thus the balance of influence had shifted somewhat from that which prevailed 
during the regulatory debate. 
 
The manufacturers’ representatives within the interview group had not been 
personally involved in the early discussions about EuroNCAP and it is 
therefore less easy to view this developmental phase from the industry’s 
perspective. They were aware, however, of issues of concern to the industry 
at the time, some of which remained unresolved. These included the higher 
test speed for cars (compared to that used for the regulations), the subjective 
rating system and the absence of weighting factors based upon accident 
research. It was clear that the exclusive reliance upon predictive crash testing 
as opposed to real world performance had continued to be troubling for some:  
 
“The industry’s attitude in general was that it is overall safety that 
counts and you don’t know that until you have ten years of lifetime of 
the car when you have enough crashes and so on, so even if you don’t 
perform well in one situation you may be so much better in another and 
I think there were instances where some cars performed badly in 
EuroNCAP but came out very well in rating scales and things like that.”  
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The opposition to EuroNCAP was coordinated by ACEA and its national 
member groups but while ACEA, the public face of the industry, remained 
implacably hostile in the motor vehicle working groups in Brussels and 
elsewhere, individual manufacturers began to be won over.   A respondent 
who was closely involved in the setting up of EuroNCAP recalled holding 
confidential meetings with every design team in Europe in which the 
objectives of the programme were carefully explained and guarantees of fair 
treatment given. He believed that a point was reached at which major 
manufacturers began to perceive the advantages of running with the 
programme as outweighing the disadvantages. 
 
The public breaking of ranks by one manufacturer was said to be a defining 
moment in the early history of EuroNCAP, fatally undermining further 
opposition. One observer suggested that earlier resistance on the part of the 
French had been a pragmatic response to their lack of preparedness for the 
tests and that it was quickly dropped when the time was right for them to 
perform well: 
The French opposed and tried to lower the influence of EuroNCAP 
because they were not ready to reach a good rating.  At the same time 
they prepared their new cars and then, when they were ready, they 
changed completely their position about EuroNCAP.  
  
Similarly, a safety expert who had worked with another manufacturer recalled 
that its initial opposition had been triggered by awareness that its cars had 
been engineered for performance and reliability rather than safety, and that it 
was unprepared for a safety-based assessment.  A good performance in 
EuroNCAP demanded a change in the company’s policy and profile that had 
been difficult to accept at the time.  
 
There was a consensus among the respondents that industry opposition to 
participation in EuroNCAP had since been overcome. Even if doubts 
remained on the part of some manufacturers about the validity of its approach, 
EuroNCAP had become too influential to be ignored and the risks of staying 
outside too great once competitors began to benefit from the ratings they had 
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achieved and, moreover, to use these ratings to improve their image with the 
public through advertising campaigns. 
 
Looking back over the introduction of EuroNCAP, most respondents said that 
it had not been modified to meet the industry’s concerns. One reason given 
was that EuroNCAP was in essence an up-grading of the front and side 
impact regulations, which had already been subject to intensive discussion. 
Another was the power of the consumer organisations, which had enabled the 
proponents of the new programme to resist pressure from ACEA and SMMT. 
A third perspective was that a purist approach had been taken to the 
development of test and assessment protocols and that while there had been 
a degree of consultation with industry, there was little cooperative activity at 
that stage. Three respondents dissented from this majority view, two of whom 
had been part of the team at the DfT that set up EuroNCAP.  They 
remembered a willingness to take on board reasonable objections and 
comments from the industry, although not blanket opposition on principle. 
“Touches on the tiller”, was how one person described it: 
 
  “I don’t think it has made any great difference to where we were going 
 or what we wanted to do, but it is just a question of listening sensibly to 
 what people are saying and sometimes say ‘ Yes, perhaps we haven’t 
 got that quite right we will just amend that’”  
 
In both camps there were those who felt that the relationship between 
EuroNCAP and the industry had become more constructive and cooperative 
over time: 
 
“I think in the beginning they were not so sure but as they found 
EuroNCAP to be effective and more quickly reactive,  then they 
considered that they wanted to be involved to control these activities.”  
 
But questions specifically directed at the manufacturers’ representatives 
elicited a lingering dissatisfaction about the extent to which their concerns 
were listened to.  Specifically, there was a suggestion that some of the 
requirements introduced most recently did not bring a direct safety benefit and 
increased the risk of single point optimisation, thus compromising safety for 
some road users. More generally, resentment was expressed at the 
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assumption believed to be common among safety professionals that the 
industry was anti-safety and had little to contribute to the safety debate.  
 
The success of EuroNCAP in boosting industry performance, as  
compared to earlier consumer tests 
 
Respondents were asked whether EuroNCAP had exerted a greater pressure 
upon car manufacturers to improve their safety performance than earlier 
consumer tests, such as those conducted by ADAC and Automotor and Sport 
in Germany. Most agreed that EuroNCAP had indeed been more successful 
than its predecessors in engaging manufacturers in a search for good ratings 
once the initial threats of non-compliance had been overcome. Several 
reasons were given. The endorsement by the European Commission and the 
backing given by various national governments with a good pro-safety record 
were said to have established EuroNCAP as an independent and credible 
organisation: 
“I think that gave it a lot more cachet for people to say ‘Not only have 
we got governments involved but also the Commission’  To sell it to 
people as being a responsible and well set up organisation was quite 
important.”  
 
EuroNCAP was thus more difficult for manufacturers to ignore than the ADAC 
tests, which were seen to be a German rather than a European initiative and 
one which, moreover, was directed towards a selective membership rather 
than European consumers at large.  There were also some doubts about the 
appropriateness of the ADAC tests to the European market and, according to 
one respondent, the extent to which the parameters of the tests were 
influenced by the major German manufacturers.  EuroNCAP, by contrast, was 
not only seen to be independent of specific interest groups but also offered 
the industry a unified testing system, based upon the regulatory tests with 
which it was already required to comply and which had been the subject of 
extensive research and discussion. This simplified things considerably for 
manufacturers: 
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“There was their own growing awareness that it is better to have one 
EuroNCAP test than passing a test with every different automotive 
magazine in Europe which, at least, they were aware of as also being a 
kind of a burden.”  
 
Although EuroNCAP had subsequently outpaced the regulations in some 
respects, the two were based upon the same test protocols, so that those 
manufacturers which sought to do well in the consumer testing programme 
were not presented with the dilemma of whether to design for one rather than 
the other. 
 
Another factor generally agreed to have given EuroNCAP greater leverage 
over the industry than earlier consumer tests was its star rating system for 
individual vehicles. Initially highly controversial across the industry and the 
focus of almost universal opposition, it was said to have gained acceptance 
quickly among those manufacturers whose vehicles began to do well. Good 
ratings provided manufacturers with a valuable opportunity to distinguish 
themselves within a crowded marketplace and simultaneously improved 
safety for their customers:  
 
“They like it when they get five stars, as you know one manufacturer 
have made a big thing of it, they have got a huge advertising campaign, 
I would think they  would thank EuroNCAP for its position in the market 
today, where they sell everything with the EuroNCAP slogan on it, and 
they have made a huge amount of money because they have played 
the game the way they wanted to - and to our benefit, because their 
cars are safer.”  
 
Some believed that obstructive tactics deployed by industry at the outset were 
inspired principally by manufacturers’ fears of poor ratings and their desire to 
slow down the process in order to give themselves time to adjust.  This view 
was not, however, widely supported among the industry representatives in the 
interview group. Of the three who represented the viewpoint of Japanese 
manufacturers, only one agreed that EuroNCAP had been seen as a threat at 
the beginning because its cars were not expected to perform well. The others 
said that a culture of safety had already been established within their 
organisations.  Moreover, Japan had already adopted the frontal offset test, 
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and companies with a large US market were already having to meet USNCAP 
regulations, with the result that :   “It was not a sub-optimised car for any kind 
of crash scenario which means We already had the advantage of being 
cautious for safety.”  
 
From the perspective of a German manufacturer within the group, opposition 
to the publication of rating results did not reflect fears about its own 
performance but, rather, doubts about the validity of a simple rating system in 
expressing complex safety questions:  
 
“We were not really happy about publication of such rating results, as 
we said before our strategy is to focus on real life safety and 
EuroNCAP tests can only cover a small part of real life safety and when 
you communicate in such a simple way with stars,  one to five stars,  
that a car is safe, then this may lead to misinterpretations by our 
customers.”  
 
This manufacturer did not use EuroNCAP ratings in its advertising campaigns, 
believing that it was better to convince customers of the superiority of its 
individual safety solutions. The other industry representatives agreed, 
however, that the ratings were a useful publicity tool for their companies.  
 
The management of EuroNCAP’s introduction 
A question about whether the introduction of EuroNCAP could have been 
managed differently elicited a mixed response. All but one of the 
manufacturers’ representatives were critical of what they believed to have 
been inadequate consultation with the industry, although some did 
acknowledge that the industry’s outright opposition at the time would have 
made detailed consultation difficult. There was a specific criticism that 
EuroNCAP had relied exclusively upon safety researchers for its technical 
advice and had not been prepared to engage specialists with specific 
expertise in vehicle design. Another source of complaint was a lack of 
advance warning about changes in the test protocols, making it difficult for 
manufacturers to plan the research that was required to meet new 
specifications.   
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Half the industry representatives said that they had become more comfortable 
with the EuroNCAP development process over time, while the remainder 
expressed continuing doubts about how well it worked and/or its benefits in 
terms of real world safety. A particular issue was raised about whether the 
extra resources required to achieve good ratings might not be more 
beneficially spent on different approaches to safety: 
 
“We have said that the requirements should be based on real world 
relevance and on the actual benefits that you get for the investments 
and if you look at that certainly it has been mentioned before that 100 
euros for a knee bag may not be the most valuable investment you 
could make because with the same 100 euros you could do maybe a 
lot in software for a pre-crash type system”  
 
The researchers and representatives of government and consumer 
organisations, who made up the remainder of the interview group, were 
mostly of the opinion that the EuroNCAP development process had functioned 
remarkably well given the obstacles and objections it encountered.  Some 
acknowledged that while more extensive consultation would have been ideal, 
the reality of the circumstances at the time demanded that a decisive lead be 
taken, short-circuiting debate about the basic principle of consumer testing. 
The commitment of the UK government to press ahead regardless with an 
NCAP for the UK was seen as critical to the effective subsequent introduction 
of EuroNCAP. One respondent commented that if instead there had been an 
attempt to create EuroNCAP by drawing key players together in a European 
forum, the initiative would have run aground quickly on the assembled range 
of conflicting interests. Another commented that while the discussions about 
process and responsibilities had been difficult, the work done on the content 
and technical detail of the protocols was sound and was in effect “ the 
condition that has made all the other things possible.”  
 
There was, however, a dissenting voice from a safety expert based within the 
consumer movement who considered that undue efforts had been made to 
appease the industry throughout the development process and indeed that a 
certain amount of control had been ceded to it, with undesirable effects in 
terms of the transparency and comprehensiveness of EuroNCAP: 
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“There is a feeling among a lot of people that one of the things you 
have got to do is carry the industry with you… I think you have got to 
be much more transparent and be very straight down the line in the 
consumers’  interest, and those are two things that EuroNCAP is not 
good at and there is a lot of industry manipulation going on and that is 
something that EuroNCAP is going to have to review.  One very 
important thing we have got to do is rescue EuroNCAP from being 
controlled by the industry and the industry is very powerful at the 
moment in working the system so that the worst vehicles don’t get 
tested, and that is unacceptable.”  
 
5.3 Summary of Qualitative Data 
5.3.1 Regulations versus Consumer Testing 
 
Respondents’ views were sought about the relative importance of EuroNCAP 
and the front and side impact regulations in driving car crashworthiness 
performance.  Their replies show a widespread conviction that the two have 
worked in a complementary manner to improve safety, and that neither one 
would have been as effective without the other.  A considerable majority also 
believed that the continuing co-existence and development of EuroNCAP and 
the regulations will be necessary in future if improvements in safety are to be 
maintained: 
 
“My view is that there had been an inter-relationship between the 
legislative side and the consumer information side, I don’t think we 
would have had the good development of EuroNCAP had there not 
been that initial front and side impact legislation there to show that the 
government was serious, to show that they would have to do 
something by a certain date.  And then EuroNCAP really helped to 
bring out best performance in various models.”  
 
Within this two-pronged approach, the regulations were most usually 
represented as the baseline or long-stop that has ensured a minimum 
standard for all vehicles, while EuroNCAP was seen as the dynamic, cutting 
edge that has encouraged manufacturers to compete to raise standards. For 
this reason, EuroNCAP  was generally believed to be the more speedy and 
effective in terms of driving forward safety technology and securing the 
widespread deployment of innovative safety features:  
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“I think I would probably say consumer testing brings a quicker change; 
it is probably one of its bigger differences.  NCAP forced the 
manufacturers to do a lot very quickly, so you get more of a curve like 
that…The regulations, they know there is a cut off when it must be 
done by, well they delay it for as late as possible until they can come 
up with a cheap engineering solution and then it will rise steeply 
whereas on NCAP they will just do it a lot quicker.”   
 
EuroNCAP was also seen to have the advantage of being more readily 
intelligible to the consumer, thus adding consumer power - or at least the 
manufacturers’ perception of consumer power - to the incentives for improving 
safety. 
 
The effectiveness of the regulations was judged rather differently in terms of 
their capacity to capture all cars in the fleet and ensure their conformity to 
acceptable standards.  The safeguard offered by the regulations was felt to be 
particularly important for cars produced by low-volume manufacturers, which 
would never be tested by EuroNCAP,  and for cheap imports which, without 
guaranteed safety standards, could put large numbers of European 
consumers at risk.  Furthermore, the regulations were necessarily more 
comprehensive in their coverage than a consumer ratings system, including 
the detailed specification of components such as seat-belt buckles. 
 
Although the regulations were regarded as the more static element, several 
respondents emphasised the importance of updating them and ensuring that 
they continued to provide a challenge to manufacturers. In other words, they 
opposed any drift away from the regulations in favour of exclusive reliance on 
EuroNCAP, on the grounds that the regulations would then come to be 
regarded as a rock-bottom standard rather than one that moved upwards in 
line with changing capacity to improve safety.  They felt that it was important, 
therefore, to maintain the linkage, through research and agreed test protocols, 
between the regulations and EuroNCAP.  In this way, the advances stimulated 
by EuroNCAP would drive forward  the regulatory standards and  EuroNCAP 
would draw strength from the technical expertise underpinning the regulations.  
It was noted that where EuroNCAP testing was not solidly grounded in 
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legislative standards – the pedestrian test was mentioned specifically – the 
manufacturers found it easy to disregard.   Compatibility was identified as 
another issue that required regulation: 
 
“I think it’s already been proved that EuroNCAP lifts the game beyond a 
regulatory approach in certain areas…  Pedestrian safety hasn’t 
delivered that – no.  With some things that are easier to do such as 
seat belt reminders and a few other things, it’s easy for industry to 
tweak around, via EuroNCAP.  With big structural things, like 
compatibility, we’re going to have standard compatibility, we’re going to 
have standard pedestrian protection.  I believe you need a legislative 
basis for that and it needs to be in Brussels.”  
 
Not everyone was sanguine, however, about the capacity of regulatory action 
to challenge manufacturers. One respondent in particular believed that there 
was an over-reliance upon a consensus-based approach to securing changes 
in the regulations and that this made the process very open to subversion or 
dilution by the industry. In their view, “As long as they have the basic mindset 
that they are only going to do regulations if the industry agrees, they are never 
going to get anywhere.”  
 
A small number of respondents dissented from the majority view that the 
regulations and EuroNCAP were equally necessary and should continue to 
complement each other in driving improvements in crashworthiness.  Two 
manufacturers felt that improving the regulations was a better way forward, 
and this reflected their lack of confidence in the continuing relevance of 
EuroNCAP testing procedures. Elaborating this point of view, one said that the 
largest safety benefits in the future could arise from the active and pre-crash 
safety features now being developed by the major manufacturers and that this 
approach was less susceptible to a ratings scheme than established 
secondary safety technology:   
 
“They may  be suited for a regulatory approach to the degree that again 
you set a certain base standard, that may be meaningful as we have 
for the braking effective safety for many systems and the same in the 
passive safety for the crashes, but if you try to regulate or rate the high 
end, I think this will fail, because one thing you cannot keep track of is 
progress. There will always be somebody a step ahead of you which 
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you have not covered in the rating so it is not fair to him because he 
has done something that should be rewarded and is not - and to really 
map that into such a simple picture as a number of stars, is not feasible 
any more.”  
 
A diametrically opposed viewpoint was that expressed by a government 
representative who considered that EuroNCAP had effectively superseded the 
regulations and offered a far quicker and more streamlined means of 
achieving safety improvements. His own experience of the regulatory process 
had led him to question its capacity for change and thereby its continuing 
relevance: 
 
“It’s the Commission’s responsibility and even if you do try, aren’t you 
running the risk of it getting blocked anyway by all those 25 member 
states and the Commission who won’t propose it.  We’ve been 
exasperated for years - spending money trying to get them to improve it 
and going over there for meetings.  So if you go to your NCAP 
resources instead you are free to change it very quickly and find out 
how safe or unsafe the cars are in another area, like primary NCAP, 
which could be developed at some cost” 
 
The role of the European Commission and European Parliament in 
promoting car crashworthiness 
 
An appraisal of the European Commission’s role by the interviewees 
suggested that it had offered less than wholehearted support to the 
development of the regulations and EuroNCAP. Some felt that the emphasis 
placed by the Maastricht Treaty on the removal of barriers to trade had 
resulted in too much weight being given within the Commission to concerns 
about the burden to industry that would result from better safety standards. 
This position was said to have been promoted particularly strongly by the 
Directorate (DG3) with responsibility for industry and enterprise.   For some 
time DG3 was a more forceful voice within the Commission than DG7, the 
Directorate for Transport and Energy, which had not been strong on vehicle 
safety issues at the outset,  although it was later to provide some powerful 
and influential safety champions.  One consequence was a long-running 
tussle between the EEVC, led by member states and primarily a forum for 
technical development, and discussions in Brussels formally led by DG3.  
Even though many people attended both forums, they did so in different roles, 
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with the result that the research-based initiatives for safety improvements 
emanating from the EEVC  were often deflected in the Brussels forum.  It was 
suggested by one industry observer that these tensions had lessened in 
recent years and that there was now a more cooperative and rational 
relationship.  
 
“…They realised in Brussels and Geneva that if they could come to 
some sort of agreement then they wouldn’t duplicate each other, since 
it is the same people so that the way it has worked out now, Geneva 
tends to develop a lot of the safety regulations which are then purely 
rubber stamped and applied in Brussels as directives, and I think it is 
true to say that Brussels have taken the lead more on environmental 
regulations which then get fed back to become ECE regulations, so 
that way they avoid too much interaction. There are exceptions like 
pedestrian protection.”  
 
When EuroNCAP was proposed, the different viewpoints of DG3 and DG7 
were even more sharply underlined, the former expressing open hostility while 
the latter, mainly through individuals who supported the initiative, successfully 
lobbied for the new initiative to receive funding from the Commission and 
enabled it to set up its secretariat in Brussels.  The formal position of the 
Commission was seen by one observer to have shifted dramatically over a 
short period: 
 
“…It changed from threatening the UK Government with legal action, to 
putting money into it and claiming all the credit for it, so they have done 
a fairly significant about turn, although the Commission should not be 
all labelled as one probably because this is when we got DG3 for 
industry which is what the regulations were done under and DG7 which 
was more about road safety.”  
 
Those with recent knowledge of the Commission’s stance towards EuroNCAP 
described it as highly supportive politically but administratively fraught – to the 
extent that there were currently significant issues about the non-payment of 
bills.  The Commission was urged to attend to its financial support 
arrangements to ensure that these actually enabled EuroNCAP to fulfil its 
objectives. There was little doubt that EuroNCAP was in its turn helpful to the 
Commission in enabling pressure for change to be applied to the vehicle 
industry in parallel with the regulatory process:  
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“I would say (the Commission) helps to drive EuroNCAP and my 
impression is that European Commission also likes to drive the car 
industry a little bit quicker into a special direction, through rating 
systems like EuroNCAP.  This process seems to be easier and quicker 
than the legislative process.”  
  
The same respondent considered that the Commission should take more of a 
technical lead within EuroNCAP, opening up discussion around issues such 
as assessment protocols and collision types.  Others, however, felt that the 
capacity of the Commission to take on board technical issues was 
undermined by the frequent movement of personnel, which meant that 
knowledgeable people tended to be replaced after a short time by those who 
were less familiar with the subject.  Becoming ensnared in bureaucracy and 
paperwork at the expense of a broader vision was believed to be another 
hazard for Commission staff. 
 
In comparison, the role of the European Parliament in promoting vehicle 
safety was presented in an unambiguously positive light. The introduction of 
the co-decision procedure in 1993/94 was identified as the mechanism that 
enabled the Parliament to transform itself from a body that rubber-stamped 
Commission initiatives to one that began to take an independent stance on 
issues brought forward by MEPs on behalf of their constituents and by 
European consumer groups such as the ETSC and BEUC.  In doing so, it 
showed a willingness to challenge the industry-friendly perspective on vehicle 
safety that had previously dominated the Commission and to remind the 
Commission of its obligations to promote the safety of the public.  As noted 
earlier, the European Parliament was credited with rescuing the front and side 
impact regulations, assisted by judicious lobbying by the FIA and expert 
behind-the-scenes briefing of an MEP rapporteur, who was one of the first to 
be successful in using the co-decision procedure to represent his constituents.   
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6 Conclusions 
 
The history of vehicle safety policy in Europe shows that the 1990s were a 
period of unprecedented progress.  An expanding body of authoritative 
research based on the analysis of car accident data and predictive whole 
vehicle crash testing lent urgency to the debate about the upgrading of safety 
legislation.  The enlargement of the European Union simultaneously provided 
a new impetus and opportunity for co-operation on vehicle safety.   
 
The two principal markers of progress during the decade were the agreement 
of the front and side impact directives in 1995 and 1996 and the setting up of 
EuroNCAP in 1996.  The UK government, through the research programme at 
the DfT, made a substantial contribution to both developments and the 
present study has addressed the question of whether this investment has 
helped the government to meet its primary policy aim of road casualty 
reduction.  The broad conclusion is that UK government support for the 
regulations and EuroNCAP has been justified by consequent improvements in 
vehicle user protection.   
 
Effect of regulations and EuroNCAP on vehicle safety 
The quantitative analysis of national accident figures undertaken for this 
project suggests that the front and side impact regulations and EuroNCAP 
have exercised a positive and sustained impact upon car occupant safety in 
the UK.   
 
This conclusion is strongly supported by qualitative evidence from 
interviewees across governments, the safety research community, motor 
manufacturers and NGOs, who described the regulations as a basic safety 
platform that has ensured a minimum standard for all vehicles, to which 
EuroNCAP has added a new dynamic by harnessing competition between 
manufacturers to raise safety standards.  In this way, best design and the 
latest safety features have been diffused throughout the industry far more 
quickly than could have been achieved by regulation alone.   
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Without the regulations and EuroNCAP, it is clear that vehicle safety would 
have improved in line with evolving technology but that such improvements 
would have been made in a piecemeal way, heavily influenced by market 
judgements, with the likelihood that many safety features that are now 
standard would have remained luxury options.   
 
EuroNCAP in particular has provided a powerful stimulus to the industry’s 
investment in vehicle safety, and safety requirements have been given much 
higher priority in the design process.  Safety features are now advertised 
prominently by manufacturers.  The precise effect on consumer behaviour is 
difficult to discern but the greater transparency provided by EuroNCAP has 
undoubtedly made manufacturers aware that consumers now have ready 
access to information about safety and are therefore able to use that 
information in their purchasing decisions.   
 
The role of the DfT/TTS research programme 
Whole vehicle testing has been the indispensable basis of effective predictive 
tests and much credit can be given to the UK government for providing 
technical leadership in this field through the work undertaken at TRL during 
the 1980s.   
 
The commitment of individuals was critical to the formulation of the regulations 
and to the promotion of EuroNCAP. Countries where strong safety cultures 
were already established, principally the UK, Netherlands and Sweden, 
nurtured safety champions in government, research institutions and NGOs, 
with the UK Department for Transport providing a particularly supportive 
environment.   
 
At national government level, the UK’s contribution to securing progress in 
frontal and side impact protection through the regulations and consumer 
testing was clearly very substantial and indeed indispensable in the case of 
EuroNCAP, which would not have come into existence without the prior UK 
commitment to launching UKNCAP within the TTS research programme.   
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At the same time, it is evident that neither the regulations nor EuroNCAP 
would have been implemented without wider European support and 
ownership, particularly from the governments of The Netherlands and 
Sweden, the EEVC, the ETSC, the FIA, the European Parliament and 
DG7/DGTREN within the European Commission.  UK government 
representatives often played a vital political role in orchestrating this support in 
the European arena.   
 
Value for money of the DfT/TTS research programme  
The basic cost benefit analysis has concluded that the investment in the 
broad-based research programme at the TTS division of the DfT between 
1990 and 2002 has yielded substantial benefits in terms of the progress made 
towards the Government’s KSI target for 2010 and in substantial cost savings 
associated with the sustained fall in KSI casualties over the period.   
 
The combined cost of the TTS programme (encompassing staff costs and all 
research costs, both direct and indirect), was just over £23 million. On the 
benefit side, an average annual reduction of just under four per cent in KSI 
casualties has been achieved between 1999 and 2003.   
 
The year on year reductions in KSI rates have been associated with absolute 
reductions in serious injuries rather than fatal outcomes (although numbers of 
fatal outcomes have decreased substantially relative to the size of the fleet).  
Year on year reductions in casualties on this scale bring very large cost 
savings.  For example, the decline in number of seriously injured car 
occupants between 2002 and 2003 represents a saving of over £196 million 
and even if each accident had been slight rather than serious, the saving 
would be in the region of £181 million.   
 
It is evident  that reductions in KSI injury outcomes can be attributed to a 
number of factors and not solely to improvements in crashworthiness 
prompted by the front and side impact regulations and EuroNCAP.  Changes 
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in medical care, road infrastructure, enforcement and vehicle user behaviour 
are clearly important.   
 
Nonetheless, the decline in seriously injured casualties since the mid 1990s 
indicates that changes in vehicle design associated with the front and side 
impact regulations and EuroNCAP have indeed had an important influence.  
Moreover, given that the age of the fleet changes from year to year and 
around eight per cent is made up of the most recent vehicles, the benefits of 
newer car design will become widespread with each successive year.  This 
evidence therefore points to the conclusion that the TTS research programme 
has been highly cost effective.   
 
Effectiveness of programme in reaching policy objectives 
Car occupants are less likely to be killed or seriously injured in a road accident 
now than in the early 1990s.  Provided that the reduction in KSI casualties 
achieved between 1999 and 2003 can be sustained at an average rate of 
three per cent, per annum between 2004 and 2010, the Government’s target 
for 2010 of a 40 per cent reduction in KSI casualties over the 1994-98 
average is achievable.  
 
The evidence from this project shows that improvements in secondary safety 
resulting from the front and side impact regulations and EuroNCAP and 
reflecting the priorities of the TTS research programme, have made a vital and 
effective contribution to the key policy objective of reducing serious road 
casualties.   
 
It is a cause for concern, however, that the numbers of fatalities have 
remained static relative to those for serious injuries and it is possible that this 
aspect needs to be addressed through a more specific target.   
 
Impact of programme and recommendations for improvement  
Using STATS19 and CCIS data to analyse the outcomes of accidents 
involving old and new cars over similar time periods, it has been possible to 
give precise indications of the safety benefits delivered by improvements in 
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vehicle design arising from the regulations and EuroNCAP.  This methodology 
was chosen in preference to a ‘before and after’ approach involving two time 
periods in order to minimise the effect of other changes (road design, 
enforcement policy, road user behaviour etc.) on fatalities and serious injuries.   
 
The results from STATS19 show that KSI outcomes have improved for all 
drivers of new cars in all types of impact and whether car to car or car to non 
car.  With the exception of females in front impacts, front seat passengers 
have also benefited.  However, the results do give rise to concern about the 
lack of benefit to rear seat passengers in new cars who, irrespective of age or 
gender, have all experienced worse outcomes in front impacts, whether car to 
car or car to non car.  Older people and women have also been 
disadvantaged in other types of impact.   
 
The CCIS data, which provide detailed information about injury type, confirm a 
general improvement in injury risk for car occupants in all types of impact, 
whatever the object struck.  The data have also pinpointed areas of concern 
where gains in protection have been less significant than might have been 
expected or where there have been disbenefits.  For example, serious chest 
injury, knee fracture and foot/ankle fracture are not reduced greatly in newer 
cars involved in frontal impacts and there is also a small increase in neck 
fracture and serious abdominal injury, mainly in car to car impacts.   
 
These findings suggest that modern seat belt systems have not delivered the 
benefits expected in terms of chest injury reduction in this type of impact and 
that reduced foot well intrusion has not provided the expected extra protection 
for the foot and ankle. Increases in neck fractures may be due to higher crash 
pulses with newer vehicles and there may be a need to consider the role of 
airbag deployment as a contributor to these injuries. 
 
These quantitative results tend to confirm the observations of a majority of 
interviewees in the qualitative part of the study, namely that the front and side 
impact regulations and EuroNCAP have brought significant improvements in 
the levels of protection for car occupants but that aspects of the vehicle 
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design process may have disadvantaged some user groups.  In particular, the 
optimisation of vehicles is widely thought to be an inevitable side effect of 
predictive testing, with the result that user groups which diverge most from the 
50th percentile male receive the least benefit from crashworthiness 
improvements and, in some cases, actual disbenefits.   
 
It also seems clear that little progress has been made towards improving the 
pedestrian friendliness of vehicle design or in resolving problems of 
compatibility. Moreover, during the evaluation period compatibility had been 
considered principally in terms of car-to-car impacts whereas the 
consequences of collisions between cars and heavier vehicles such as lorries 
are potentially even more devastating.  These remain as challenges for the 
regulations and EuroNCAP to address through improvements to their testing 
regimes. However, these issues are being currently explored within the DfT 
VCCOMPAT programme of research. 
 
Further improvements to the front and side impact legislative requirements 
have since been identified by the EEVC and others and, as noted by the DfT 
in its latest review of its road safety strategy, sustained reductions in 
casualties can be expected only if vehicle design and secondary safety 
continue to evolve.   
 
Although the motor industry’s initial hostility towards both the regulations and 
EuroNCAP has been replaced over time by a more compliant and co-
operative approach, it is apparent that there are lingering concerns about 
aspects of the EuroNCAP programme, including its benefits in terms of real 
world safety, its cost and what the industry sees as a degree of 
unpredictability and subjectivity in the EuroNCAP test requirements.  It is clear 
also that some within the industry would prefer EuroNCAP to divert resources 
into primary safety while the balance of opinion outside the industry points 
towards an extension and refinement of the existing approach.   
 
The history of the front and side regulations and EuroNCAP since their 
implementation suggests that they have acted in an effective and 
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complementary way to promote car occupant safety.  Neither element would 
have been as effective without the other and attention should be given in the 
future to maintaining the link between them so that they continue to be 
mutually reinforcing in the interest of improved safety for vehicle users.   
 
Lessons for policy-making and programme delivery strategy by 
government 
The leading edge research into crashworthiness undertaken at the TRL 
laboratories from the 1980’s onwards provided the critical underpinning for a 
government policy that was to prove highly controversial in terms of the 
constraints it imposed upon a powerful industry.   The full weight of industry 
opposition, including a formidable research capability, was brought to bear 
upon the front and side impact regulations and EuroNCAP.  It is doubtful 
whether the government’s policy on regulation and its delivery of the NCAP 
and EuroNCAP programmes could have been sustained without the backing 
of the robust and innovative research conducted in the TRL laboratories. 
 
Individuals with a passionate commitment to vehicle safety were important at 
all stages of the development of the regulations and EuroNCAP, often making 
waves and attracting opposition within their organisations.  The Department 
for Transport encouraged individual champions to contribute to the safety 
research agenda and acted upon key issues arising from this research, 
translating them into policy proposals which the UK government then 
promoted strongly within the European arena. 
 
Although the lead provided by the UK government was indispensable in 
putting the regulations and EuroNCAP on the European policy agenda, it is 
unlikely that implementation would have been achieved without a committed 
working partnership with other national governments and institutions and a 
sense of shared ownership of the process. Technical co-operation within the 
EEVC was an important dimension of the partnership, and the involvement of 
consumer organisations in the political process was vital in pushing the public 
interest into the foreground of European debate. 
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The history of the front and side impact regulations and EuroNCAP reveals 
how the UK government repeatedly seized the initiative on vehicle safety and 
made the industry respond to its concerns. When the regulatory process 
threatened to stall, the momentum was maintained through the development 
of NCAP and then EuroNCAP.  It is clear that although impressive strides 
have been made through the implementation of both programmes, there has 
subsequently been a loss of momentum on issues such as pedestrian safety 
and compatibility (with car to HGV compatibility remaining a particularly salient 
issue).  Past experience suggests that resolute initiatives from government will 
be required to push the industry towards systematic and sustained 
improvements in these areas.   
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9 Glossary 
 
AA Automobile Association 
ABS Antilock Braking System 
ACEA Association des Constructeurs Europeens d’Automobiles 
ADAC German Automobile Association 
AIS Abbreviated Injury Scale 
AIT Alliance Internationale de Tourisme 
ANCAP Australian New Car Assessment Programme 
BEUC Bureau Europeen dea Consommateurs 
CCIS Co-operative Crash Injury Study 
CCTP Computer Controlled Test Procedure 
DETR Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions 
DfT Department for Transport 
DoT Department of Transport 
DSIR Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
DTLR Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions 
DG 3 Directorate-General for Trade and Industry 
DG 7 Directorate-General for Transport 
DG TREN Directorate-General for Transport and Energy 
ECE Economic Commission for Europe 
EEC European Economic Committee 
EEVC European Experimental Vehicle Committee 
ERGA European Regulations Global Approach 
ESV Experimental Safety of Vehicles (conference) 
ETSC European Transport Safety Council 
EU European Union 
EuroNCAP European New Car Assessment Programme 
EuroSID European Side Impact Dummy 
FIA Federation Internationale de l’Automobile 
FMVSS Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 
FSP Front Seat Passenger 
GRSP Global Road Safety Partnership 
HIC Head Injury Criteria 
HLDI Highway Loss Data Institute 
IIHS Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
IRCOBI International Research Council on the Biomechanics of Impact  
IT International Testing 
KSI Killed or Seriously Injured 
LAB Laborotoire Accedontologie et Biomechanique 
MAIS Maximum Abbreviated Injury Score 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
ODB Offset Deformable Barrier 
PACTS Parliamentary Advisory Committee on Transport Safety 
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RRL Road Research Laboratory 
RSP Rear Seat Passenger 
SMMT Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders 
STATS 19 (GB Road Accident Statistics) 
SUV Sports Utility Vehicle 
TRL Transport Research Laboratory 
TRRL Transport Road Research Laboratory 
TTS Transport Technology and Standards Division (of DfT) 
UKNCAP United Kingdom New Car Assessment Programme 
UN United Nations 
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
USNCAP United States New Car Assessment Programme 
VALT Vakuutusyhtioiden Liikenneturvallisuustoimikunta 
VSE Vehicle Standards and Engineering Division (of DfT) 
VSRC Vehicle Safety Research Centre 
VTS Vehicle Technology and Standards Division (of DfT) 
WG 9 EEVC Working Group on Side Impacts 
WG 17 EEVC Working Group on Pedestrian Protection 
WP 29 UN (Inland Transport Committee )Working Party on the 
Construction of Vehicles in Geneva  
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Quantitative Analysis Figures and Charts 
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STATS 19 Data Analysis 
 
Drivers 
 
Car to Car impacts 
Frontal Impacts (Frontal Impact Directive) 
 
Figures 1 – 3 compare the killed or seriously injured (KSI) outcome between 
old and new cars for drivers in car to car frontal impacts. This scenario is 
covered by the regulation and EuroNCAP. 
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Figure 1 Drivers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• The KSI rate in frontal impacts for drivers of newer vehicles is 3.9% 
compared with 5% for drivers of older vehicles. This is a reduction of 
almost 22%. 
• The proportion of uninjured drivers is higher in the older vehicles than 
the newer vehicles. 
• The data suggest that in car to car frontal impacts, drivers of newer 
cars are marginally more likely to receive an injury than drivers of older 
vehicles, but that the injury is likely to be less severe in the newer 
vehicles. 
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Figure 2 Drivers by Gender – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• It is clear that female drivers are more likely to be injured in a frontal 
impact than male drivers. The proportion of female drivers uninjured is 
some 20% lower than male drivers.  
• The uninjured rate for male drivers is slightly higher in older vehicles 
than newer vehicles, the converse being the case for female drivers. 
• The KSI rate for male drivers is 5.2 in the older vehicles and 3.9 in the 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 25%. 
• The KSI rate for female drivers is 5.6 in older vehicles and 4.2 in newer 
vehicles, a reduction of 25%. 
• There appears to have been equal benefit for the reduction of KSI for 
both men and females in frontal impacts. 
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Figure 3 Drivers by Age – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• Older (>50) drivers are marginally more likely to be injured in a frontal 
crash than younger drivers. The uninjured rate for younger drivers is 
54.8% in the older vehicles and 54% in newer vehicles indicating a very 
slight increase in the rate of injury in newer vehicles. The uninjured rate 
for older drivers is 51% in older vehicles and 51.9% in newer vehicles 
indicating a very slight decrease in the rate of injury in newer vehicles. 
• The KSI rate for younger drivers is 5.1% in older vehicles and 3.7% in 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 27%. 
• The KSI rate for older drivers is 7.7% in older vehicles and 6.1% in 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 21%. 
• Older drivers remain more vulnerable to KSI injury outcome than 
younger drivers. Though there has been a reduction in the KSI rate for 
both age groups, the benefit in the newer cars has been greater for the 
younger drivers than the older drivers.  
 
Rear Impacts (No Directive) 
 
Figures 4 – 6 compare the KSI outcome between old and new cars for drivers 
in car to car rear impacts. 
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Figure 4 Drivers – car to car rear impacts 
 
• The proportion of uninjured drivers in car to car rear impacts has risen 
from 40.1% in older vehicles to 45.1% in newer vehicles. This is mainly 
accounted for by a reduction in the proportion of slight injuries. 
• The KSI rate in older vehicles is 1.4% and this falls to 1% in newer 
vehicles, a reduction of 29%. 
• Newer vehicle design appears to have had an effect in reducing the 
likelihood of all injury severities in rear car to car impacts. 
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Figure 5 Drivers by Gender – car to car rear impacts 
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• Female drivers are clearly more likely to be injured in a rear car to car 
impact than male drivers. This is largely accounted for by an increase 
in slight injuries, most likely to be soft tissue neck injuries. The rate of 
uninjured drivers has risen in the newer vehicles for both genders, but 
remains over 20% lower for females than males. 
• The KSI rate for females is 1.7% in the older vehicles and 1.1% in the 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 35%. 
• The KSI rate for men is 1.2% in the older vehicles and 0.9% in the 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 25%. 
• Female drivers remain disadvantaged in rear impacts compared to 
male drivers, but the improvements in terms of KSI injury outcome are 
more noticeable for females than for men. 
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Figure 6 Drivers by Age – car to car rear impacts 
 
• Older drivers are less likely to be injured in a rear car to car impact than 
younger drivers. The rate of uninjured drivers rises for both age groups 
in the newer vehicles. This is predominantly accounted for by a 
reduced propensity towards slight injury outcome in the older age 
category. 
• The KSI rate for younger drivers is 1.3% in older vehicles and 1% in 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 23%. 
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• The KSI rate for older drivers is 1.9% in older vehicles and 0.9% in 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 53% (note smaller sample size may 
reflect in this result). 
• It appears that modern vehicle design has been beneficial for both 
younger and older drivers, with the benefit in terms of serious injury 
outcome being greater for the older drivers than the younger drivers. 
 
Right Side Impacts – Struck side (Side Impact Directive) 
 
Figures 7 – 9 compare the KSI outcome between old and new cars for drivers 
in car to car right side impacts. This scenario is covered by the regulation and 
EuroNCAP. 
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Figure 7 Drivers – car to car right side impacts 
 
• The rate of uninjured drivers in right side car to car impacts is 
marginally higher (47.3) in newer vehicles than in older vehicles 
(45.3%). 
• The KSI rate in older vehicles is 4.9% and 3.8% in newer vehicles, a 
reduction of 22%. 
• Newer vehicles appear to offer better protection in right side impacts 
than older vehicles. 
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Figure 8 Drivers by Gender – car to car right side impacts 
 
• Female drivers are clearly more likely to receive an injury in a right side 
car to car impact than male drivers. The uninjured rate for female 
drivers is 29.7% in older vehicles and 33% in newer vehicles 
representing a reduction in overall injury in the newer vehicles. A 
similar observation applies to male drivers, though the proportion of 
uninjured drivers is some 20% higher than the female drivers for both 
vehicle ages. 
• The KSI rate for male drivers is 5.1 in older vehicles and 3.9% in newer 
vehicles, a reduction of 24%. 
• The KSI rate for female drivers is 5.1% in older vehicles and 3.9% in 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 24%. 
• For right side car to car impacts, there is no difference in the KSI rate 
between genders and there is an equal reduction in the rate of KSI in 
the newer vehicles. Female drivers however remain more vulnerable to 
slight injury outcome than male drivers. 
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Figure 9 Drivers by Age – car to car impacts 
 
• Older drivers have a higher uninjured rate than younger drivers in both 
old and new vehicles when considering right side car to car impacts. 
This is particularly noticeable in the newer vehicles where the 
difference in the uninjured rate between the driver age categories is 
6.7% compared with 1.1% in the older vehicles. 
• The KSI rate for younger drivers is 4.3% in the older vehicles and 3.3% 
in the newer vehicles, a reduction of 23%. 
• The KSI rate for older drivers is 8.5% in the older vehicles and 5.6% in 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 34% (smaller sample size may have an 
effect). 
• Modern vehicle design has benefited both younger and older drivers 
but the benefit appears greatest for the older drivers. 
 
Left Side Impacts – Non-struck side (No Directive) 
 
Figures 10 – 12 compare the KSI outcome between old and new cars for 
drivers in car to car left side impacts.  
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Figure 10 Drivers – car to car left side impacts 
 
• The rate of uninjured drivers in left side car to car impacts is higher in the 
older vehicles (51.3%) than in the newer vehicles (49%) representing a 
slight increase in overall injury rates for newer cars compared with older 
cars. 
• The KSI rate in older vehicles is 4.3% and 3.5% in newer vehicles, a 
reduction of 19%. 
• Modern car design appears to have had a positive effect on the likelihood 
of serious injury outcome for drivers in left side car to car impacts but the 
rate of slight injury has increased. 
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Figure 11 Drivers by Gender – car to car left side impacts 
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• Female car drives are clearly more likely to be injured in a left side car 
to car impact than male drivers. The uninjured rate for female drivers is 
34.2% in the older vehicles and 32.6% in the newer vehicles, 
representing a marginal increase in overall injury rate for females. The 
uninjured rate for male drivers is considerably higher at 55.8% in the 
older vehicles and 57.3% in the newer vehicles, representing a 
marginal decrease in the overall rate of injury for male drivers. 
• The KSI injury rate for male drivers in left side car to car impacts is 
4.6% in the older vehicles and 3.6% in the newer vehicles, a reduction 
of 22%. 
• The KSI injury rate for female drivers is 4.5% in the older vehicles and 
3.6% in the newer vehicles, a reduction of 20%. 
• Newer vehicle design appears to have had a benefit in reducing 
serious injury outcome for both male and female drivers in left side car 
to car impacts, the benefit being marginally greater for men than 
females. Female drivers remain considerably disadvantaged in terms of 
slight injury outcome compared to male drivers. 
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Figure 12 Drivers by Age – car to car left side impacts 
 
• Older drivers are more likely to be uninjured in left side car to car 
impact than younger drivers; this is the case for both old and new 
vehicles. The uninjured rate for younger drivers is 46.8% in older cars 
and 45.4% in newer cars representing a marginal increase in the 
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overall injury rate for younger drivers in newer vehicles. The uninjured 
rate for older drivers is 48.1% in old cars and 51.5% in new cars, 
representing a slight benefit in the overall injury outcome for older 
drivers in newer cars. 
 
• The KSI rate for younger drivers is 4.4% in older vehicles and 3.4% in 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 23%. 
• The KSI rate for older drivers is 5.5% in older vehicles and 4.2% in 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 24%. 
• Although older drivers have a lower rate of overall injury outcome than 
younger drivers, and the reduction in the rate of KSI is similar for both 
driver age groups, the older drivers remain disadvantaged in terms of 
serious injury outcome.  
 
Accidents other than car to car (injured occupant within car so excludes 
accidents where injury was only to pedestrian and cyclist/motorcyclist) 
 
Frontal Impacts 
 
Figures 13 – 15 compare the KSI outcome between old and new cars for 
drivers in car to non car frontal impacts.  
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Figure 13 Drivers – car to non car frontal impacts 
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• The KSI rate in frontal impacts for drivers of newer vehicles is 7.3% 
compared with 9.7% for drivers of older vehicles. This is a reduction of 
25%. 
• The proportion of uninjured drivers is marginally higher in the newer 
vehicles than in the older vehicles. 
• Newer vehicles offer better protection for KSI injury outcome than older 
vehicles in non car to car frontal collisions. 
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Figure 14 Drivers by Gender – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• It is clear that female drivers are more likely to be injured in a frontal 
impact than male drivers. The proportion of uninjured female drivers is 
7% lower than male drivers for the older vehicles and 9% lower for the 
new vehicles. 
• For both genders the proportion of uninjured drivers is slightly higher in 
the newer vehicles than the older vehicles. 
• The KSI rate for male drivers is 10.9% in the older vehicles and 8% in 
the newer vehicles, a reduction of 27%. 
• The KSI rate for female drivers is 8% in the older vehicles and 6.1 % in 
the newer vehicles, a reduction of 24%. 
• There has been a marginally greater benefit in the reduction of KSI 
injury outcome for male drivers when compared to female drivers in 
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frontal non car to car impacts, but the rate remains higher for men than 
for females. 
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Figure 15 Drivers by Age – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• Younger drivers have a higher injury rate than older drivers (>50) 
considering all levels of severity, both in the older cars and the newer 
cars. The uninjured rate for younger drivers is 42.8% in the older 
vehicles and 44.8% in the newer vehicles. The uninjured rate for older 
drivers is 48% in the older cars and 52.3% in the newer cars. 
• The KSI rate for younger drivers is 10.4% in the older cars and 7.6% in 
the newer cars, a reduction of 27%. 
• The KSI rate for older drivers is 10.3% in the older cars and 7.3% in the 
newer cars, a reduction of 29%. 
• There are similar KSI rates for both age categories and across both 
vehicle age groups. The benefit in modern cars has been marginally 
greater for the older drivers compared to the younger drivers. 
 
Rear Impacts 
 
Figures 16 – 18 compare the KSI outcome between old and new cars for 
drivers in car to non car rear impacts.  
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Figure 16 Drivers – car to non car rear impacts 
 
• The proportion of uninjured drivers in car to non car rear impacts has 
risen from 46.6% in older vehicles to 47.8% in newer vehicles.  
• The KSI rate in the older vehicle is 2.1% and this falls to 1.5% in the 
newer vehicles, a reduction of 29%. 
• Newer vehicle design appears to have had an effect upon reducing the 
likelihood of all injury severities in rear car to non car impacts. 
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Figure 17 – Drivers by Gender – car to non cat rear impacts 
 
• Female drivers are clearly more likely to be injured in a rear car to non 
car impact than male drivers.  This is largely accounted for by an 
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increase in slight injuries, most likely to be soft tissue neck injuries. The 
rate of uninjured drivers has risen in the newer cars for both genders, 
slightly more so for female drivers than male drivers. 
• The KSI rate for female drivers is 2.4% in the older cars and 1.6% in 
the newer cars, a reduction of 33%. 
• The KSI rate for male drivers is 2.1% in the older cars and 1.6 % in the 
newer cars, a reduction of 24%. 
• Female drivers have seen a greater reduction in KSI injury outcome in 
modern cars compared with the reduction for male drivers. 
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Figure 18 Drivers by Age – car to non car rear impacts 
 
• Older drivers are less likely to be injured in a rear car to non car impact 
than younger drivers. The uninjured rate rises for both driver age 
groups in the newer cars compared with the older cars. 
• The KSI rate for younger drivers is 2.1% in the older cars and 1.6% in 
the newer cars, a reduction of 24%. 
• The KSI rate for older drivers is 2.7% in the older cars and 1.4% in the 
newer cars, a reduction of 48%. 
• It appears that modern vehicle design has been beneficial for both 
younger and older drivers and the benefit has been greater for the 
older drivers than the younger drivers. 
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Right Side Impacts - Struck Side 
Figures 19 – 21 compare the KSI outcome between old and new cars for 
drivers in car to non car right side impacts.  
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Figure 19 Drivers – car to non car right side impacts 
 
• The rate of uninjured drivers in right side car to non car impacts is a 
little higher (59.3%) in newer vehicles than in older vehicles (55.4%). 
• The KSI rate in older cars is 7% compared with 4.8% in the newer cars, 
a reduction of 31%. 
• Newer vehicles appear to offer better protection for drivers in right side 
car to non car impacts. 
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Figure 20 Drivers by Gender – car to non car right side impacts 
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• Female drivers are clearly more likely to receive an injury in a right side 
car to non car impact than male drivers. The uninjured rate for female 
drivers is 46.6% in the older vehicles and 51.9% in the newer vehicles, 
representing an overall reduction in injuries for females in the newer 
cars. Similarly the proportion of uninjured male drivers rises from 57% 
in the older cars to 62.6% in the newer cars. The uninjured rate for 
male drivers remains consistently a little over 10% higher than for 
female drivers irrespective of vehicle age. 
• The KSI rate for male drivers is 8.2% in the older cars and 5.6% in the 
newer cars, a reduction of 32%. 
• The KSI rate for female drivers is 5.3% in the older cars and 3.7% in 
the newer cars, a reduction of 30%. 
• Whilst female drivers are considerably more vulnerable to slight injury 
than male drivers and remain so in the newer vehicles, male drivers 
have a higher KSI rate in both the newer and older cars. The benefit in 
the reduction of the KSI rate for both males and females is similar. 
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Figure 21 Drivers by Age – car to non car right side impacts 
 
• For car to non car right side impacts, older drivers have a higher 
uninjured rate than younger drivers in both old and new vehicles, 
though the discrepancy between the older and younger drivers reduces 
in the newer cars. 
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• The KSI rate for younger drivers is 7.7% in the older cars and 5% in the 
newer cars, a reduction of 35%. 
• The KSI rate for older drivers is 6% in the older cars and 4.6% in the 
newer cars, a reduction of 23%. 
• Modern vehicle design has benefited both younger and older drivers in 
right side non car to car impacts, but the benefit appears to be greater 
for the younger drivers. 
 
Left Side Impacts – Non Struck Side 
Figures 22 – 24 compare the KSI outcome between old and new cars for 
drivers in car to non car left side impacts.  
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Figure 22 Drivers – car to non car left side impacts 
 
• The rate of uninjured drivers in left side car to non car impacts is similar 
for both the older vehicles (57.9%) and the newer vehicles (57.2%). 
• The KSI rate is 6.3% in the older cars and 4.4% in the newer cars, a 
reduction of 30%. 
• Modern car design appears to have had a positive effect on reducing 
the likelihood of KSI injury outcome for drivers in left side car to non car 
impacts. 
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Figure 23 Drivers by Gender – car to non car left side impacts 
 
• Female drivers are more likely to be injured in a left side car to non car 
impact than male drivers. The uninjured rate for female drivers is 
50.5% in the older vehicles and 48.6 in the newer vehicles, 
representing a marginal increase in overall injury rate for females. The 
uninjured rate for male drivers is higher at 58.7% in the older cars and 
61.2% in the newer cars, representing a marginal decrease in the 
overall injury rate for men. 
• The KSI injury rate for male drivers is 7.8% in the older cars and 4.8% 
in the newer cars, a reduction of 38%. 
• The KSI injury rate for female drivers is 3.8% in the older cars and 
3.9% in the newer cars, a slight increase of 3%. 
• New vehicle design appears to have had a considerable benefit in 
reducing the likelihood of KSI injury outcome for male drivers but has 
had no benefit, in fact a marginal disbenefit, for the injury outcome for 
female drivers in left side car to non car impacts. 
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Figure 24 Drivers by Age – car to non car left side impacts 
 
• Older drivers are more likely to be uninjured in a left side car to non car 
impact than younger drivers; this is the case for both old and new 
vehicles. The uninjured rate for younger drivers is 52.8% in the older 
cars and 53.9% in the newer cars, representing a marginal decrease in 
the overall injury rate for younger drivers in newer vehicles. The 
uninjured rate for older drivers is 65.4% in the older cars and 61.4% in 
the newer cars, representing an increase in the overall rate of injury for 
older drivers in left side car to non car impacts. 
• The KSI rate for younger drivers is 7.4% in the older cars and 4.8% in 
the newer vehicles, a reduction of 35%. 
• The KSI rate for older drivers is 4.1% in the older cars and 3.6% in the 
newer cars, a reduction of 12%. 
• Modern vehicle design appears to have benefited younger driver both 
in terms of their overall injury rate and their KSI injury rate. For older 
drivers there has been an increase in overall injury rate in the newer 
cars and the reduction in the KSI rate, though 12%, is considerably 
lower than the reduction experienced by the younger drivers (35%). 
 
Car passengers – front seat and rear seat 
 
Since the data does not contain information relating to uninjured car 
passengers, a different approach has been used to compare the injury 
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outcomes from passengers in newer and older vehicles. The Odds Ratio 
method had been used and is calculated as the ratio of the KSI rate for a 
given subset in the older vehicles and the KSI rate for the same subset in the 
newer vehicles. An Odds Ratio equal to 1 (normalised to 0) indicates no 
change in the KSI rate. The Odds Ratios were calculated for both Front Seat 
Passengers (FSP) and Rear Seat Passengers (RSP) for each impact type, 
front, rear, right and left, and by each of the categories all occupants, male, 
female, young and old. 
 
Car to Car Impacts 
The results of the Odds Ratios for car to car impacts are summarised in table 
1. Each scenario is commented in detail in figures 25 to 32. 
Table 1: Odds Ratios for car to car impacts by seating position 
and impact type 
 Fronts Rear Right Left 
All FSP 0.07 0.47 0.16 0.69 
Male FSP 0.27 0.56 0.5 1.11 
Female FSP -0.03 0.53 0.01 0.46 
Young FSP 0.04 0.6 0.49 0.83 
Old FSP 0.21 1 -0.02 1.63 
     
All RSP -0.1 -0.04 0.1 0.01 
Male RSP -0.13 0.39 0.06 -0.1 
Female RSP -0.1 -0.48 0.11 0.1 
Young RSP -0.13 0 0.13 0.05 
Old RSP -0.03 -0.65 -0.08 -0.44 
 
Front Impacts - car to car
All FSP, 0.07
Male FSP, 0.27
Female FSP, -0.03
Young FSP, 0.04
Old FSP, 0.21
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
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Figure 25 Front seat passengers – car to car frontal impacts 
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Figure 26 Rear seat passengers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• In car to car frontal impacts KSI injury rate benefits are seen in the 
newer cars for all front seat passengers except for the younger female 
passengers. This disbenefit is marginal.  
• The greatest benefits are evident for male front seat passengers and 
the older front seat passengers. 
• For rear seat passengers in frontal impacts disbenefits for the KSI 
injury outcome are seen across the entire diversity of occupants. 
• The greatest disbenefits are observed for the male RSPs and the 
younger RSPs, those occupants who are inherently more resilient to 
injury. 
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Figure 27 Front seat passengers – car to car rear impacts 
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Figure 28 Rear seat passengers – car to car rear impacts 
 
• In car to car rear impacts benefits are apparent in the newer vehicles 
for all front seat occupants. 
• The KSI rate in rear impacts has improved for male rear seat 
passengers and younger RSPs, but the rate has increased for female 
and older RSPs. 
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Figure 29 Front seat passengers – car to car right side impacts 
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Figure 30 Rear seat passengers – car to car right side impacts 
 
• Right side impacts represent non struck side impacts for FSPs. Newer 
car design has benefited the KSI rate for all FSPs in right side impacts 
except for the older FSPs. 
• For rear seat passengers it is not possible to say whether a right side 
impact represents a struck side or a non struck side impact since exact 
location in the rear of the car is not recorded in the data set.  On the 
whole benefits are observed for rear seat passengers in right side 
impacts, however when the data are categorised by RSP age, older 
RSPs appear disadvantaged in the newer cars.  
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Figure 31 Front seat passengers – car to car left side impacts 
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Figure 32 Rear seat passengers – car to car left side impacts 
 
• Left side impacts represent struck side impacts for front seat 
passengers. There is a clear improvement in the KSI rate for front seat 
passengers in the newer cars compared to the older cars. 
• For rears seat passengers in left side impacts, small benefits are seen 
in the newer cars for female and younger occupants, whilst male 
occupants appear disadvantaged and older RSPs exhibit the greatest 
increase in KSI rate in the newer cars compared to the older cars. 
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Accidents other than car to car (injured occupant within car so excludes 
accidents where injury was only to pedestrian and cyclist/motorcyclist) 
 
The results of the Odds Ratios for car to non car impacts are summarised in 
table 2. Each scenario is commented in detail in figures 33 to 40. 
 
Table 2: Odds Ratios for car to non car impacts by seating position 
and impact type 
 Fronts Rear Right Left 
All FSP 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.47 
Male FSP 0.46 1.79 0.16 0.52 
Female 
FSP 
0.12 -0.1 0.89 0.36 
Young 
FSP 
0.4 0.23 0.24 0.38 
Old FSP 0.2 0.55 1.36 0.73 
     
All RSP 0.35 0.88 0.3 0.1 
Male RSP 0.51 0.65 0.45 0 
Female 
RSP 
0.17 1.09 0.43 0.2 
Young 
RSP 
0.44 1.42 0.35 0.13 
Old RSP -0.02 -0.04 2.07 -1.47 
 
 
Front impacts - car to not car
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Figure 33 Front seat passengers – car to non car frontal impacts 
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Figure 34 Rear seat passengers – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• For car to non car frontal impacts, improvements in the rate of KSI 
injury outcome are seen for almost exclusively all the car passenger 
population. 
• The only marginal increase in KSI rate is observed for older rear seat 
occupants. 
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Figure 35 Front seat passengers – car to non car rear impacts 
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Figure 36 Rear seat passengers – car to non car rear impacts 
 
• In rear car to non car impacts, as with frontal impacts, reductions in the 
KSI rate are seen in the newer cars across most of the passenger 
population. 
• The only increases in KSI rate are seen in the female FSP group and 
the older RSP group. 
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Figure 37 Front seat passengers – car to non car right side impacts 
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Figure 38 Rear seat passengers – car to non car right side impacts 
 
• In right side car to non car impacts (non struck impacts for FSPs), both 
front seat and rear seat passengers in their entirety have benefited with 
newer car design in terms of KSI injury outcome. 
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Figure 39 Front seat passengers – car to non car left side impacts 
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Figure 40 Rear seat passengers – car to non car left side impacts 
 
• A similar observation to right side impacts is apparent for car to non car 
left side impacts, the exception being for the older RSPs.  
 
The older RSPs appear to have a substantial increased rate of KSI injury 
outcome in the newer cars than the older cars. It should be pointed out that at 
this point in the analysis, the number of cases dropped quite substantially 
which can cloud the results since a single event can dramatically change the 
interpretation. 
 
CCIS Data Analysis 
 
Frontal Impacts 
 
Car to All Objects 
Driver  
Table 3 shows the sample size for drivers in frontal impact irrespective of 
object hit and the Odds Ratios outcomes are illustrated in figures 41 to 45. 
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Table 3: Sample size – drivers, all frontal impacts 
Drivers  Old cars New cars 
All 2203 3462 
Male 1542 2199 
Female 638 1224 
Young 1586 2485 
Old 468 848 
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Figure 41 Drivers – all impact objects, frontal impacts 
 
• Benefits are seen in newer cars for drivers in frontal impacts in all body 
regions apart from the neck and the abdomen. 
• The result indicating a reduction in serious (AIS3+) facial injuries is 
susceptible to the low incidence of such injuries. 
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Figure 42 Male drivers – all impact objects, frontal impacts 
 
• Male drivers benefit in terms of serious injury outcome in newer 
vehicles for frontal impacts across all body regions except the neck and 
the abdomen. 
• The results for the neck and the abdomen are susceptible to the low 
occurrence of serious injury in these body regions. 
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Figure 43 Female drivers – all impact objects, frontal impacts 
 
• The only apparent disbenefit for female drivers in frontal impacts 
relates to knee fractures. This is a marginal disbenefit. 
• Results for the abdomen and pelvis should be treated with caution. 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF xxxiii
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
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Figure 44 Younger Drivers – all impact objects, frontal impacts 
 
• Younger belted drivers benefit in the new cars and in frontal impacts 
across all body regions except for the neck and the abdomen. 
• The AIS 3+ injury rates for the abdomen are identical in the new and 
old car samples. 
• The disbenefit observed for neck injury outcome should be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 45 Older drivers – all impact objects, frontal impacts 
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• Reductions in the rates of serious injury are observed in new cars 
across all body regions except the abdomen and the face for older 
drivers in frontal impacts. 
• The result for the face is not applicable. 
• The results for the abdomen and the lower leg need to be treated with 
caution. 
 
It should be noted that although the number of serious abdominal injuries for 
male drivers was low in the old car sample and hence the result considered 
cautionary, there was a significant increase in the number seen in the new car 
sample.  Similarly there are large but cautionary decreases in female pelvic 
injury and older occupant lower leg injury in the new cars compared with the 
old cars. 
 
Front Seat Passengers  
Table 4 shows the sample size for front seat passengers in frontal impacts 
irrespective of object hit and the Odds Ratios outcomes are illustrated in 
figures 46 to 50. 
 
Table 4: Sample size – front seat passengers, all frontal impacts 
FSP Old cars New cars 
All 671 1018 
Male 288 392 
Female 365 601 
Young 410 600 
Male 138 222 
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Figure 46 Front seat passengers – all impact objects, frontal impacts 
 
• Belted front seat passengers have benefited in new cars in terms of 
neck, lower leg and foot/ankle injury. 
• There are increases in the serious injury rate for the cranium and the 
knee. 
• Abdominal and thigh injury rates are unchanged between the two car 
samples. 
• It is not possible to calculate the Odds Ratio for face of pelvic injuries. 
• The results for the cranium, neck, abdomen and knee need to be 
treated with caution. 
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Figure 47 Male front seat passengers – all impact objects, frontal 
impacts 
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• Considering male front seat passengers in frontal impacts (all impact 
objects), new car design has benefited the serious injury rate for the 
chest, thigh and lower leg. 
• There is no change in the rate of AIS 3+ cranium injury between the 
two car groups. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face, neck, 
abdomen, pelvis or knee. 
• All of the results for male FSPs need to be treated with caution. 
 
Female Belted Fsp - Frontal Impacts - All objects hit
Cranium
Neck
Chest Abdomen
Thigh
Lower Leg
Foot/Ankle
Knee n/aPelvis n/aFace n/a
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
 
Figure 48 Female front seat passengers – all impact objects, 
frontal impacts 
• Female front seat passenger in frontal impacts see benefits in serious 
chest, abdomen, lower leg and foot/ankle injury rates on the new cars 
compared to the old cars. 
• Substantial disbenefits are seen for the cranium and the neck. Dis- 
benefits are also observed for the thigh. 
• It is not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face, pelvis or knee. 
• Results for the cranium, neck, abdomen and thigh need to be treated 
with caution. 
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Figure 49 Younger front seat passengers – all impact objects, 
frontal impacts 
 
• Younger front seat passengers have benefited in newer cars in terms 
of serious chest and lower leg injury. 
• Disbenefits are seen for the cranium and the abdomen. 
• No change is observed for the neck, thigh and foot/ankle. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face, pelvis or knee. 
• The results for the cranium, neck, abdomen, thigh and lower leg should 
all be treated with caution. 
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Figure 50 Older front seat passengers – all impact objects, 
frontal impacts 
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• Older front seat passengers in frontal impacts (all impact objects) have 
benefited in terms of serious neck, chest, abdominal, lower leg and 
foot/ankle injury. 
• Disbenefits are observed for the thigh and the knee. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the cranium, face or 
pelvis. 
 
Though the number of AIS 3+ cranium injuries was low (all FSP) in the old car 
sample and so the result should be treated with caution, there was a 
substantial increase in the number of these injuries in the new car sample. 
Similarly a large but cautionary decrease in foot/ankle injury for older front 
seat occupants was observed. 
 
Car to Car Impacts 
 
Drivers  
Table 5 shows the sample sizes for drivers in car to car frontal impacts and 
figures 51 – 55 illustrate the Odds Ratios outcomes. 
Table 5: Sample size – drivers, car to car frontal impacts 
Drivers Old cars New cars 
All 1711 2104 
Male 1194 1319 
Female 494 762 
Young 1253 1460 
Old 357 576 
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Figure 51 Drivers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• For car to car impacts, drivers in frontal impacts benefit in newer cars in 
terms of serious cranium, chest, pelvis, thigh and lower leg injury. 
• Disbenefits are seen for the neck, abdomen and knee. 
• There is no change in the serious injury rate for the foot/ankle. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the face. 
• The result for the abdomen needs to be treated with caution. 
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Figure 52 Male drivers – car to car frontal impacts 
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• Male drivers in car to car frontal impacts have benefited in new cars in 
terms of serious cranium, face, chest, thigh, knee, lower leg and 
foot/ankle injury. 
• Disbenefits are seen for the neck, abdomen and pelvis. 
• The results for the face, neck and abdomen need to be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 53 Female drivers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• Female drivers in car to car frontal impacts have seen improvements in 
the serious injury rate for the cranium, face, chest, abdomen, thigh and 
lower leg in new cars. 
• Disbenefits have been observed for the knee and the foot/ankle. 
• There has been no change in the rate of AIS 2+ neck injury. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the pelvis. 
• The results for the cranium, face, neck, abdomen and lower leg need to 
be treated with caution. 
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Figure 54 Younger drivers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• Younger belted drivers in car to car frontal impacts have seen a 
reduction in the rate of serious injury in new cars for the cranium, face, 
chest, pelvis, thigh and lower leg. 
• Increases in serious injury rates are observed for the neck, knee and 
foot/ankle.  
• There has been no change in the rate of abdominal injury. 
• The results for face, neck and abdomen need to be treated with 
caution. 
 
Old Belted Drivers - Frontal Impacts - Car to Car
Cranium
Neck
Chest
Pelvis
Thigh
Knee
Lower Leg
Foot/Ankle
Abdomen n/aFace n/a
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
 
Figure 55 Older drivers – car to car frontal impacts 
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• Older belted drivers in car to car frontal impacts have seen a decrease 
in the rate of serious cranium, neck, chest, thigh, lower leg and 
foot/ankle injury in new cars compared with old cars. 
• An increase in the serious injury rate is seen for the pelvis. 
• There has been no change in the rate of AIS 2+ knee injury. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for facial or abdominal 
injuries. 
• The results for the neck, pelvis, lower leg and foot/ankle need to be 
treated with caution. 
 
Front Seat Passengers 
Table 6 shows the sample sizes for front seat passengers in car to car frontal 
impacts and figures 56 – 60 illustrate the Odds Ratios outcomes. 
 
Table 6: Sample size – front seat passengers, car to car frontal impacts 
FSP Old cars New cars 
All 516 686 
Male 230 232 
Female 269 432 
Young 310 401 
Old 105 154 
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Figure 56 Front seat passengers – car to car frontal impacts 
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• Belted front seat passengers in car to car frontal impacts have 
benefited in the rate of serious neck, chest, pelvis, thigh lower leg and 
foot/ankle injury in the new cars compared to the old cars. 
• Disbenefits have been seen for the cranium and the abdomen. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face, pelvis or knee. 
• The results for the cranium, neck, abdomen, thigh and lower leg should 
be treated with caution. 
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Figure 57 Male front seat passengers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• Male front seat passengers have seen a decrease in the rate of serious 
injury in the newer cars for the cranium, thigh and foot/ankle in car to 
car frontal impacts. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for any of the other body 
regions. 
• All the results need to be treated with caution. 
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Figure 58 Female front seat passengers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• Female front seat passengers in car to car frontal impacts have 
benefited in newer cars for serious neck, chest, thigh, lower leg and 
foot/ankle injury. 
• A disbenefit has been seen for AIS 3+ abdominal injury. 
• Odds Ratios could not be calculated for the cranium, face, pelvis and 
knee. 
• The results for the neck, abdomen, thigh and lower leg should be 
treated with caution. 
Young Belted Fsp - Frontal Impacts - Car to Car
Cranium
Chest
Thigh
Foot/Ankle
Lower Leg n/aKnee n/aPelvis n/aAbdomen n/aNeck n/aFace n/a
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
 
Figure 59 Younger front seat passengers – car to car frontal impacts 
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• Younger FSPs have benefited in newer car design in car to car frontal 
impacts in terms of serious cranium, chest, thigh and foot/ankle injury. 
• Odds Ratios could not be calculated for any of the other body regions. 
• The results for the cranium, chest and thigh need to be treated with 
caution. 
 
Old Belted Fsp - Frontal Impacts - Car to Car
Neck
Chest
Thigh
Foot/Ankle  n/aLower Leg n/aKnee n/aPelvis n/aAbdomen n/aFace n/aCranium n/a
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
 
Figure 60 Older front seat passengers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• Improvements in the rate of serious injury are seen for older FSPs in 
car to car frontal impacts for the neck, chest and thigh.  
• It was not possible to calculate and Odds Ratio for any other body 
region. 
• Results for the neck and thigh need to be treated with caution. 
 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF xlvi
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
Car to Non Car Impacts 
 
Drivers 
Table 7 gives the sample sizes for drivers in car to non car frontal impacts 
whilst figures 61 – 65 show the Odds Ratio outcomes. 
Table 7: Sample size – drivers, car to non car frontal impacts 
Drivers Old cars New cars 
All 494 1358 
Male 348 881 
Female 143 462 
Young 332 1357 
Old 110 271 
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Figure 61 Drivers – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• Improvements in the rate of serious injury are evident in new cars for all 
body regions except for the face when drivers in car to non car frontal 
impacts are considered. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for facial injury. 
• The result for abdominal injuries should be treated with caution. 
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Figure 62 Male drivers – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• For male drivers in car to non car impacts, decreases in the serious 
injury rate are apparent for the cranium, chest, pelvis, knee, lower leg 
and the foot/ankle in new cars compared to old cars. 
• Increases are evident for the abdomen and thigh. 
• The AIS2+ neck injury rate was identical for the old and new cars. 
• It was not possible to calculate and Odds Ratio for the face. 
• The results for the neck, abdomen and pelvis should be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 63 Female drivers – car to non car frontal impacts 
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• For female drivers in car to non car frontal impacts, newer car design 
benefits serious injury outcome for all body regions except the face. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio of the face. 
• The results for the cranium, neck, abdomen, pelvis and lower leg 
should, however, be treated with caution. 
 
Young Belted Drivers - Frontal Impacts - Car to Object
Cranium
Neck
Chest
Abdomen
Pelvis
Thigh
Knee
Lower Leg
Foot/Ankle
Face n/a
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
 
Figure 64 Younger drivers – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• Benefits in the new car sample are apparent for younger drivers in car 
to non car frontal impacts across all body regions. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the face. 
• The results for neck, abdomen and pelvis should be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 65 Older drivers – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• For older drivers in car to non car frontal impacts benefits in the serious 
injury rates are seen for all body regions apart from the face and the 
chest. 
• The AIS 3+ chest injury rate is higher in the new cars than in the old 
cars. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the face. 
• All but the results for the foot and ankle should be treated with caution. 
 
Front Seat Passengers 
Table 8 shows the sample sizes for front seat passengers in car to non car 
frontal impacts whilst figures 66 – 70 illustrate the Odds Ratio outcomes. 
Table 8: Sample size – front seat passengers, 
car to non car frontal impacts 
FSP Old cars New cars 
All 155 332 
Male 58 159 
Female 96 169 
Young 99 200 
Old 33 67 
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Figure 66 Front seat passengers – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• Considering FSPs in car to non car impacts, the serious injury rates fall 
in the new cars for the neck, chest, abdomen and the foot/ankle. 
• The rates increase in the new cars for the cranium, the thigh and the 
lower leg. 
• It was not possible to calculate the Odds Ratios for the face, pelvis or 
knee. 
• All of the results apart from the chest should be treated with caution. 
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Figure 67 Male front seat passengers – car to non car frontal impacts 
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• For male FSPs in car to non car frontal impacts it was only possible to 
calculate an Odds Ratio for the cranium. Here a disbenefit was seen in 
the new cars when compared to the old cars but this result should be 
treated with caution. 
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Figure 68 Female front seat passengers – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• Decreases in the serious injury rates are seen in the new cars for the 
neck, chest and abdomen when female FSPs in car to non car impacts 
are considered. 
• Increases are apparent for the cranium, thigh, lower leg and foot/ankle. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the face, pelvis or 
knee. 
• Apart from the chest, all of the results should be treated with caution. 
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Figure 69 Younger front seat passengers – car to non car frontal impacts 
 
• When younger FSPs in car to non car frontal impacts are considered, 
benefits in the new car sample are apparent for serious chest and 
lower leg injury outcome. 
• Disbenefits are seen for the cranium and the thigh. 
• It was not possible to calculate the Odds Ratios for the remaining body 
regions. 
• All of the results however need to be treated with caution. 
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Figure 70 Older front seat passengers – car to non car frontal impacts 
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• In the case of older FSPs in car to non car frontal impacts, it was only 
possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the chest and the foot/ankle.  
• Minor benefits are seen in the new cars for serious chest injury 
outcome; more substantial benefits are seen for AIS 2+ foot/ankle 
injury outcome. 
• Both results however should be treated with caution. 
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Struck Side Impacts 
 
Car to All Objects 
 
Table 9 shows the sample sizes for front seat occupants in struck side 
impacts, irrespective of impact object, whilst figures 71 – 75 illustrate the 
Odds Ratio outcomes. 
Table 9: Sample size – front seat occupants, all struck side impacts 
Front seat 
occupants 
Old cars New cars 
All 2028 1856 
Male 1137 1106 
Female 874 738 
Young 1413 1327 
Old 458 443 
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Figure 71 Front seat occupants – all impact objects, struck side impacts 
 
• In stuck side impacts, irrespective of impact objects, decreases in the 
rate of serious injury are seen for the chest pelvis and thigh in the new 
cars. 
• Increases in serious injury rates are seen in the new cars for the 
cranium, neck, knee and foot/ankle. 
• The facial, abdominal and lower leg injury outcome is identical in the 
old and new cars. 
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Figure 72 Male front seat occupants – all impact objects, 
stuck side impacts 
 
• For males in stuck side impacts (all bullet objects), benefits for serious 
injury outcome in new car design are apparent for the chest, abdomen, 
pelvis, and thigh. 
• Disbenefits are apparent for the cranium, neck, lower leg and 
foot/ankle. 
• The serious injury rates for the face and the knee are identical. 
• The results for the face and the knee need to be treated with caution. 
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Figure 73 Female front seat occupants – all impact objects, 
struck side impacts 
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• When female front seat occupants in struck side crashes are 
considered, decreases in the rate of serious injury are seen in the new 
cars for the chest, lower leg and the foot/ankle. Increases are seen for 
the cranium, neck, abdomen, pelvis, thigh and knee. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the face. 
• The results for the knee and the foot/ankle should be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 74 Younger front seat occupants – all impact objects, 
struck side impacts 
 
• Younger front occupants in struck side impacts have improvements in 
the serious injury rates to the chest, pelvis and thigh in the new cars 
compared to the old cars. 
• Disbenefits are seen for the cranium, neck, abdomen, lower leg and 
foot/ankle. 
• The rates for the face and the knee are identical in the new and old car 
samples. 
• The result for the face should be treated with caution.  
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Figure 75 Older front seat occupants – all impact objects, 
struck side impacts 
 
• Older front seat occupant have lower serious injury rates in new cars 
struck side impacts compared to old cars for the cranium, chest, pelvis, 
thigh and lower leg. 
• A higher rate is seen in the new cars for serious neck injury. 
• The injury outcome is identical in the sample for the face, abdomen and 
foot/ankle. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the knee. 
• The results for the face, neck, abdomen, pelvis and foot/ankle should 
be treated with caution. 
 
Car to car  
 
Table 10 shows the samples sizes for front occupants in car to car struck side 
impacts; figures 76 – 80 illustrate the Odds Ratio outcomes. 
Table 10: Sample size – front seat occupants, 
car to car struck side impacts 
Front seat occupants Old cars new cars 
All 1301 962 
Male 684 568 
Female 600 386 
Young 867 613 
Old 330 298 
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Figure 76 Front seat occupants – car to car struck side impacts 
 
• In car to car struck side impacts, benefits in new cars are seen in the 
serious injury outcome for front seat occupant across all body regions 
other than the face and the knee. 
• There is an increase in the rate of AIS 3+ facial injury in the new cars 
compared with the old cars. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the knee. 
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Figure 77 Male front seat occupants – car to car struck side impacts 
 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF lix
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
• Considering male front seat occupants in struck side crashes, 
decreases in the rate of serious injury are observed in the new cars for 
all body regions other than the face, neck and the knee. 
• The rate of AIS 2+ neck injury has increased in the new cars. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face or the knee. 
• The results for the abdomen, pelvis, thigh and foot/ankle need to be 
treated with caution. 
 
Female front occupants- Struck Side - Car to Car
Cranium
Face
Neck
Chest
Abdomen Pelvis
Thigh
Lower Leg
Foot/Ankle
Knee n/a
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
 
Figure 78 Female front seat occupants – car to car struck side impacts 
 
• Female front occupants in struck side crashes have benefited in the 
new cars in terms of serious injury outcome for the cranium, face, neck, 
chest, lower leg and foot/ankle. 
• Disbenefits are seen for the abdomen, pelvis and thigh. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the knee. 
• The results for the face, neck, pelvis and foot/ankle need to be treated 
with caution. 
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Figure 79 Younger front seat occupants – car to car frontal impacts 
 
• Younger front occupants have seen benefits for serious injury outcome 
in the new car sample across all body regions other than the face, the 
neck and the knee. 
• A disbenefit is apparent for AIS 3+ facial injury. 
• The rate of AIS 2+ neck injury was identical in both car samples. 
• It was not possible to calculate the Odds Ratio for knee injury outcome. 
• The results for the pelvis, lower leg and foot/ankle need to be treated 
with caution. 
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Figure 80 Older front seat occupants – car to car struck side impacts 
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• Older car occupants have a lower rate of serious injury in new cars in 
struck side impacts for the cranium, chest, pelvis, thigh and lower leg. 
• There is an increase in the rate of serious injury for the neck, abdomen 
and the foot/ankle. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face or the neck. 
• The results for the neck, abdomen, pelvis, thigh and foot/ankle need to 
be treated with caution. 
 
It should be noted that though the number of serious pelvic and lower leg 
injuries for male drivers was low in the new car sample and hence the result 
considered cautionary, there was a significant decrease over the number seen 
in the old car sample.  Similarly there are large but cautionary decreases in 
pelvic, lower leg and foot/ankle injury for younger occupants in the new cars 
compared with the old cars. 
 
Car to Non Car 
 
Table 11 gives the sample sizes for front sear occupants in car to non car 
struck side impacts whilst figures 81 – 85 illustrate the Odds Ratio outcomes. 
 
Table 11: Sample size – front seat occupants, car to 
non car struck side impacts 
Front seat occupants Old cars New 
cars 
All 726 857 
Male 395 457 
Female 274 337 
Young 546 688 
Old 128 134 
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Figure 81 Front seat occupants – car to non car struck side impacts 
 
• In car to non car struck side impacts, decreases in the rate of serious 
injury occur in the new cars compared to the old cars for the thigh and 
the knee only. 
• Increases are observed in all other body regions except for the face. 
• The rate of AIS3+ facial injury is identical in the new and old cars. 
• The results for the face, knee and foot/ankle need to be treated with 
caution. 
 
Male front occupants- Struck Side - Car to Object
Cranium
Face
Neck
Chest
Abdomen
Pelvis
Thigh
Knee
Lower Leg
Foot/Ankle
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
 
Figure 82 Male front seat occupants – car to non car struck side impacts 
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• For male front occupants in car to non car impacts, benefits in the new 
cars are only seen for serious injury outcome in the abdomen and 
thigh. 
• Disbenefits are evident for the cranium, neck, chest, pelvis, lower leg 
and foot/ankle. 
• The serious injury rates for the face and neck are identical in the new 
and old cars. 
• The results for the face, knee and foot/ankle need to be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 83 Female front seat occupants – car to non car 
struck side impacts 
• Female front occupants in struck side impacts see a decrease in the 
rate of serious injury outcome in new cars for the knee and the lower 
leg. 
• Increases are apparent for the cranium, chest, pelvis and thigh. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face, neck, 
abdomen, or foot/ankle. 
• The results for the cranium, pelvis, thigh, knee and the lower leg should 
be treated with caution. 
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Young front occupants- Struck Side - Car to Object
Cranium
Face
Neck
Chest
Abdomen
Pelvis
Thigh Knee
Lower Leg
Foot/Ankle
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
 
Figure 84 Younger front seat occupants – car to non car struck 
side impacts 
 
• Considering younger front seat occupants in struck side crashes, there 
is a decrease in the serious injury rate in the new cars for the face, 
thigh and knee. 
• Increases are apparent for all other body regions. 
• The results for the face, pelvis, knee and the foot/ankle need to be 
treated with caution. 
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Figure 85 Older front seat occupants – car to non car struck 
side impacts 
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• Older front seat occupants in struck side crashes benefit in the new 
cars in terms of serious injury outcome for the cranium, abdomen, 
pelvis and lower leg. 
• A disbenefit is seen for the chest. 
• It is not possible to calculate and Odds Ratio for the face, neck, thigh, 
knee, or foot/ankle. 
 
Non Struck Side Impacts 
 
Car to All Objects 
 
Table 12 shows the sample sizes for front seat occupant in non struck side 
impacts, irrespective of object hit; figures 86 – 90 illustrate the Odds Ratio 
outcomes. 
 
Table 12: Sample size – front seat occupants, all impact objects, 
 non struck side impacts 
Front seat occupants old cars new cars 
All 1707 1661 
Male 970 948 
Female 705 686 
Young 1086 1134 
Old 403 382 
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Figure 86 Front seat occupants – all impact objects, 
non struck side crashes 
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• In non struck side impacts, irrespective of impact object, front seat 
occupants have lower rates of serious injury in the new cars for the 
cranium, neck, abdomen, pelvis and the foot/ankle. 
• The serious injury rate is higher in the new cars for the chest, knee and 
lower leg. 
• The AIS 2+ thigh injury rate is identical for the old and new cars. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for facial injury. 
• The results for the abdomen, pelvis, knee and the foot/ankle need to be 
treated with caution. 
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Figure 87 Male front seat occupants – all impact objects, 
non struck side impacts 
 
• For male front occupants in non struck side crashes (all objects hit), 
benefits are seen in the new cars for the cranium, neck, abdomen, and 
the foot/ankle. 
• Disbenefits are apparent for the chest, thigh and lower leg. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the face, pelvis or 
knee. 
• The results for the neck, abdomen, thigh, lower leg and the foot/ankle 
need to be treated with caution. 
 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF lxvii
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
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Figure 88 Female front seat occupants – all impact objects, 
non struck side crashes 
 
• Considering female front occupants in non stuck side crashes, 
irrespective of impact object, benefits in the rate of serious injury are 
seen in the new cars for the pelvis, thigh and foot/ankle. 
• Disbenefits are seen for the cranium, neck, chest, knee and lower leg. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face or the 
abdomen.  
• The results for the pelvis and all lower limb regions should be treated 
with caution. 
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Figure 89 Younger front seat occupants – all impact objects, non struck 
side impacts 
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• Younger occupants in non stuck side impact (all impact objects) have a 
lower rate of serious injury in new cars compared with old cars for the 
cranium, neck, abdomen and pelvis. 
• The serious injury rate is higher in the new cars for the chest, knee and 
lower leg. 
• The AIS2+ injury rates are identical for the thigh and the foot/ankle in 
the new and old car samples. 
• It was not possible to calculate and Odds Ratio for the face. 
• The results for the abdomen, pelvis, knee, lower leg and the foot/ankle 
should be treated with caution. 
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Figure 90 Older front seat occupants – all impact objects, 
non struck side impacts 
 
• Considering older occupants in non struck side crashes (all impact 
objects) benefit are seen in the new cars for serious injury outcome to 
the cranium and the foot/ankle. 
• Disbenefits are apparent for the neck, chest and the thigh. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the remaining boy 
regions (change chart) 
• The results for the cranium, neck, thigh and foot/ankle should be 
treated with caution. 
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It should be noted that although the number of serious pelvic injuries for all 
front occupants was low in the new car sample and hence the result 
considered cautionary, there was a significant decrease over the number seen 
in the old car sample.  Similarly there are large but cautionary decreases for 
neck injury in the male occupant sample and for cranium injury in the older 
occupant sample in the new cars compared with the old cars. A large increase 
in knee injury for all occupants was observed in the new cars compared with 
the old cars. 
 
Car to Car 
 
Table 13 gives the sample sizes for front seat occupants in car to car non 
struck side crashes whilst figures 91 – 95 show the Odds Ratio outcomes. 
 
Table 13: Sample size – car to car non struck side impacts 
Front seat occupants old cars new cars 
All 1106 867 
Male 618 421 
Female 462 429 
Young 677 571 
Old 282 225 
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Figure 91 Front seat occupants – car to car non struck side impacts 
 
PPAD 9/033/128, S0221/VF lxx
Report for the Department for Transport January 2006 
• In car to car non struck side impacts, benefits are seen for front seat 
occupants in new cars compared to old cars for the cranium, neck, 
chest, abdomen, thigh and foot/ankle. 
• Disbenefits are apparent for the knee and the lower leg. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face or the pelvis. 
• The results for the abdomen and all the results for the lower extremities 
should be treated with caution. 
 
Male front occupants- Non Struck Side - Car to Car
Cranium
Neck
Chest
Abdomen
Thigh
Foot/Ankle
Lower Leg n/aKnee n/aPelvis n/aFace n/a
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
 
Figure 92 Male front seat occupants – car to car non struck side impacts 
 
• Male front seat occupants in car to car non struck side impacts have a 
lower rate of serious injury in the new cars for the cranium, neck, chest, 
thigh and the foot/ankle. 
• The abdominal serious injury rate is identical in the new and old cars. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the face, pelvis knee or 
lower leg. 
• The results for the neck, abdomen, thigh and foot/ankle need to be 
treated with caution. 
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Figure 93 Female front seat occupants – car to car non struck 
side impacts 
 
• Considering female front occupants in car to car non struck side 
impacts, benefits are seen in the new cars for serious cranium, chest 
and lower leg injuries. 
• A disbenefit is apparent for AIS 2+ neck injury. 
• The rate of AIS 2+ knee injury is identical for the two car samples. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the remaining body 
regions. 
• The results for the cranium, knee and lower leg should be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 94 Younger front seat occupants – car to car non struck 
side impacts 
 
• Younger front occupants in car to car non stuck side impacts have a 
lower rate of serious cranium, neck, chest, abdominal and thigh injuries 
in new cars compared to old cars. 
• The rate is higher in the new cars for serious knee and lower leg injury. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the face, pelvis or 
foot/ankle. 
• The results for the chest, abdomen, thigh, knee and lower leg should all 
be treated with caution. 
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Figure 95 Older front seat occupants – car to car non struck 
side impacts 
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• For older front occupants in car to car non struck side impacts, the only 
benefit in the new cars compared to the old is for the foot/ankle. 
• Disbenefits are seen for the neck and the chest. 
• It was not possible to calculate an Odds Ratio for the remaining body 
regions. 
• The results for the neck and the foot/ankle should be treated with 
caution. 
 
It should be noted that although the number of serious thigh and ankle injuries 
for all front occupants was low in the new car sample and hence the result 
considered cautionary, there was a significant decrease over the number seen 
in the old car sample.  Similarly, there are large but cautionary decreases for 
neck injury in the male occupant sample and for pelvis and thigh injury in the 
female occupant sample, in the new cars compared with the old cars.  
 
Car to Non Car 
 
Table 14 shows the sample sizes for front seat occupants in car to non car 
non struck side impacts. Figures 96-100 illustrate the Odds Ratio outcomes. 
 
Table 14: Sample size – front seat occupants, car to non car 
non struck side impacts 
Front seat 
occupants 
Old cars New cars 
All 600 758 
Male 350 502 
Female 242 244 
Young 405 541 
Old 121 153 
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Figure 96 Front seat occupants – car to non car non struck side impacts 
 
• In car to non car stuck side impacts benefits are seen for front 
occupants in new cars compared to old cars for serious cranium, neck, 
and abdominal injury. 
• Disbenefits are apparent for the chest, thigh and lower leg.  
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the remaining body 
regions. 
• The results for the neck, abdomen, thigh and lower leg should be 
treated with caution. 
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Figure 97 Male front seat occupants – car to non car 
non struck side impacts 
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• Male front occupants in car to non car impacts have a lower rate of 
serious injury in new cars compared to old cars for the cranium, neck, 
abdomen, pelvis and lower leg. 
• A higher rate of serious injury in the new cars is apparent for the chest 
and the thigh. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the remaining body 
regions. 
• The results for the neck, abdomen, pelvis, thigh and lower leg need to 
be treated with caution. 
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Figure 98 Female front seat occupants – car to non car 
non stuck side impacts 
 
• For female front occupants in car to non car non struck side impacts, 
the only benefit in the new cars compared to the old is for serious neck 
injury. 
• Disbenefits are apparent for the cranium, chest and thigh. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the remaining body 
regions. 
• The results for the cranium, neck and thigh need to be treated with 
caution. 
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Figure 99 Younger front seat occupants – car to non car non struck 
side impacts 
 
• Younger front occupants in car to non car, non struck side impacts, 
have a lower rate of serious injury in new cars compared to old cars for 
the cranium, neck, abdomen and lower leg. 
• They have a higher rate of serious injury in new cars for the chest and 
the thigh. 
• It was not possible to calculate Odds Ratios for the remaining body 
regions. 
• The results for the neck, abdomen, thigh and lower leg need to be 
treated with caution. 
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Old front occupants- Non Struck Side - Car to Object
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Figure 100 Older front seat occupants – car to non car 
non struck side impacts 
 
• Older front seat occupants in car to non car, non struck side impacts, 
benefit in terms of serious injury outcome in the new car sample for the 
cranium and the chest. 
• It was not possible to calculate the Odds Ratios for the remaining body 
regions. 
• All of the results need to be treated with caution. 
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Appendix 2:  Time Line 
 FRONTAL AND SIDE IMPACT PROTECTION POLICY TIMELINE 
 
Frontal impact Directive 96/79/EC 
Side impact Directive 96/ 27/EC 
 
 Research and development/ promotion of 
test procedures and technical basis etc. 
UN ECE legislation/other 
national legislation 
EC legislation Consumer information 
1958  The 1958 UN agreement 
supervised by WP 29, the Inland 
Transport Committee’s Working 
Party on the Construction of 
Vehicles 
  
1960s Infamous design fault in the Chevrolet Corsair 
was the start of public demand for 
improvements in vehicle safety and the first 
vehicle safety legislative development (US) in 
1967.  Mackay (1988) later described this first 
generation of standards on which subsequent 
European standards were based as arbitrary 
design rules which lacked comprehensive 
justification 
   
1970 The EEVC was founded in 1970 in response to 
the US Department of Transportation's initiative 
for an international programme on experimental 
safety vehicles 
 
 EC Directive 
70/156/EEC sets out 
EU-wide requirements 
for the type approval of 
vehicles  
 
1972 Ralph Nader awakened consumer and media 
interest in unsafe vehicle design and car 
industry action to avoid or water down 
legislation in Unsafe at any speed  
 
   
1975 HYBRIDIII dummy available  UN ECE Regulation 33 on 
structural frontal impact protection, 
July 1975 
 US IIHS publish crash data from insurance 
claims 
1978 1978-81 EC Side impact project, ARU 
Birmingham University /TRL 
First frontal crash tests in US – 
100% full width frontal barrier test 
US FMVSS 208 (48km/h) 
 Start of US NCAP using US FMVSS 208 at 
56 km/h 
 
  
 Research and development/ promotion of 
test procedures and technical basis etc. 
UN ECE legislation/other 
national legislation 
EC legislation Consumer information 
1980 Start of whole vehicle testing for research and 
development and consumer testing, but 
regulations only require component testing. 
Each country pursuing its own research themes  
with some co-ordination at EEVC 
 
EuroSID development 
 
@ 1980 -The Biggest Epidemic of our Time, 
BBC Panorama documentary on road safety 
   
1982 EEVC proposes a standardised test procedure 
for cars using movable deformable barrier in a 
full scale test using EuroSID dummy 
UN ECE proposal for a 
frontal 30 degree angled 
barrier test 
 The ‘public right to know about vehicle safety’ 
promoted. The UK Consumers’ Association 
Secondary Safety Rating System in Cars (mix of 
visual inspection and component testing) + the US 
HDLI and Folksam real crash data analysis published 
comparative results during the 1980s 
1983 CCIS began 
 
Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport 
Safety (PACTS) established 
Implementation of 1981 
compulsory front seat belt 
use legislation  
 
  
  
1984 Development of deformable barrier – TRRL 
funded by DfT 
   
1985 ERGA Passive Safety group set up by EC and 
Member States in July 1985 to study 
possibilities for adapting existing EEC 
Directives to adapt to technical progress 
   
1986 European Road Safety Year    
1987 First UK casualty reduction targets: Road 
safety: the next steps 
 New Article 100a of 
the Treaty states that 
a high level of 
protection must be 
provided in 
harmonised rules 
(now Article 95) 
 
German consumer testing- crash test rates vehicles 
1-10 ADAC, Automotor und Sport 
 
Manufacturers taking account internally but showing 
opposition to ratings externally 
 
  
 Research and development/ promotion of 
test procedures and technical basis etc. 
UN ECE legislation/other 
national legislation 
EC legislation Consumer information 
1989 UK and Australian research confirm that the 
involvement of the full frontal structure is the 
exception to the rule 
 
Hobbs 199220 
Fildes et al 199128 
 
UK DfT, casualty savings for next 10-15 years 
highlights importance of veh measures 
 
Frustration from DfT and UK researchers about 
standards negotiated internationally and 
influenced by purely industrial view 
 
Increased role of real world accident data in 
research programmes 
 
EEVC Working Group 9  presents final 
recommendations from to side impact test 
procedures to 12 ESV Conf in Melbourne 
 
ERGA safety group reports on its work to the 
European Commission. One recommendations 
is the take up of EEVC side impact test 
recommendations 
 
European car industry puts forward proposal 
for Composite Test Procedure for side impact 
 Package of proposed 
legislative road safety  
measures put forward 
in 1989 by the 
European 
Commission (e.g. 
harmonised blood 
alcohol and speed 
limits) 
 
 
1990 
 
Political Agenda develops– mainly research up till now 
 
 
 1990 Creation of  EEVC WG11 on frontal impact 
protection. 
 
Polarisation between industry views and UK 
research led view 
 
UK raises public awareness with TV 
programme 
 
The American side impact 
test procedure is adopted in 
US in FMVSS 214 with 
different barrier to European 
barrier 
  
 
1991 Side impact test procedure (90 degree impact 
with moving barrier with ground clearance 
height of 300mm) developed by EEVC 
 
EEVC Working Group 9 - Specification of the 
EEVC Side Impact Dummy EuroSID-1. April 
1990 
Political need for new  
frontal impact test 
acknowledged and 3 
proposals under 
consideration: 
 
1)angled barrier test 
2)draft EEVC proposal 
3)proposal based on 
FMVSS 208 
 
but discussions stalled until 
1993 
 
Political need for new 
test acknowledged 
and EC Motor Vehicle 
Working Group 
(comprising EC, 
Member States and 
NGOs) discusses 
issue  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Research and development/ promotion of test 
procedures and technical basis etc. 
UN ECE 
legislation/other 
national 
legislation 
EC legislation Consumer information 
1992 A UK study estimates that better frontal impact test 
procedure could lead to a saving of 65,000 deaths 
and serious injuries in EU countries 
Also that better side impact test procedure could lead 
to a saving of 25,000 deaths and serious injuries in 
EU countries.  These statistics later used by NGOs 
and the European Commission. 
 
WALL J.G.,Vehicle safety-what are the needs? 
Transport Research Laboratory, Proceedings of the 
XXIV FISITA Congress, June 1992, IMechE, UK, 
19925
 The 92/53 EEC Directive 
established European Community 
Whole Vehicle Type Approval 
(ECWVTA) for cars 
Australian ANCAP uses FMVSS 208 (56 
km/h) 
 
DfT publish Choosing Safety – STATS19 
data rating by make and model 
1993 EEVC Working Group 9 - Side Impact Test 
Procedures - Final Report. 
In view of concern about absence of evidence-based 
road safety policymaking in Brussels, European 
Transport Safety Council established by PACTS and 
German, Dutch orgs. with publication of 
comprehensive report on vehicle safety distributed to 
policymakers in EU institutions and nationally. 
Reducing traffic injuries through vehicle safety 
improvements: the role of car design. Final report and 
technical annexes, ETSC, 1993 looked critically at the 
options for a new European frontal impact test, 
highlighting the superiority of the EEVC ODB test and 
how UN ECE had dragged its feet generally on 
updating vehicle safety standards – legislative 
standards 20 years behind the needs identified by 
crash research. 
ETSC joins forces with the European consumer 
organisation , BEUC, to put the case to the EU 
institutions and Member States for improvements in 
vehicle crash protection standards 
UN ECE side 
impact regulation 
agreed with 
barrier height of 
260mm 
Maastricht Treaty (Article 75) gives 
EU clear shared competence for 
traffic safety  
 
Article 113 Committee produces 
co-ordinated position on timetable - 
in favour of adoption of the EEVC 
ODB test by 1998 
 
1st EC road safety action 
programme marks the beginning of 
an EU policy on road safety 
 
Germany proposed industry’s  
composite test procedure, as an 
alternative to side impact, 
supported by France 
 
Debate within EEVC on speed for 
front impact regulation, UK stance 
based on crash tests and real world 
data, compromise at 56 km/h made 
Offset deformable barrier test (ODB) (40% 
frontal) used in ANCAP (60km/h) 
 
  
 
1994 
 
 
Policy Bifurcation point – less UK resources into regulation  and large investment into developing consumer rating NCAP – research feeds both 
  
 Research and development/ promotion of test 
procedures and technical basis etc. 
UN ECE 
legislation/other 
national 
legislation 
EC legislation Consumer information 
1994 EEVC completing validation results on frontal ODB 
test to ensure repeatability 
 EC issues a 2 stage proposal for 
legislation for frontal impact 
protection 0n 13.12.94  
(COM(94)520 final comprising a 
Stage 1 30 degree rigid barrier test 
and anti-slide device for new car 
types (1.10.95) and Stage 2 and 
ODB test by (1.10.98), though the 
detail of Stage 2 is not included in 
the proposal for a Directive  
 
EEVC WG 11 presents new frontal impact test 
procedure to 14th ESV Paper No 96-S3-O-28 
 
ARU, Loughborough conducts measurements of front 
stiff structure heights and concludes that 260m barrier 
clearance is far too low 
 
ETSC symposium in European Parliament – UK TRL 
presents evidence to show that Stage 1 of frontal 
impact proposal barely justifiable on safety grounds.  
Also  evidence to show that reducing the barrier 
height to 260mm and excluding viscous criteria will 
reduce potential protection to car occupants 
 
The UK Department of Transport 
assists in establishing a legislative 
amendment (EEVC ODB test 
procedures and requirements) to 
the EC proposal tabled (and later 
accepted) by the European 
Parliament  
 
Experts and MEPs argue for removal of Stage 1 of 
both legislative proposals and immediate adoption of 
Stage 2.  
 
EC issues a 2 stage proposal for 
legislation for side impact 
protection (COM(94)519 final, 
based on the UN ECE Regulation 
comprising a Stage 1 test for a 
260mm barrier  for new car types 
(1.10.95) and Stage 2 with a barrier 
height of 300mm by ODB test by 
(1.10.2001) 
 
One manufacturer, Fiat had demonstrated on road 
feasibility of side impact barrier height. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Research and development/ promotion 
of test procedures and technical basis 
etc. 
UN ECE legislation/other 
national legislation 
EC legislation Consumer information 
1995 1st edition of ETSC’s CRASH newsletter 
on vehicle crash protection 
 
FIA joins the ETSC/BEUC NGO campaign 
for research-based improvements to the 
crash test proposals 
 
ETSC develops and shows video for 
policymakers ‘Legislating for Safety’ to 
explain why changes are needed to 
Commission’s front and side impact 
proposals.  
 
Pete Thomas and John Charles paper to 
Washington Dec 199525 concludes that 
driver risk of AIS 2+ lower limb injury was 
52% greater than passenger risk – down to 
presence of pedals and other structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross party European Parliamentary  
resolution tabled on 7.2.94  
expressing concern that new EC 
proposals do not reflect best practice 
 
Given Parliament’s of co-decision for 
Single Market legislation, the 
Commission’s proposals discussed 
formally by European Parliamentary 
Committees.  The lead Committee 
was Economic and monetary Affairs – 
rapporteur UK MEP  
 
Stage 1 frontal impact proposal 
unanimously rejected in favour of 
going straight to Stage 2 with a 
review, Strasbourg plenary in July 
1995 
 
The Stage 1 of side impact proposal 
also unanimously rejected in favour of 
going straight to Stage 2 (300 m 
barrier height) to be met by new types 
from 1.10.1998 in Strasbourg plenary, 
July 1995 
 
DfT attends key meeting in Brussels 
 
Commission amended front impact 
proposal published 27.11.95 
(COM(95) 510 final 
 
EU Council of Ministers agree new 
EC side impact directive  
The UK DfT announces a state of the art 
new car assessment programme at the 
Transport Research Laboratory to start in 
summer 1995. 
 
ODB test (64 km/h) used by US Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety complement US 
NCAP 
 
ANCAP increases ODB test speed to 64 
km/h 
 
Monash University, Australia found that cars 
performing well in Australian NCAP also 
performed well in real world crashes 
 
ETSC report on Consumer information on 
the crash performance of cars: the role of 
the EU 
 
  
 Research and development/ promotion of test 
procedures and technical basis etc. 
UN ECE 
legislation/other 
national 
legislation 
EC legislation Consumer information 
1996 An analysis of car to car accidents in Sweden 
between 1994 and 1996 showed a decrease of 
35% in the relative risk of fatal and severe injury 
associated with 'new' car designs compared with 
'old' designs  
 
EEVC WG11 propose tibia and foot certification 
tests 
 
 EC Whole Vehicle Type 
Approval for cars is in force 
from 7th January 1996 
 
EC Council of Ministers agree 
new frontal impact Directive, 
28.05.96 accepted by the 
Commission on 13.06.96. 
 
Directive 96/79/EC on the 
protection of occupants of 
motor vehicles in the event of 
a frontal impact and amending 
Directive 70/156/EEC, 16th 
December 1996, published in 
Official Journal  
 
Frontal and side impact 
Directives require 2 year 
review 
 
1st phase of NCAP includes Front, side and 
pedestrian element – UK driven and funded. High 
media profile – six models. 
 
Intense opposition from car industry  
 
An AA survey (June, 1996) showed that 72% of 
members wanted better information about how cars 
would protect them if involved in an accident  
 
Japanese NCAP (1996) full frontal  55 km/h) 
 
UK establishes EuroNCAP EEVC frontal  ODB test 
(64 km/h) and EEVC side impact  test used by 
EuroNCAP (50km/h). 2nd phase. Sweden and 
Netherlands join in consortium approach and some 
EC funding. 
 
Sweden announces that it will embark on an NCAP 
using EEVC procedures on front, side and 
pedestrian protection 
 
Melbourne ESV devotes a full session to consumer 
information  
1997 DfT produces projections of potential savings 
from vehicle safety measures to meet national 
target 
 
VSRC,UK, showed that front impact test speed is 
too slow 
  2nd phase, now EuroNCAP within a year – 
consortium approach, member sates buy in, some 
EC funding 
 
 
 Research and development/ promotion of test 
procedures and technical basis etc. 
UN ECE 
legislation/other 
national 
legislation 
EC legislation Consumer information 
1998  UN ECE 
Agreement on 
Global Technical 
Regulations 
 
 
 
 
Implementation date of 1.10.98 
for new EC frontal and side 
impact test legislation 
 
Discussion in background in 
Europe about whether to 
increase the frontal impact 
Directive speed since 
manufacturers are designing for 
higher speed with EuroNCAP 
3rd round EuroNCAP, more industry 
involvement, have own internal requirements, 
Industry forum set up 
1998   Adaptation to technical progress 
– ankle certification procedure, 
Directive 1998/98/EC 
 
1999    Australian NCAP aligns crash test and 
assessment to EuroNCAP on frontal  and side 
impact testing ( 50km/h) 
 
2  year review.  EuroNCAP superseding the 
directive, driving safety further  
2000 EEVC presents further recommendations to EC 
DG Enterprise for further revision of  front and 
side impact Directives (www.eevc.org - visited 
16.6.04) 
   
2003    ETSC calls for EuroNCAP to award an overall 
safety rating to cars incorporating all the different 
current EuroNCAP safety factors would give 
manufacturers a genuine consumer focussed 
incentive to improve all aspects of car safety – 
and not just for the adult occupants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 3:  Topic Guides 
 
 Vehicle Safety Standards – Improving Car Crashworthiness  
Policy Evaluation Programme 
 
 
Topic Guide for Industry 
 
 
 
The purpose of this interview is to establish industry’s views 
about the introduction and influence of the front and side impact 
Regulations and EuroNCAP.   
 
 
 
START: 1) Introduce yourself and explain the purpose of the interview.  2) ask 
the interviewee to introduce themselves briefly, by giving their name, current 
role, how long they have been with the company and whether they were 
directly involved with the introduction of the Regulations and EuroNCAP and if 
so, in what capacity.  
 
 
THE REGULATIONS 
 
Impact 
 
1. How have the regulations influenced design in your company? 
 
2. Have the levels of protection afforded to an occupant in an accident improved 
since the introduction of front and side impact Regulations? 
 
3. If so, are these improvements the result of the Regulations or other factors? 
 
PROBE 
 
o Would your vehicles have the same safety design features without the 
regulatory requirement? 
 
o Would you have implemented the same level of protection to reduce 
injury risk without the front and side impact Regulations?  If yes, why 
and over what timescale? 
 
4. What are the additional benefits / disbenefits of whole vehicle testing versus 
component testing? 
 
5. Have the Regulations promoted a process of continuous improvement in 
crashworthiness performance? 
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 6. Do you feel that either the front or side impact Regulations have led you to 
optimise systems for specific impact scenarios? 
 
7. Has this optimisation disadvantaged any particular vehicle user group? 
(Women, children, elderly, people with disability) 
 
PROBE 
 
o Have vehicle modifications, designed to meet the requirements of the 
Regulations, resulted in vehicles that are less safe than they might 
otherwise be in other crash scenarios? 
 
o Have vehicle modifications, designed to meet the requirements of the 
Regulations, resulted in additional problems of compatibility? 
 
8. Have vehicle modifications designed to improve performance under the 
Regulations resulted in vehicles that are less / more pedestrian friendly? 
 
Investment decisions and cost (Ensure costs only apply to meeting the 
regulations) 
 
9. What is the timescale for investment decisions on improving the 
crashworthiness of cars? 
 
10. At what stage in the formulation/implementation of the Regulations did you 
start to take account of them in design and investment decisions? (We should 
anticipate different answers for front and side impact) 
 
11. What has been the burden to the industry in terms of modifications required 
for meeting the Regulations? 
 
12. What has been the cost for each production vehicle?  Identify direct and 
indirect costs. 
 
13. Does the company separately identify the cost of meeting the Regulations? 
When considering new investment is the cost of meeting the Regulations 
considered? 
 
Process 
 
14. What were the driving forces behind the introduction of the side and front 
impact Regulations? 
 
15. Why were the Regulations proposed at the time they were?  
 
16. Why were regulations introduced later in Europe than the USA? 
 
17. Were you, from the outset, supportive of front and side impact Regulations?  If 
so why; if not, why not? 
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 PROBE 
 
o Check difference in responses to side and front regulations 
o Did you want a lower barrier height in the side impact test?  If so, why? 
o Why was there such a debate on the impact speed, angle and overlap 
for the front impact Regulation?   
o Was there any merit in delaying the introduction of the Regulations? 
o Could the introduction of the Regulations have been 
managed/delivered differently? 
 
18. Through which channels did you make your views known?  
 
PROBE details of lobbying of:  
 
o Government 
o European Commission (which DG?) 
o European Parliament 
o Trade associations 
o Other manufacturers 
o Media 
o Other 
o Did manufacturers coordinate their response? 
o Were the Regulations modified to take account of the views of the car 
industry?  
 
PROBE 
 
o Were you able to change the original proposal? If yes, how? 
o What support did you receive?   
o Was your position supported by your government?  Why?/why not?  If 
yes, in what way did they support you? 
o What positions were taken by the different governments and car 
manufacturers? 
 
19. Now that the regulations are established, how supportive are you of the 
regulations? 
 
20. Do you think, given the current performance of cars in the consumer test, that 
it would be appropriate to raise the speed of the front  impact Regulations 
tests in line with EuroNCAP? 
 
EuroNCAP 
 
Impact  
 
21. How has EuroNCAP influenced design 
 
22. Have the levels of protection afforded to an occupant in an accident improved 
since the introduction of EuroNCAP? 
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 23. If so, are these improvements the result of EuroNCAP or other factors? 
 
PROBE 
 
o Would your vehicles have the same safety design features without 
EuroNCAP.  
 
o Would you have implemented the same level of protection to reduce 
injury risk without EuroNCAP.  If yes, why? 
 
24. Has EuroNCAP promoted a process of continuous improvement in 
crashworthiness performance? 
 
25. Do you feel that EuroNCAP has led you to optimise systems for specific 
impact scenarios?  
 
26. Has this optimisation disadvantaged any particular vehicle user group? 
(Women, children, elderly, people with disability) 
 
PROBE 
 
o Have vehicle modifications designed to meet the requirements of 
EuroNCAP resulted in vehicles that are less safe than they might 
otherwise be in other crash scenarios? 
 
o Have vehicle modifications, designed to meet the requirements of 
EuroNCAP, resulted in additional problems of compatibility? 
 
27. Have vehicle modifications designed to improve performance under 
EuroNCAP resulted in vehicles that are less / more pedestrian friendly? 
 
28. Has EuroNCAP modified consumer attitudes towards purchasing cars? 
 
29. How do you see the future of EuroNCAP as an approach for further 
improvements in car crashworthiness? 
 
Investment decisions and cost 
 
30. At what stage in the formulation/implementation of EuroNCAP did the 
company start to take account of it in design and investment decisions? 
 
31. What has been the burden in order to achieve good ratings in the EuroNCAP 
programme? 
 
 
32. Does the company separately identify the cost of meeting the requirements of 
EuroNCAP?  When considering new investment is the cost of meeting 
EuroNCAP considered? 
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 33. What has been the average cost to each typical production vehicle? (They 
may not breakdown costs to this level) 
 
Process 
 
34. What were the driving forces behind the introduction of EuroNCAP? 
 
35. Why was EuroNCAP proposed at the time it was? 
 
36. Were you opposed to EuroNCAP when it was first introduced?  If so, why?  
 
37. Through which channels did you make your views known? To whom and 
when? 
 
PROBE details of lobbying of:  
 
o Government 
o European Commission (which DG?). 
o European Parliament 
o Trade associations 
o Other manufacturers 
o Media 
o Other 
o Did manufacturers coordinate their response?  If so, how? 
o Was EuroNCAP modified to take account of the views of the car 
industry? 
 
PROBE 
 
o Were you able to change the original proposal? If yes, how? 
o What support did you receive?   
o Was your position supported by your Government?  Why?/why not?  If 
yes, in what way did they support you? 
o What positions were taken by the different Governments and car 
manufacturers? 
 
38. Now that EuroNCAP is established, how supportive are you of the 
Programme?  (probe turning point if appropriate) 
 
39. What was your reaction to the publication of named individual vehicle test 
results? 
 
40. Did you feel any pressure to perform well in the early EuroNCAP tests (over 
and above other consumer tests such as ADAC, AuS)? 
 
41. Do you use the EuroNCAP results in marketing?  Do you feel that a higher 
score is an advantage even if not directly used in marketing and why? 
 
42. Could the development/introduction of EuroNCAP have been 
managed/delivered differently? 
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43. How comfortable do you now feel with the way the EuroNCAP 
development process works? 
 
REGULATIONS VERSUS CONSUMER TESTING 
 
44. What is the driving force in car crashworthiness performance? 
 
45. Which approach (Regulation/EuroNCAP) has been the more effective? 
 
46. If EuroNCAP has been most effective, is there still a role for regulation and 
vice versa. 
 
47. What is your view of publications that rate one make and model against 
another using insurance and accident data? 
 
48. Do you feel that such rankings influence your investment into car crash 
worthiness? 
49. Do you get a more efficient and widespread deployment of safety benefit 
through regulation or consumer testing? 
 
UK INPUT 
 
50. Were there any governments in particular that took the lead in promoting 
the Regulations? 
 
51. Are there any governments in particular that take the lead in promoting 
EuroNCAP? 
 
52. What has been the role of the European Commission/European 
Parliament in promoting car crashworthiness/the Regulations/ EuroNCAP? 
 
53. How would you rate the UK DfT initiatives as being the driving force behind 
the development and implementation of the front and side impact 
Regulations when compared to (your own and) other European 
governments? 
 
54. How would you rate the UK DfT initiatives as being the driving force behind 
the development and implementation of the EuroNCAP programme when 
compared to (your own and) other European governments? 
 
55. In you opinion what has been the overall impact of the regulations and 
EuroNCAP programme? - Successes and Failures? 
 
Probe future and diversity of crash testing versus virtual testing if not already 
covered 
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 Vehicle Safety Standards – Improving Car Crashworthiness 
Policy Evaluation Programme 
 
 
Topic Guide for Research Groups 
 
 
 
The purpose of this interview is to establish the views of research 
groups about the introduction and influence of the front and side 
impact Regulations and EuroNCAP.   
 
 
START: 1) Introduce yourself and explain the purpose of the interview.  2) ask 
the interviewee to introduce themselves briefly, by giving their name, current 
role, how long they have been with the organisation and whether they were 
directly involved with the introduction of the Regulations and EuroNCAP and if 
so, in what capacity.  
 
 
THE REGULATIONS - Include questions referring to Any Standards and 
Regulations 
 
Impact 
 
1. Did  the levels of protection afforded to an occupant in an accident improve as 
a result of  the introduction of front and side impact Regulations? 
 
2. If so, are these improvements the result of the Regulations or other factors? 
 
PROBE 
 
o In your opinion would vehicles have had the same safety design 
features without the regulatory requirement? 
 
o In your opinion would Manufacturers have implemented the same level 
of protection to reduce injury risk without the front and side impact 
Regulations?  If yes, why? 
 
3. What are the additional benefits / disbenefits of whole vehicle testing versus 
component testing? 
 
4. Have the Regulations promoted a process of continuous improvement (?) in 
crashworthiness performance? 
 
5. Do you feel that either the front or side impact Regulations have led to 
optimisation of systems for specific impact scenarios? 
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 6. Has this optimisation disadvantaged any particular vehicle user group? 
(Women, children, elderly, people with disability)  Were they more (or less) 
disadvantaged than they would have been without the regulations? 
 
PROBE 
 
o Have vehicle modifications, designed to meet the requirements of the 
Regulations, resulted in vehicles that are less safe than they might 
otherwise be in other crash scenarios? 
o Have vehicle modifications, designed to meet the requirements of the 
Regulations, resulted in additional issues of compatibility? 
 
7. Have vehicle modifications designed to improve performance under the 
Regulations resulted in vehicles that are less/ more pedestrian friendly? 
 
8. Do you think, given the current performance of cars in the consumer test, that 
it would be appropriate to raise the speed of the front impact Regulation in line 
with EuroNCAP? 
 
Investment decisions and cost 
 
9. What was the anticipated burden to the industry in terms of modifications 
required for meeting the Regulations? 
 
10. Was industry’s timescale for investment decisions on improving the 
crashworthiness of cars taken into account when the Regulations were 
introduced? 
 
11. What was the envisaged average cost to the industry for each typical 
production vehicle?  
 
12. What was the research programme budget?  Whose budget?  
 
 
PROBE 
 
o If, how and why it changed over time. 
 
Process 
 
13. What were the driving forces behind the introduction of the side and front 
impact Regulations? 
 
14. Why were the Regulations proposed at the time they were? 
 
15. Why were regulations introduced in the US before Europe? 
 
16. Was there opposition from the industry to the front and side impact 
Regulations?  If so, to what and why? 
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 PROBE 
 
o Why did industry want a lower barrier height in the side impact test?   
o Why was there such a debate on the impact speed, angle and overlap 
for the front Regulation?   
o Was there any merit in delaying the introduction of the  
Regulations? 
o Could the introduction of the Regulations have been 
managed/delivered differently? 
 
17. How strong was the industry view / opposition? 
 
18. Through which channels did the car industry make its views known?  
 
19. Were the Regulations modified to take account of the views of industry?    
 
PROBE 
 
o How was industry able to change the original proposal? 
o What support did industry receive from their national governments?   
o What positions were taken by the different governments and car 
manufacturers? 
o In your view did the modifications made strengthen or weaken the level 
of protection given to occupants in an accident? 
 
EURONCAP 
 
Impact 
 
20. Have the levels of protection afforded to an occupant in an accident improved 
since the introduction of EuroNCAP? 
 
21. If so, are these improvements the result of EuroNCAP or other factors? 
 
PROBE 
 
 
o In your opinion would  manufacturers have implemented the same level 
of protection to reduce injury risk without EuroNCAP?  If yes, why? – 
not a research group question - delete 
 
o To what extent has EuroNCAP promoted a process of continuous 
improvement in crashworthiness performance? 
 
22. Do you feel that EuroNCAP has led industry to optimise systems for specific 
impact scenarios? 
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PROBE 
 
o Have vehicle modifications, designed to meet the requirements of the 
Regulations, resulted in vehicles that are less safe or safer than they 
might otherwise be in other crash scenarios? 
 
o Have vehicle modifications, designed to meet the requirements of the 
Regulations, resulted in additional problems of compatibility? 
 
23. Have vehicle modifications designed to improve performance under the 
Regulations resulted in vehicles that are less / more pedestrian friendly? 
 
24. Has EuroNCAP modified consumer attitudes towards purchasing cars? 
 
 
25. Do you feel that such rankings influence the industry’s attitude towards  car 
safety?  (Probe into possible crossover into primary safety) 
 
26. Do you feel that such rankings influence the industry's investment in design? 
 
27. How do you see the future of EuroNCAP as an approach for further 
improvements in car crashworthiness? 
 
28. Do you see a benefit in publications such as DfT’s ‘Choosing safety’? 
 
29. What is your view of publications that rate one make and model against 
another using insurance and accident data? (Is this what you mean by the 
above question?) 
 
 
Costs 
 
30. What has been the burden for industry to achieve good ratings in the 
EuroNCAP programme? 
 
 
Process 
 
31. What were the driving forces behind the introduction of EuroNCAP? 
 
32. Why was EuroNCAP proposed at the time it was? 
 
33. Why was EuroNCAP introduced later than its US counterpart? 
 
34. Was there opposition from the industry to EuroNCAP? If so, what strength of 
opposition and why? 
 
35. What positions were taken by the different governments and car 
manufacturers? 
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36. Through which channels did industry make its views known? To whom and 
when? 
 
37. Was EuroNCAP modified to meet industry’s concerns?  If so how? 
 
38. In your view, did the modifications strengthen or weaken the protection given 
to occupants in an accident? 
 
39. What was industry’s reaction to the publication of named individual vehicle 
test results? 
 
40. Did you think that industry was put under pressure to perform well in the early 
EuroNCAP tests (over and above other consumer tests such as ADAC, AuS)? 
 
41. Could the development/introduction of EuroNCAP have been 
managed/delivered differently? 
 
REGULATIONS VERSUS CONSUMER TESTING 
 
42. What is the driving force in car crashworthiness performance? 
 
43. Which approach (Regulation/EuroNCAP) has been the more effective? 
 
44. In your opinion if EuroNCAP has been most effective, is there still a role for 
regulation and vice versa?  What should the future role be?  Are they 
complimentary?   
 
 
45. Do you get a more efficient and widespread deployment of safety benefit 
through regulation or consumer testing? 
 
UK INPUT 
 
46. Were there any governments in particular that took the lead in promoting the 
Regulations? 
 
47. Are there any governments in particular that take the lead in promoting 
EuroNCAP? 
 
48. What has been the role of the European Commission/European Parliament in 
promoting car crashworthiness/the Regulations/ EuroNCAP? 
 
49. How would you rate the UK DfT initiatives / efforts as being the driving force 
behind the development and implementation of the front and side impact 
Regulations when compared to (your own and) other European 
Governments? 
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 50. How would you rate the UK DfT initiatives as being the driving force behind 
the development and implementation of the EuroNCAP programme when 
compared to (your own and) other European Governments? 
 
51. In you opinion what has been the overall impact of the regulations and 
EuroNCAP programme? - Successes and Failures? 
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